Bertrand模型與超模博弈
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-12-12 03:14
【摘要】:將近年來(lái)博弈論中出現(xiàn)的一種新的研究方法——超模博弈理論應(yīng)用于Bertrand寡頭博弈中,對(duì)于具有一般成本函數(shù)的差異產(chǎn)品的Bertrand寡頭博弈,當(dāng)企業(yè)的策略只是選擇價(jià)格水平時(shí),比較了博弈為超模和對(duì)數(shù)超模博弈的充分條件,表明雖然一個(gè)對(duì)數(shù)超模博弈一定是擬超模的,因而較超模博弈的適用范圍更廣泛,但二者的充分條件之間不具備可比性,即不能由其中一個(gè)推出另外一個(gè)。同時(shí)既使該博弈既不是超模的也不是對(duì)數(shù)超模的,仍可能存在對(duì)利潤(rùn)函數(shù)的其它單調(diào)轉(zhuǎn)換使博弈成為超模的。當(dāng)邊際生產(chǎn)成本為常數(shù)時(shí),給出了具體的反例。當(dāng)企業(yè)的策略為同時(shí)選擇價(jià)格和廣告水平,且企業(yè)的邊際生產(chǎn)成本為常數(shù)時(shí),表明在一般的假設(shè)下博弈為超模博弈,從而說(shuō)明了為什么通常情況下較高的廣告水平對(duì)應(yīng)著較高的價(jià)格。
[Abstract]:The supermodel game theory, a new research method in game theory in recent years, is applied to the Bertrand oligopoly game. For the Bertrand oligopoly game with different products with general cost function, when the firm's strategy is only to choose the price level, The sufficient conditions for the game to be supermodule and logarithmic supermodule are compared. It is shown that although a logarithmic supermodule game must be quasi-supermodule, so it has a wider range of application than supermodel game, but the sufficient conditions between them are not comparable. That is, one cannot launch the other. At the same time, even if the game is neither hypermodule nor logarithmic supermodule, there may be other monotonic transformations of the profit function that make the game supermodule. When the marginal production cost is constant, a concrete counterexample is given. When the strategy of the enterprise is to select both the price and the advertising level, and the marginal production cost of the enterprise is constant, it is shown that the game is supermodel game under the general assumption. This explains why higher advertising levels usually correspond to higher prices.
【作者單位】: 華中科技大學(xué)控制科學(xué)與工程系;
【基金】:國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(60674083)
【分類號(hào)】:C931
,
本文編號(hào):2373794
[Abstract]:The supermodel game theory, a new research method in game theory in recent years, is applied to the Bertrand oligopoly game. For the Bertrand oligopoly game with different products with general cost function, when the firm's strategy is only to choose the price level, The sufficient conditions for the game to be supermodule and logarithmic supermodule are compared. It is shown that although a logarithmic supermodule game must be quasi-supermodule, so it has a wider range of application than supermodel game, but the sufficient conditions between them are not comparable. That is, one cannot launch the other. At the same time, even if the game is neither hypermodule nor logarithmic supermodule, there may be other monotonic transformations of the profit function that make the game supermodule. When the marginal production cost is constant, a concrete counterexample is given. When the strategy of the enterprise is to select both the price and the advertising level, and the marginal production cost of the enterprise is constant, it is shown that the game is supermodel game under the general assumption. This explains why higher advertising levels usually correspond to higher prices.
【作者單位】: 華中科技大學(xué)控制科學(xué)與工程系;
【基金】:國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(60674083)
【分類號(hào)】:C931
,
本文編號(hào):2373794
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