本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈　切入點：獎懲機制　出處：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在全面貫徹十八大和十八屆五中全會精神,貫徹推進(jìn)生態(tài)文明和綠色發(fā)展的決策部署,堅持五大發(fā)展理念,以加快轉(zhuǎn)變發(fā)展方式,促進(jìn)行業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級為主線的大環(huán)境下,我國重點強調(diào)生產(chǎn)制造業(yè)全面履行生產(chǎn)者延伸責(zé)任制,負(fù)責(zé)產(chǎn)品整個生命周期,特別是關(guān)于廢舊電子產(chǎn)品的回收再加工問題。因此,閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈管理成為規(guī)范廢舊電子產(chǎn)品回收再制造的重要途徑。本文運用動態(tài)博弈、靜態(tài)博弈、最優(yōu)化等方法對制造商分擔(dān)回收投資成本及獎懲機制作用這兩種規(guī)制方法下第三方負(fù)責(zé)回收的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的定價決策進(jìn)行研究。首先,建立了閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈集中式情形、分散式情形下無回收投資成本分擔(dān)情形、制造商分擔(dān)固定回收投資成本情形及制造商分擔(dān)單位回收成本情形。通過解析分析與解析解的比較得到以下主要結(jié)論:1、制造商擔(dān)負(fù)回收投資可以降低回購價及正向銷售價格,提高回收率,制造商、零售商的利潤均提升,當(dāng)制造商擔(dān)負(fù)比例較小時,回收商的利潤也會提高。2、制造商分擔(dān)單位回收成本僅對回購價起作用,對其它決策變量無任何作用。其次,為了使回收率達(dá)到集中式情形,本文又考慮了政府獎懲機制,分別建立了僅考慮獎懲機制模型、獎懲機制下制造商擔(dān)負(fù)回收投資模型,通過解析分析及解析解的比較得到以下主要結(jié)論:1、在引入政府獎懲機制后,能夠提高回購價,降低正向銷售價格,提高廢舊電器電子產(chǎn)品的回收率,且當(dāng)獎懲力度滿足一定條件時,回收率高于集中式情形。2、獎懲機制與制造商擔(dān)負(fù)回收投資成本聯(lián)合作用后,在適當(dāng)?shù)莫剳土Χ燃爸圃焐虛?dān)負(fù)比例下,該機制的作用效果優(yōu)于僅考慮獎懲機制或是僅考慮制造商擔(dān)負(fù)回收投資成本情形,并且此時的獎懲力度是僅考慮獎懲機制時回收率達(dá)到集中式水平時獎懲力度值的1/3即能達(dá)到集中式水平。最后,在上述模型基礎(chǔ)上考慮企業(yè)社會責(zé)任,通過對模型求解、解析解分析及數(shù)值仿真發(fā)現(xiàn):在供應(yīng)鏈各成員考慮企業(yè)社會責(zé)任后,有利于提高消費者對產(chǎn)品和企業(yè)的認(rèn)可度,增加市場需求量,提高廢舊電器電子產(chǎn)品的回收率,并且閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈各成員的利潤也得到提高。
[Abstract]:Under the general environment of comprehensively implementing the spirit of the Fifth Plenary session of the 18 and 18 CPC Central Committees, carrying out the decision-making arrangements for promoting ecological civilization and green development, adhering to the five development concepts, and taking speeding up the transformation of development mode and promoting the transformation and upgrading of the industry as the main line, Our emphasis is on the full implementation of the extended producer responsibility system in the manufacturing sector, which is responsible for the entire life cycle of the product, especially with regard to the recycling and reprocessing of used and end-of-life electronic products. Closed-loop supply chain management has become an important way to standardize the recycling and remanufacturing of used electronic products. Optimization and other methods are used to study the pricing decision of the closed-loop supply chain in which the third party is responsible for the recovery under the two regulation methods of the manufacturer sharing the cost of recovery investment and the role of reward and punishment mechanism. Firstly, the centralized situation of the closed-loop supply chain is established. In the case of decentralized investment without sharing the cost of the recovered investment, By comparing the analytic analysis with the analytic solution, the following main conclusions: 1. The manufacturer can reduce the repo price and the forward sales price by taking charge of the recovery investment, and by comparing the analytical analysis with the analytic solution, the manufacturer shares the fixed recovery investment cost and the unit recovery cost. With the increase of recovery rate, the profits of manufacturers and retailers are all increased. When the manufacturers bear a smaller proportion, the profits of recyclers will also increase by 0.2. The manufacturer's share of unit recovery costs will only play a role in the repo price. Secondly, in order to make the recovery rate reach the centralized situation, this paper also considers the government reward and punishment mechanism, establishes the model of only considering the reward and punishment mechanism, under the reward and punishment mechanism, the manufacturer takes charge of the recovery investment model. Through the comparison of analytical analysis and analytical solution, the following main conclusions are drawn: 1. After introducing the mechanism of government reward and punishment, the repo price can be raised, the positive sale price can be reduced, and the recovery rate of used electrical and electronic products can be increased. And when the rewards and punishments meet certain conditions, the recovery rate is higher than that of centralized cases. After the combination of reward and punishment mechanism and manufacturer bear the recovery of investment cost, under the appropriate reward and punishment strength and manufacturer burden ratio, The effect of this mechanism is better than that of only considering the reward and punishment mechanism or only considering that the manufacturer bears the cost of recovering the investment. And at this time, the reward and punishment strength is only 1/3 when the recovery rate reaches the centralized level when the reward and punishment mechanism is considered. Finally, on the basis of the above model, the corporate social responsibility is considered, and the model is solved by solving the model. The analytical solution analysis and numerical simulation show that after the members of the supply chain consider the corporate social responsibility, it is beneficial to improve the consumers' recognition of the products and enterprises, increase the market demand, and increase the recovery rate of the used electrical and electronic products. And the profit of each member of the closed-loop supply chain is also improved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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