發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-04-11 07:28

【摘要】：傳統(tǒng)的公司治理是新古典靜態(tài)資源配置觀的衍生物,因此傳統(tǒng)公司治理主要討論了企業(yè)投入資源的剩余收益如何分配的問題,但是并沒有討論投入資源的剩余收益是如何產(chǎn)生的。資源的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造與價(jià)值分配是生產(chǎn)過程不可分割的組成部分,僅僅反映剩余收益分配的公司治理是不完善的。拉讓尼克和奧蘇麗文認(rèn)為創(chuàng)新是企業(yè)價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的源泉。創(chuàng)新所具有的不確定性、集體性和累積性要求資源配置于創(chuàng)新的過程時(shí)應(yīng)當(dāng)具有開發(fā)性、組織性和戰(zhàn)略性。企業(yè)若想建立有利于創(chuàng)新活動的公司治理體系就應(yīng)當(dāng)滿足相應(yīng)的組織條件即財(cái)務(wù)承諾、組織整合和內(nèi)部人控制這三個(gè)條件。本文首先從理論上闡述了企業(yè)內(nèi)部人控制有利于企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新,然后運(yùn)用阿里巴巴的案例解釋了內(nèi)部人控制為什么以及如何有利于企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新活動。在阿里巴巴成長的過程中,雖然風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本的進(jìn)入稀釋了創(chuàng)始人管理團(tuán)隊(duì)所持有的股權(quán),但是阿里巴巴的創(chuàng)始人管理團(tuán)隊(duì)始終掌握著企業(yè)的控制權(quán),即阿里巴巴始終滿足內(nèi)部人控制這一組織條件。本文首先通過研究阿里巴巴的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和投票權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)了解了阿里巴巴為什么始終滿足內(nèi)部人控制這一組織條件,然后對阿里巴巴的財(cái)務(wù)承諾事件、組織整合事件以及戰(zhàn)略決策事件進(jìn)行研究和分析,找出內(nèi)部人控制與財(cái)務(wù)承諾、內(nèi)部人控制與組織整合以及內(nèi)部人控制與戰(zhàn)略決策之間的關(guān)系,從而得出阿里巴巴的內(nèi)部人控制有利于管理者制定和實(shí)施有效的戰(zhàn)略決策并且有利于企業(yè)創(chuàng)新等結(jié)論。阿里巴巴的“合伙人制度”最終合法化了其實(shí)質(zhì)上的內(nèi)部人控制治理體系。當(dāng)然,任何治理體系都不是完美無缺的,本文最后指出內(nèi)部人控制的局限性和適用條件。
[Abstract]:The traditional corporate governance is a derivative of the neo-classical static resource allocation concept. Therefore, the traditional corporate governance mainly discusses how to distribute the residual income of the enterprise input resources. However, there is no discussion of how the remaining income from input resources is generated. The value creation and distribution of resources is an integral part of the production process, and the corporate governance, which only reflects the distribution of surplus income, is not perfect. Rajennick and O'Sullivan believe that innovation is the source of enterprise value creation. The uncertainty, collectivity and accumulation of innovation require that resources should be developed, organized and strategic in the process of innovation. If an enterprise wants to establish a corporate governance system which is conducive to innovation activities, it should satisfy the corresponding organizational conditions, namely, financial commitment, organizational integration and insider control. In this paper, the author firstly expounds that insider control is beneficial to the innovation of enterprises, and then explains why and how insider control is beneficial to the innovation activities of enterprises by using Alibaba's case. In the process of Alibaba's growth, although the entry of venture capital diluted the ownership held by the founder's management team, Alibaba's founder management team always held the control of the enterprise. That is, Alibaba is always satisfied with the internal control of this organizational condition. This paper first studies Alibaba's ownership structure and voting right structure to understand why Alibaba has always satisfied the organizational conditions of insider control, and then to Alibaba's financial commitment event. Organizational integration events and strategic decision-making events are studied and analyzed to find out the relationship between insider control and financial commitment, insider control and organizational integration, as well as insider control and strategic decision-making. Thus it is concluded that Alibaba's insider control is helpful for managers to make and implement effective strategic decisions and is conducive to enterprise innovation and so on. Alibaba's "partner system" finally legalized its internal control and governance system. Of course, any governance system is not perfect. Finally, this paper points out the limitations and applicable conditions of insider control.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F724.6;F715.5

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前9條

1 李瞄，

本文編號：2456207