本文關(guān)鍵詞： 批發(fā)價格 委托代理 質(zhì)量成本 道德風(fēng)險 產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)　出處：《青島大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理,就是以組成供應(yīng)鏈的各成員伙伴內(nèi)部質(zhì)量管理為基礎(chǔ),從宏觀的角度考慮實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈上成員伙伴之間質(zhì)量職能和質(zhì)量活動的協(xié)調(diào)、整合和優(yōu)化�；诋a(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的合同設(shè)計是供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理的實施方法和途徑,供應(yīng)商和購買商之間簽訂的產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量懲罰合同和產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量擔(dān)保合同就是其中一種。而且根據(jù)合同依據(jù)的項目不同又可分為基于供應(yīng)鏈內(nèi)部故障和基于供應(yīng)鏈外部故障的供應(yīng)鏈合同。其中,內(nèi)部故障為購買商對供應(yīng)商所提供的中間產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行入廠檢驗時檢測出不合格的產(chǎn)品,外部故障則是不合格的中間產(chǎn)品在入廠檢驗過程中未檢測出,從而賣給消費者后出現(xiàn)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量問題。核心企業(yè)需要通過合同管理,來約束供應(yīng)鏈上各成員的行動,減少機(jī)會主義,提高其合作積極性和質(zhì)量管理的效率。 本文在總結(jié)了國內(nèi)外關(guān)于供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理的研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,研究了由一個風(fēng)險中性的供應(yīng)商和一個風(fēng)險中性的購買商所組成的二級供應(yīng)鏈中,在考慮產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量失誤的情況下的質(zhì)量合同設(shè)計問題,主要研究內(nèi)容如下： (1)不考慮二次加工情況下的供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量成本分擔(dān)合同研究。建立了以批發(fā)價格為契約的二級供應(yīng)鏈模型,運(yùn)用委托代理方法,以信息對稱條件下的供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)解為基礎(chǔ),分別求解了在三種信息不對稱情況下的最優(yōu)內(nèi)、外部損失成本分?jǐn)傁禂?shù),設(shè)計出最優(yōu)的質(zhì)量成本分擔(dān)合同,并進(jìn)行了算例分析。 (2)二次加工情況下產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)獨立的質(zhì)量成本分擔(dān)合同研究�？紤]了購買商在進(jìn)行簡單二次加工情況下的最優(yōu)質(zhì)量合同設(shè)計,以信息對稱條件下的供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)解為基礎(chǔ),求解了產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)獨立時存在單邊道德風(fēng)險情況下的最優(yōu)內(nèi)、外部損失成本分?jǐn)傁禂?shù)。 (3)二次加工情況下產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)的質(zhì)量成本分擔(dān)合同研究。探討了當(dāng)購買商對所購中間產(chǎn)品、零部件進(jìn)行二次加工,且二次加工過程中會影響中間產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量時的最優(yōu)質(zhì)量合同設(shè)計問題,在上述研究的基礎(chǔ)上,建立了產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)情況下的收益模型,從而分析得出單邊道德風(fēng)險條件下的最優(yōu)內(nèi)、外部損失成本分?jǐn)傁禂?shù),并進(jìn)行了討論分析。分析得出當(dāng)供應(yīng)商存在單邊道德風(fēng)險問題時,在購買商進(jìn)行二次加工情況下,產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)與否并不影響供應(yīng)商所承擔(dān)的內(nèi)部損失成本。當(dāng)購買商存在單邊道德風(fēng)險問題時,當(dāng)發(fā)生內(nèi)部損失的情況下,二次加工與否、產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)與否都不影響供應(yīng)商所承擔(dān)的內(nèi)部損失成本；而當(dāng)發(fā)生外部故障時,產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)獨立時與不進(jìn)行二次加工時的外部成本分擔(dān)系數(shù)是一致的,產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)的相關(guān)時,供應(yīng)商將不會承擔(dān)任何外部損失成本。
[Abstract]:Supply chain quality management is based on the internal quality management of the members of the supply chain, from the macro point of view to achieve the coordination of quality functions and quality activities among the member partners in the supply chain. Integration and optimization. Contract design based on product quality is the implementation method and approach of supply chain quality management. The product quality penalty contract and the product quality guarantee contract signed between supplier and buyer are one of them. And according to the project on which the contract is based, it can be divided into internal failure of supply chain and external supply chain. Breakdown of supply chain contracts. The internal fault is that the buyer detects the unqualified product when the intermediate product supplied by the supplier is inspected, while the external fault is that the unqualified intermediate product is not detected in the process of entering the factory. The core enterprises need contract management to restrain the actions of the members in the supply chain, reduce opportunism, and improve their cooperation enthusiasm and quality management efficiency. On the basis of summarizing the research results of supply chain quality management at home and abroad, this paper studies the secondary supply chain which is composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-neutral purchaser. The main contents of the research on the design of quality contract are as follows: 1) Research on supply chain quality cost sharing contract without considering secondary processing. A two-level supply chain model with wholesale price as contract is established, and principal-agent method is used. Based on the optimal solution of the supply chain under the condition of information symmetry, the optimal internal and external loss cost sharing coefficients under three kinds of information asymmetry conditions are solved, and the optimal quality cost sharing contract is designed. An example is given. 2) Research on the independent quality cost sharing contract of product structure under secondary processing. The optimal quality contract design of the buyer is considered in the case of simple secondary processing. Based on the optimal solution of the supply chain under the condition of information symmetry, the optimal internal and external loss cost allocation coefficient in the case of unilateral moral hazard when the product structure is independent is solved. Research on the contract of quality cost sharing related to the product structure under the condition of secondary processing. This paper discusses the secondary processing of the parts and components for the intermediate products purchased by the purchaser. The optimal quality contract design problem in the process of secondary processing will affect the quality of intermediate products. On the basis of the above research, a profit model is established in the case of product structure correlation. Thus, the optimal internal and external loss cost allocation coefficient under unilateral moral hazard is obtained, and discussed and analyzed. The analysis shows that when the supplier has unilateral moral hazard problem. In the case of secondary processing, whether the product structure is related or not does not affect the cost of internal loss borne by the supplier. When the buyer has unilateral moral hazard, when there is internal loss. Whether the secondary processing or not, whether the product structure is relevant or not does not affect the internal loss cost borne by the supplier; When the external failure occurs, the external cost sharing coefficient is the same when the product structure is independent and the external cost sharing coefficient is the same when the product structure is not secondary processing. When the product structure is related, the supplier will not bear any external loss cost.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F273.2

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