本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 非效率投資 建材行業(yè)　出處：《北京林業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：投資作為企業(yè)最重要的財務(wù)決策之一,直接決定著企業(yè)未來現(xiàn)金流的增長和企業(yè)價值最大化的實現(xiàn)。然而在不完美的資本市場中,企業(yè)的投資決策往往偏離價值最大化的目標(biāo),從而導(dǎo)致非效率投資行為,即過度投資或投資不足。這種非效率投資現(xiàn)象,不僅有損企業(yè)價值的增加,還會影響國民經(jīng)濟(jì)健康穩(wěn)定地發(fā)展。此外,因中國特殊的制度安排,股權(quán)比較集中和國家股所占比重高是股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的突出特點,這種特殊的股權(quán)安排與企業(yè)的非效率投資行為是否存在一定的關(guān)聯(lián)性,是當(dāng)前亟需研究的問題。因此,本文通過實證研究股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與非效率投資的相關(guān)性,以期為上市公司通過完善股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)來緩解非效率投資問題提供經(jīng)驗性的依據(jù)。 本文以我國建材行業(yè)上市公司作為研究對象,從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)角度研究企業(yè)的非效率投資行為。選擇建材行業(yè)上市公司2007-2012年六年的數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本,首先采用Richardson(2006)殘差模型驗證建材行業(yè)上市公司是否存在非效率投資現(xiàn)象,然后建立多元回歸模型,從股權(quán)性質(zhì)、股權(quán)集中度和股權(quán)制衡三個維度來分析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是如何影響非效率投資的。實證結(jié)果表明：(1)非效率投資現(xiàn)象在建材行業(yè)上市公司廣泛存在,過度投資在國有上市公司更為顯著,而投資不足在民營上市公司更為顯著；(2)國有股權(quán)加劇非效率投資問題；(3)股權(quán)集中度與非效率投資呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系；(4)股權(quán)制衡可以緩解非效率投資問題；(5)國有上市公司股權(quán)制衡與非效率投資行為呈不顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系。最后根據(jù)實證結(jié)論,從股權(quán)治理角度提出緩解建材行業(yè)上市公司非效率投資問題的建議。
[Abstract]:As one of the most important financial decisions, investment directly determines the growth of future cash flow and the realization of maximization of enterprise value. However, in the imperfect capital market. The investment decision of enterprises often deviates from the goal of value maximization, which leads to inefficient investment behavior, that is, overinvestment or underinvestment. This phenomenon of inefficient investment not only damages the increase of enterprise value. It will also affect the healthy and stable development of the national economy. In addition, due to China's special institutional arrangements, relatively concentrated equity and a high proportion of state shares are prominent features of the equity structure. Whether there is a certain correlation between this special equity arrangement and the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises is a problem that needs to be studied at present. Therefore, this paper empirically studies the correlation between equity structure and inefficient investment. In order to provide empirical basis for listed companies to improve equity structure to alleviate the problem of inefficient investment. In this paper, the listed companies of building materials industry in China as the research object. This paper studies the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises from the perspective of equity structure, and selects six years' data of listed companies in building materials industry as samples. Firstly, we use Richardson's 2006) residual model to verify whether there is an inefficient investment phenomenon in listed companies in building materials industry, and then establish a multivariate regression model from the nature of equity. The empirical results show that the phenomenon of inefficient investment exists widely in listed companies in building materials industry. The overinvestment is more obvious in the state-owned listed companies, but the underinvestment is more obvious in the private listed companies. (2) State-owned equity is aggravating the problem of inefficient investment; (3) there is a positive correlation between equity concentration and inefficient investment; Equity checks and balances can alleviate the problem of inefficient investment; 5) there is no significant positive correlation between equity balance and inefficient investment behavior of state-owned listed companies. Finally, according to the empirical conclusions, the paper puts forward some suggestions to alleviate the problem of inefficient investment of listed companies in building materials industry from the perspective of equity governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京林業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F406.72;F426.92

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本文編號：1493772