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  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 綜合項目交付 激勵池 構(gòu)建過程 分配決策　出處：《天津大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：綜合項目交付模式(Integrated Project Delivery,IPD)是近年來工程建設(shè)行業(yè)的一種新興交付模式。該模式通過有效的結(jié)合建筑信息模型技術(shù),借助于工程項目各參與方的早期介入、相互信任、共同決策、風險共擔、利益共享等相關(guān)機制來提高工程項目從立項、設(shè)計到施工的全生命周期的績效,進而全方位、立體化的達到工程項目管理過程的目標。在IPD項目交付模式的實施過程中,如何有效地解決各參與方對項目風險的分擔以及對共享收益的分配問題一直是阻礙該模式廣泛應(yīng)用的最大瓶頸,也是IPD交付模式能否在建設(shè)工程項目中順利實施的關(guān)鍵所在。激勵池制度的應(yīng)用,很好地解決了這樣的問題。但是,在IPD項目激勵池的建立中,如何量化激勵池的規(guī)模大小以及各參與方按照何種比例來分配激勵池中的共享收益一直是IPD項目實施過程中爭論的焦點。本文通過一系列的數(shù)學模型以及最優(yōu)化求解,從定量化的角度給予了IPD項目激勵池建立以及分配的合理決策方式。結(jié)合最大熵理論,將項目伊始有限的已知條件結(jié)合進去,得到IPD項目各參與方效用值與激勵池規(guī)模的大小的函數(shù)關(guān)系,從而為應(yīng)用累積前景理論求解項目激勵池的最佳大小奠定了基礎(chǔ)。接下來,本文應(yīng)用不對稱Nash協(xié)商模型,通過最大化各方效用值得到IPD項目各參與方在激勵池中應(yīng)該分得的比例的均衡解。最后,通過對實際算例的分析,給出了上述方法的實際應(yīng)用過程,并根據(jù)得到的IPD項目激勵池規(guī)模以及各參與方分配比例的結(jié)果進行討論,給出應(yīng)用IPD項目交付模式的合理化建議。本文的理論與現(xiàn)實意義主要在于對IPD項目交付模式風險分擔與利益分配的過程給出了具體的可視化方法,不論是對于政府監(jiān)管部門、業(yè)主、承包商以及第三方單位都給出了其自身在IPD項目交付模式中承擔的風險系數(shù)以及利潤分配比例,對工程實踐過程中IPD交付模式合同的簽訂以及共同決策的順利開展給出了定量化的依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Integrated Project delivery model (IPD) is a new delivery mode in the engineering construction industry in recent years. This model is based on the effective combination of building information model technology, the early involvement of the participants in the project, mutual trust and common decision-making. Risk sharing, benefit-sharing and other related mechanisms to improve the project from the project, design to the construction of the entire life cycle performance, and then all-round, Achieve the objectives of the engineering project management process. In the implementation of the IPD project delivery model, How to effectively solve the problem of risk sharing among participants and the allocation of shared benefits has been the biggest bottleneck that hinders the wide application of the model. It is also the key to the successful implementation of IPD delivery mode in construction projects. The application of incentive pool system solves this problem very well. However, in the establishment of IPD project incentive pool, How to quantify the size of the incentive pool and what proportion of participants to allocate the shared income in the incentive pool has always been the focus of controversy in the implementation of the IPD project. This paper is based on a series of mathematical models and optimization solution. From the point of view of quantification, this paper gives a reasonable decision way for the establishment and allocation of IPD project incentive pool, and combines with the maximum entropy theory to combine the known conditions which are limited at the beginning of the project. The functional relationship between the utility value of each participant of IPD project and the size of the incentive pool is obtained, which lays a foundation for solving the optimal size of the incentive pool by applying the cumulative foreground theory. Then, the asymmetric Nash negotiation model is applied in this paper. By maximizing the utility of all parties, it is worth getting the equilibrium solution of the proportion that each participant in the IPD project should get in the incentive pool. Finally, through the analysis of practical examples, the practical application process of the above method is given. Based on the results of the scale of the incentive pool and the proportion of participants in the IPD project, The theoretical and practical significance of this paper is mainly to give a concrete visualization method for the process of risk sharing and benefit distribution in IPD project delivery mode, regardless of whether it is for the government supervision department. The owner, contractor and third party give their own risk factor and profit distribution ratio in the IPD project delivery model. The quantitative basis for the signing of IPD delivery model contract and the smooth development of common decision in engineering practice are given.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：TU71

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本文編號：1502242