本文關(guān)鍵詞： 再制造 產(chǎn)品保證 定價(jià)策略 斯坦伯格（Stackelberg）博弈　出處：《杭州電子科技大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：傳統(tǒng)制造方式片面地追求經(jīng)濟(jì)效益，卻忽略了環(huán)境的污染、破壞和資源浪費(fèi)等問(wèn)題。隨著消費(fèi)者逐漸增強(qiáng)的環(huán)保意識(shí)、政府各項(xiàng)環(huán)保政策的紛紛出臺(tái)以及再制造行業(yè)商機(jī)的不斷挖掘，越來(lái)越多的學(xué)術(shù)界與企業(yè)界開(kāi)始研究或開(kāi)展再制造活動(dòng)。 以往關(guān)于再制造供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)策略的研究，主要集中在討論回收再制造模式、再制造產(chǎn)品和新產(chǎn)品之間的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、消費(fèi)者的再制造產(chǎn)品偏好度等問(wèn)題，忽略了產(chǎn)品保證因素，消費(fèi)者對(duì)再制造產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量和性能的顧慮等因素要求再制造商或其他保證方提供給消費(fèi)者再制造產(chǎn)品保證，有力的產(chǎn)品保證有時(shí)比價(jià)格更能左右消費(fèi)者的選擇。本文在對(duì)產(chǎn)品保證、再制造和再制造產(chǎn)品的產(chǎn)品保證等相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行綜述研究的基礎(chǔ)上，針對(duì)以往研究存在的不足，對(duì)以下問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究： （1）確定再制造產(chǎn)品和新產(chǎn)品共存的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)為雙寡頭壟斷競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)，通過(guò)建立斯坦伯格（Stackelberg）博弈模型，引入再制造產(chǎn)品保證因素，結(jié)合廢舊產(chǎn)品回收、再制造過(guò)程和產(chǎn)品保證投入等因素，，研究閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈成員的最優(yōu)決策和最優(yōu)利潤(rùn)。 （2）從理論推導(dǎo)和數(shù)值分析的角度，逐步研究廢舊產(chǎn)品回收規(guī)模、再制造成本節(jié)約、產(chǎn)品保證投資規(guī)模、產(chǎn)品保證競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈程度和產(chǎn)品價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈程度等參數(shù)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈成員最優(yōu)決策以及最優(yōu)利潤(rùn)的影響。同時(shí)，考慮到再制造的成本節(jié)約優(yōu)勢(shì)，以再制造成本節(jié)約為媒介，比較零售商新產(chǎn)品和再制造產(chǎn)品的最優(yōu)零售價(jià)格、制造商和再制造商各自為產(chǎn)品提供的最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品保證水平?jīng)Q策和供應(yīng)鏈成員的最優(yōu)利潤(rùn)。 （3）通過(guò)理論推導(dǎo)和數(shù)值分析，本文從提高消費(fèi)者效用、獲取更多利潤(rùn)角度出發(fā)，為再制造商做出再制造過(guò)程成本節(jié)約、產(chǎn)品保證/產(chǎn)品回收投資規(guī)模和再制造領(lǐng)域進(jìn)入等方面的策略建議。本文不僅為供應(yīng)鏈成員帶來(lái)有意義的結(jié)論，而且為再制造領(lǐng)域現(xiàn)有企業(yè)和即將進(jìn)入再制造領(lǐng)域的企業(yè)提供理論指導(dǎo)和分析建議，推動(dòng)再制造產(chǎn)業(yè)在我國(guó)的建立和發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:The traditional manufacturing mode pursues economic benefits one-sidedly, but ignores the problems of environmental pollution, destruction and waste of resources, etc. With the increasing awareness of environmental protection by consumers. With the introduction of environmental protection policies and the continuous exploitation of business opportunities in the remanufacturing industry, more and more academic and business circles begin to study or carry out remanufacturing activities. Previous studies on remanufacturing supply chain pricing strategies focused on the issues of recycling and remanufacturing models, price competition between remanufactured products and new products, consumer preferences for remanufacturing products, and so on. Ignoring the product guarantee factors, consumer concerns about the quality and performance of the remanufactured product require the re-manufacturer or other guarantors to provide the remanufactured product guarantee to the consumer. The powerful product guarantee sometimes can influence the consumer's choice more than the price. This article carries on the summary research to the product guarantee, the product guarantee of the remanufacture and the remanufacture product and so on. In view of the shortcomings of previous studies, the following problems are studied: 1) the market structure of remanufactured products and new products is determined as duopoly competitive market structure, and Stackelberg game model is established by establishing Stackelberg model. The optimal decision and profit of the members of the closed-loop supply chain are studied by introducing the factors of remanufacturing product guarantee, combined with the factors of recycling of waste products, remanufacturing process and product guarantee input, etc. From the angle of theoretical derivation and numerical analysis, the scale of recycling of waste products is studied step by step, the cost of remanufacturing is saved, and the investment scale of products is guaranteed. The influence of product guarantee competition and product price competition on the optimal decision and profit of supply chain members. At the same time, the cost saving advantage of remanufacturing is considered. The optimal retail prices of new products and remanufactured products are compared by using remanufacturing cost savings as a medium. The optimal product assurance level decision and the optimal profit of supply chain member provided by manufacturer and re-manufacturer respectively. Through theoretical derivation and numerical analysis, this paper starts from the perspective of improving consumer utility and obtaining more profits, and makes cost savings for remanufacturing process. This paper not only brings a meaningful conclusion to the supply chain members, but also provides some strategic suggestions on the investment scale of product guarantee / product recovery and the entry into the field of remanufacturing. It also provides theoretical guidance and analysis suggestions for the existing enterprises in the field of remanufacturing and the enterprises about to enter the field of remanufacturing to promote the establishment and development of the remanufacturing industry in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：杭州電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F424

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