本文選題：城市商業(yè)銀行　切入點(diǎn)：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：20世紀(jì)90年代,國務(wù)院為了整頓地方金融秩序,分散地方金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn),在城市信用社的基礎(chǔ)上通過地方財(cái)政、城市企業(yè)以及地方居民投資入股的方式組建了城市商業(yè)銀行,設(shè)立之初的目的是服務(wù)當(dāng)?shù)鼐用�、扶持地方中小企業(yè)發(fā)展以及支持當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)。近年來,城市商業(yè)銀行規(guī)模逐漸壯大,在解決地方企業(yè)融資瓶頸、促進(jìn)地方經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)方面取得了不錯(cuò)的成效。但與發(fā)展規(guī)模較大的國有銀行與股份制銀行相比,城市商業(yè)銀行在經(jīng)營績(jī)效方面仍然存在著較大的差距,主要原因出在內(nèi)部公司治理方面。雖然一部分城市商業(yè)銀行已經(jīng)建立了公司法人治理結(jié)構(gòu),但股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)仍不合理,如普遍存在的政府持股現(xiàn)象、政府及其"一致行動(dòng)人"持股比例過高等現(xiàn)象,在一定程度上制約了公司治理機(jī)制效果的發(fā)揮,使得城市商業(yè)銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)增加,經(jīng)營績(jī)效有所下降。雖然已有研究從公司治理的視角考察股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)銀行績(jī)效的影響,但大多研究將城商行作為一般商業(yè)銀行處理,忽略了城商行的特殊性與目的性,或只是選取了某地區(qū)某幾家城市商業(yè)銀行作為樣本進(jìn)行研究,考察股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)銀行盈利能力和不良貸款率的影響,并沒有很好地衡量銀行的綜合經(jīng)營績(jī)效,也鮮有利用實(shí)證分析考察影響機(jī)制的研究。本文的研究以全國范圍內(nèi)的88家城市商業(yè)銀行為樣本,在衡量城商行綜合經(jīng)營績(jī)效指標(biāo)方面進(jìn)行創(chuàng)新,從盈利能力、安全能力和流動(dòng)性這傳統(tǒng)的"三性"方面入手,橫向、縱向比較了城商行的政府股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)城商行經(jīng)營績(jī)效的影響,并利用主成分分析法,從"三性"指標(biāo)入手,結(jié)合資產(chǎn)指標(biāo)和發(fā)展能力指標(biāo),構(gòu)建了綜合反映經(jīng)營能力的綜合經(jīng)營績(jī)效指標(biāo)。通過構(gòu)建面板數(shù)據(jù)模型,利用實(shí)證分析法深入考察了城商行現(xiàn)行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)綜合經(jīng)營績(jī)效的影響。在此基礎(chǔ)上根據(jù)城商行的經(jīng)營現(xiàn)狀,選擇政府股權(quán)——信貸行為——經(jīng)營績(jī)效這一途徑來分析城商行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)經(jīng)營績(jī)效的影響機(jī)制,并從貸款規(guī)模、期限、行業(yè)分布和集中度四個(gè)方面對(duì)信貸行為進(jìn)行衡量,加入了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與信貸行為的交叉項(xiàng),運(yùn)用理論結(jié)合實(shí)證的方法來分析政府股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)如何通過影響城商行的信貸行為作用于綜合經(jīng)營績(jī)效。此外,根據(jù)所處城市的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)差異,分類考察了發(fā)達(dá)程度不同區(qū)域的城市商業(yè)銀行的影響效果。結(jié)合理論分析與實(shí)證的結(jié)果可以發(fā)現(xiàn),城商行的政府股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)綜合經(jīng)營績(jī)效有顯著的負(fù)向影響,且隨著地方財(cái)政股以及作為"一致行動(dòng)人"的地方國有法人持股比例的增加,城商行的綜合經(jīng)營績(jī)效顯著下降。具體而言,政府控股會(huì)通過影響城市商業(yè)銀行的信貸行為,如增加貸款規(guī)模、提高貸款集中度,延長(zhǎng)貸款期限和增加建筑業(yè)貸款、房地產(chǎn)貸款同時(shí)減少批發(fā)零售業(yè)貸款、制造業(yè)貸款來降低城商行的綜合經(jīng)營績(jī)效。另外,政府持股通過適當(dāng)?shù)卦黾踊A(chǔ)設(shè)施行業(yè)貸款能夠在一定程度上提高城商行經(jīng)營績(jī)效,且該結(jié)果在較為落后的三線及以下地區(qū)城商行更為顯著。實(shí)證結(jié)果也顯示,發(fā)達(dá)城市的城商行更支持政府持股的"政治觀",而位于落后城市的城商行反而更多地表現(xiàn)出政府持股的"發(fā)展觀",從某種意義上說明了落后地區(qū)政府持股的合理性。最后,本文結(jié)合理論和實(shí)證分析的結(jié)果,從優(yōu)化城商行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),合理稀釋地方政府及其一致行動(dòng)人持股比例、適時(shí)引入合格境外戰(zhàn)略投資者,加強(qiáng)內(nèi)、外部監(jiān)督管理等角度提出了政策建議,旨在提升我國城市商業(yè)銀行的綜合經(jīng)營績(jī)效,更好地服務(wù)地方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In 1990s, the State Council in order to rectify the local financial order, decentralized local financial risk, the city credit cooperatives based on the local finance, city enterprises and the way of investment shares of local residents formed a city commercial bank, at the beginning of the establishment of the aim is to serve the local residents, to support the development of small and medium enterprises and support local economic construction in recent years. City Commercial Bank, gradually expand the scale, to solve the financing bottleneck of local enterprises, and achieved good results in promoting local economic growth and development. But large scale state-owned banks and joint-stock banks, city commercial banks, there is still a gap in terms of performance, the main reason of internal governance in the company. Although a part of the city commercial banks have established the corporate governance structure, but the ownership structure is not reasonable, such as pervasive political The Government Shareholding Phenomenon, the government and the "concerted action" shareholding ratio is too high, to a certain extent restricts the effect of corporate governance mechanism of the play, making the risk of city commercial banks bear the increased business performance decline. Although the effect has been studied from the perspective of corporate governance ownership structure on the performance of the bank, but most of the research the city commercial banks as a general commercial banks, city commercial banks ignore the special nature and purpose, or only selected a few city commercial banks in a region as the research sample, the influence of ownership structure on bank profitability and the rate of bad loans, is not a good measure of bank comprehensive performance, but also the little empirical analysis influence mechanism. This paper studies on the 88 city commercial banks nationwide as a sample, to measure the comprehensive performance of City Commercial Banks The index from the aspects of innovation, profitability, safety and liquidity for the ability of the traditional "three" aspects, transverse, longitudinal comparison of effects of government ownership structure of city commercial banks of city commercial banks operating performance, and using principal component analysis method, starting from the "three" index, combined with the asset index and development capacity index. Comprehensive performance indicators reflect the ability of management. By constructing a panel data model, the empirical analysis examines the impact of ownership structure on the existing city commercial banks comprehensive performance management. Based on the operating status of city commercial banks, analysis of the impact mechanism of city commercial banks ownership structure on the operating performance of the choice of government equity, credit behavior business performance this way, and from the size of the loan period, the industry distribution and to measure the degree of credit behavior four aspects, the ownership structure and The cross term credit behavior, using the theory with analysis of governmental ownership structure how to influence the credit behavior of city commercial banks in the comprehensive performance of the empirical method. In addition, according to the difference of the macroeconomic effects of the city, the classification effect developed degree in different regions of the city commercial banks. Based on the results of theoretical analysis and empirical it can be found that the government ownership structure of city commercial banks have a significant negative impact on the comprehensive performance, and with the increase of local financial stocks as well as a "concerted action" of the local state-owned legal person shares, city commercial banks comprehensive performance significantly. Specifically, the government controlled by influencing the credit behavior of city commercial banks, such as increasing the size of loans, raising the loan concentration, the extension of the loan period and increase construction loans, real estate loans and reduce the wholesale retail loan Money, loans to the manufacturing sector to reduce the city firm's comprehensive performance. In addition, the government's ownership by properly increasing loans to infrastructure industries can improve the city commercial performance in a certain extent, and the results in the three line area is relatively backward and the city firm is more significant. The empirical results also show that the developed city of the city firm support the government holdings of the "political concept", and the city is located behind the city firm but showed more government ownership "concept of development", in a sense to illustrate the rationality of government ownership in backward regions. Finally, combining with the results of theoretical and empirical analysis, from the optimization of capital structure of city commercial banks, reasonable dilution the local government and the concerted action of shareholding, the timely introduction of qualified foreign strategic investors, strengthen supervision and management in the perspective of external policy suggestions to enhance China's City Commercial Bank The comprehensive management performance will serve the development of the local economy better.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33;F830.42

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