本文選題：雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈　切入點(diǎn)：利潤最大化　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷發(fā)展,我國網(wǎng)購用戶數(shù)量不斷增長,網(wǎng)絡(luò)市場交易規(guī)模不斷擴(kuò)大。網(wǎng)購規(guī)模的快速增長吸引著越來越多的制造商在傳統(tǒng)零售渠道的基礎(chǔ)上開辟網(wǎng)上銷售渠道。網(wǎng)上銷售渠道和傳統(tǒng)零售渠道相比,具有十分明顯的優(yōu)勢:網(wǎng)上銷售對初始投資的要求較低,銷售不受時(shí)間和空間的限制,有助于企業(yè)減少庫存和積壓,從而使企業(yè)降低成本,增加盈利。因此,先進(jìn)入市場的制造商紛紛在傳統(tǒng)零售渠道的基礎(chǔ)上開辟網(wǎng)上銷售渠道,發(fā)展成為雙渠道制造商,制造商、零售商和消費(fèi)者之間形成了完整的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈,而后進(jìn)入市場的制造商在資金和管理能力有限的情況下,更傾向于通過網(wǎng)上銷售渠道進(jìn)入市場銷售產(chǎn)品。國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)中不乏有關(guān)雙渠道沖突與協(xié)調(diào)的論述,雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈主要有分散決策和集中決策兩種決策方式,分散決策是指制造商和零售商分別出于最大化自身利潤的目的進(jìn)行定價(jià)決策,集中決策是指制造商和零售商出于最大化共同利潤的目的進(jìn)行定價(jià)決策。然而不論采用何種決策方式,新制造商的進(jìn)入必然對先進(jìn)入市場的雙渠道制造商形成沖擊,因此,雙渠道制造商為了保證實(shí)現(xiàn)自身利潤的最大化,必然會(huì)重新調(diào)整定價(jià)策略。本文探討的就是雙渠道制造商在應(yīng)對新制造商進(jìn)入后的定價(jià)策略問題。通過區(qū)分集中決策和分散決策兩種決策方式,以及新制造商進(jìn)入前后兩個(gè)階段,分別構(gòu)建模型和進(jìn)行數(shù)值算例模擬,分析后進(jìn)入市場的制造商是如何影響雙渠道制造商和零售商的定價(jià)、需求和利潤的,以及各參數(shù)變化對雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈和新制造商的定價(jià)、需求和利潤會(huì)產(chǎn)生什么影響。通過本文的研究發(fā)現(xiàn):在新制造商進(jìn)入市場之前,和集中決策相比,分散決策對雙渠道制造商和零售商更有利。不論分散決策還是集中決策,制造商和零售商的市場需求、定價(jià)決策以及利潤水平都是由市場的潛在需求總量,消費(fèi)需求對產(chǎn)品價(jià)格的敏感程度,需求對渠道價(jià)格差異的轉(zhuǎn)移程度以及生產(chǎn)成品等客觀條件決定的。新制造商進(jìn)入市場后,分散決策對新制造商更有利,而集中決策對雙渠道制造商和零售商更有利。新制造商進(jìn)入市場后,雙渠道制造商的最優(yōu)定價(jià)策略是小幅提高網(wǎng)上銷售渠道的價(jià)格和批發(fā)價(jià)格,這是因?yàn)殡p渠道制造商作為先行者掌握了更多的市場份額,可以通過小幅提高價(jià)格的方式來彌補(bǔ)因新制造商進(jìn)入導(dǎo)致其市場需求下降而造成的利潤損失。不論分散決策還是集中決策,對于后進(jìn)制造商、雙渠道制造商和零售商而言,各自的定價(jià)策略,需求以及利潤除了由新制造商進(jìn)入前的參數(shù)決定之外,還增加了需求對產(chǎn)品2價(jià)格的敏感程度,相同渠道下需求對不同產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格差異的轉(zhuǎn)移程度,產(chǎn)品和渠道都不相同時(shí)價(jià)格差異對需求的轉(zhuǎn)移程度以及產(chǎn)品2的生產(chǎn)成本這些參數(shù)的影響。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of the network economy, the number of online shopping users in China is increasing. The rapid growth of online shopping has attracted more and more manufacturers to open up online sales channels based on traditional retail channels. There is a very obvious advantage: online sales of the initial investment requirements are low, sales are not subject to time and space constraints, help enterprises reduce inventory and backlog, thereby enabling enterprises to reduce costs and increase profitability. One after another, manufacturers entering the market have opened up online sales channels on the basis of traditional retail channels, and developed into a complete dual-channel supply chain between manufacturers, manufacturers, retailers and consumers. Then the manufacturers who enter the market are more inclined to enter the market through the online marketing channels under the condition of limited capital and management ability. There is no lack of discussion on the conflict and coordination of the two channels in the literature at home and abroad. The dual channel supply chain has two kinds of decision-making modes: decentralized decision and centralized decision. Decentralized decision means manufacturer and retailer make pricing decision to maximize their own profit respectively. Centralized decision-making means that manufacturers and retailers make pricing decisions for the purpose of maximizing their common profits. However, no matter what kind of decision is taken, the entry of new manufacturers will inevitably impact the manufacturers who enter the market first, so, In order to maximize their profits, the dual-channel manufacturers, It is inevitable to readjust the pricing strategy. This paper discusses the pricing strategy of the dual-channel manufacturer in response to the entry of the new manufacturer. After the new manufacturer enters the two stages, the model is built and the numerical example is simulated, and how the manufacturer entering the market influences the pricing, demand and profit of the manufacturer and retailer, and then analyzes how the new manufacturer enters the market and how to influence the pricing, demand and profit of the manufacturer and retailer. And what effect each parameter change will have on the pricing, demand and profit of the dual-channel supply chain and the new manufacturer. Through the research of this paper, we find that before the new manufacturer enters the market, it is compared with the centralized decision. Decentralized decisions are more beneficial to manufacturers and retailers with dual channels. Whether decentralized or centralized, market demand, pricing decisions and profit levels of manufacturers and retailers are all determined by the total potential demand in the market. The sensitivity of consumer demand to product price, the degree of shift of demand to channel price difference, and the objective conditions of producing finished product, etc. When the new manufacturer enters the market, the decentralized decision is more advantageous to the new manufacturer. When the new manufacturer enters the market, the optimal pricing strategy of the dual-channel manufacturer is to increase the price of the online sales channel and wholesale price slightly. This is because the dual-channel manufacturers have gained more market share as pioneers. You can compensate for the loss of profits caused by the entry of new manufacturers to their market by slightly increasing their prices. For lower-tier manufacturers, dual-channel manufacturers and retailers, whether decentralized or centralized, Their pricing strategies, demand and profits are determined by the parameters of the new manufacturer before entering, and they also increase the sensitivity of demand to the price of product 2, and the degree of transfer of demand to the price difference of different products under the same channel. The influence of price difference on the degree of demand transfer and the production cost of product 2 when the product and channel are different.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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