本文關(guān)鍵詞： 競爭 產(chǎn)品商譽 促銷努力 微分博弈 成本分擔(dān)契約　出處：《控制與決策》2017年12期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：將產(chǎn)品商譽作為狀態(tài)變量,借助微分博弈研究由單個制造商和兩個競爭性零售商組成的供應(yīng)鏈縱向聯(lián)合促銷問題.在產(chǎn)品需求受商譽和零售商促銷努力的共同影響下,分別構(gòu)建集中式和分散式微分博弈模型,引入成本分擔(dān)契約對供應(yīng)鏈進行協(xié)調(diào),并通過算例對相關(guān)參數(shù)進行靈敏度分析.研究表明:成本分擔(dān)契約的引入可提高零售商促銷努力水平、產(chǎn)品商譽以及需求量,實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào);隨著零售商競爭程度以及促銷努力成本系數(shù)的增加,引入契約后供應(yīng)鏈成員的利潤增加值呈下降趨勢;相反,隨著零售商促銷努力以及產(chǎn)品商譽對需求影響程度的增加,供應(yīng)鏈成員的利潤增加值呈上升趨勢.
[Abstract]:Taking the product goodwill as the state variable, this paper studies the vertical joint promotion problem of the supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and two competitive retailers by means of differential game. Under the influence of the goodwill and the retailer's promotion efforts, the product demand is affected together. The centralized and decentralized differential game models are constructed, and the cost sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the supply chain. The research shows that the introduction of cost sharing contract can improve the level of retailers' promotion efforts, product goodwill and demand, and achieve supply chain coordination; With the increase of retailers' competition and the cost coefficient of promotional efforts, the profit increase of supply chain members shows a downward trend after the introduction of contracts; on the contrary, with the increase of retailers' promotion efforts and the impact of product goodwill on demand, The profit increase of supply chain members is on the rise.
【作者單位】： 北京科技大學(xué)東凌經(jīng)濟管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金項目(71172169)
【分類號】：F224.32;F274
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本文編號：1515502