本文關(guān)鍵詞： 供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) 強(qiáng)勢(shì)零售商 有限理性 公平偏好 壓價(jià)　出處：《上海交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：協(xié)調(diào)是供應(yīng)鏈管理問(wèn)題的核心。為了消除雙重邊際化效應(yīng)，學(xué)者們提出各種有效的機(jī)制，其中價(jià)格協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制是研究熱點(diǎn)之一。然而，傳統(tǒng)的供應(yīng)鏈價(jià)格協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題都基于完全理性的假設(shè)，越來(lái)越多的實(shí)驗(yàn)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)決策者是有限理性的，具有公平偏好。近幾年學(xué)者們紛紛在有限理性的假設(shè)下構(gòu)建模型，重新審視供應(yīng)鏈價(jià)格協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制的適用性。 隨著零售業(yè)的快速發(fā)展，供應(yīng)鏈主導(dǎo)力量逐漸由供應(yīng)商轉(zhuǎn)移至零售商。有調(diào)研報(bào)告顯示，近80%的受訪供應(yīng)商企業(yè)在與零售商談判時(shí)曾遭遇被強(qiáng)行壓低價(jià)格的行為。針對(duì)中國(guó)零售業(yè)中由零售商壓價(jià)行為引起的零供矛盾，，本研究提出了行之有效的解決方案，幫助供應(yīng)商在弱勢(shì)環(huán)境中保全自身利潤(rùn)，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈價(jià)格協(xié)調(diào)和公平交易。 首先，本文提出同時(shí)受到產(chǎn)品零售價(jià)格和零售商市場(chǎng)投入影響的需求函數(shù)，分析有限理性下的價(jià)格策略對(duì)零售商市場(chǎng)投入的影響，為零售商提供管理決策建議。這是以往有限理性相關(guān)研究所沒(méi)有涉及的。 其次，從完全理性/有限理性，有壓價(jià)/無(wú)壓價(jià)的兩個(gè)維度構(gòu)建四個(gè)分散式供應(yīng)鏈模型，分析零售商的壓價(jià)行為和制造商的有限理性對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)決策和績(jī)效的影響。 最后，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)制造商的公平偏好可以提升（損害）品牌商譽(yù)，減輕（加劇）雙重邊際化效應(yīng)，但無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈價(jià)格協(xié)調(diào)；而零售商的壓價(jià)行為在一定條件下可以提升品牌商譽(yù)，并通過(guò)旁支付的手段實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)；兩個(gè)因素的共同作用能夠提升品牌商譽(yù)，消除雙重邊際化效應(yīng)，提出有效的利潤(rùn)分配方案以實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)和公平交易。 因此，在完全理性和有限理性的假設(shè)下，零售商的壓價(jià)行為都是一種有效的供應(yīng)鏈價(jià)格協(xié)調(diào)手段。
[Abstract]:Coordination is the core of supply chain management. In order to eliminate the double marginalization effect, scholars put forward a variety of effective mechanisms, among which price coordination mechanism is one of the hot topics. The traditional supply chain price coordination problem is based on the assumption of complete rationality, more and more experimental research found that the decision-makers are limited rationality. In recent years, scholars have constructed models under the assumption of limited rationality to re-examine the applicability of supply chain price coordination mechanism. With the rapid development of retailing, the leading power of supply chain is gradually transferred from supplier to retailer. Nearly 80% of the supplier companies interviewed have been forced to hold down prices in negotiations with retailers. In this study, an effective solution is proposed to help suppliers preserve their profits in a weak environment, so as to achieve price coordination and fair trade in the supply chain. First of all, this paper proposes a demand function which is influenced by both the retail price of products and the input of the retailer market, and analyzes the influence of the price strategy under the limited rationality on the input of the retailer market. Provide management advice to retailers. This is not involved in previous research on limited rationality. Secondly, four decentralized supply chain models are constructed from two dimensions of complete rationality / limited rationality and two dimensions of low price and no pressure price. This paper analyzes the influence of retailer's price reduction behavior and manufacturer's limited rationality on the optimal decision and performance of supply chain. Finally, it is found that the manufacturer's fair preference can enhance (damage) brand goodwill, alleviate (aggravate) the double marginalization effect, but can not achieve price coordination in supply chain. Under certain conditions, the retailer's price reduction behavior can improve the brand goodwill and achieve supply chain coordination through the means of side payment. The combined action of the two factors can enhance the brand goodwill, eliminate the double marginalization effect, and put forward an effective profit distribution scheme to achieve supply chain coordination and fair trade. Therefore, under the assumption of complete rationality and limited rationality, retailers' price reduction is an effective means of price coordination in supply chain.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前7條

1 李訓(xùn);曹國(guó)華;;基于公平偏好理論的激勵(lì)機(jī)制研究[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2008年02期

2 韓敬穩(wěn);趙道致;;零售商主導(dǎo)型供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效的行為博弈分析[J];管理科學(xué);2012年02期

3 杜少甫;杜嬋;梁j;劉天卓;;考慮公平關(guān)切的供應(yīng)鏈契約與協(xié)調(diào)[J];管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2010年11期

4 黃松;楊超;劉慧;;指數(shù)需求下考慮絕對(duì)公平關(guān)切的供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)模型[J];計(jì)算機(jī)集成制造系統(tǒng);2013年04期

5 杜少甫;朱賈昂;高冬;杜嬋;;Nash討價(jià)還價(jià)公平參考下的供應(yīng)鏈優(yōu)化決策[J];管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2013年03期

6 丁川;王開弘;冉戎;;基于公平偏好的營(yíng)銷渠道合作機(jī)制研究[J];管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2013年08期

7 畢功兵;瞿安民;梁j;;不公平厭惡下供應(yīng)鏈的批發(fā)價(jià)格契約與協(xié)調(diào)[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐;2013年01期

本文編號(hào)：1473819