【摘要】：設(shè)計(jì)了交通BOO(build,own and operate)項(xiàng)目的競(jìng)標(biāo)機(jī)制來(lái)提高項(xiàng)目拍賣者對(duì)特許經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的配置效率.運(yùn)用激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)思想建立了競(jìng)標(biāo)機(jī)制模型,在保證競(jìng)標(biāo)企業(yè)參與投標(biāo)和真實(shí)顯示自己的經(jīng)營(yíng)能力的條件下最大化期望社會(huì)福利,通過(guò)求解此模型得到了最優(yōu)的競(jìng)標(biāo)機(jī)制;鑒于最優(yōu)機(jī)制在形式上的復(fù)雜性,給出了得分規(guī)則拍賣和供應(yīng)契約拍賣兩種最優(yōu)拍賣方式.
[Abstract]:This paper designs the bidding mechanism of traffic BOO (build,own and operate) project) to improve the allocation efficiency of project auctioneers to franchise. The competitive bidding mechanism model is established by using the incentive mechanism design idea, which maximizes the expected social welfare under the condition of ensuring the bidding participation of the bidding enterprises and showing their management ability. The optimal bidding mechanism is obtained by solving this model. In view of the complexity of the optimal mechanism in form, two optimal auction methods are given: the auction of score rule and the auction of supply contract.
【作者單位】： 湖北經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院統(tǒng)計(jì)與應(yīng)用數(shù)學(xué)系;武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;武漢大學(xué)數(shù)學(xué)與統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(60574071,78771078,70471034)
【分類號(hào)】：C931
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本文編號(hào)：2239977