本文關(guān)鍵詞： 貿(mào)易信用 逆向選擇 供應(yīng)鏈 信息不對稱　出處：《管理科學(xué)學(xué)報》2014年10期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：考慮了信息不對稱環(huán)境下資金約束供應(yīng)鏈中貿(mào)易信用合同的設(shè)計問題.其中,零售商面臨資金短缺困境,對自身的競爭類型具有信息優(yōu)勢;供應(yīng)商愿意為資金短缺的零售商提供貿(mào)易信用.本文基于高低不同類型零售商的保留收益信息,將零售商的競爭環(huán)境分為三種類型,即高度競爭、適度競爭和低度競爭.據(jù)此,供應(yīng)商應(yīng)用篩選方法設(shè)計合同甄別不同競爭環(huán)境的零售商類型,提高自身和供應(yīng)鏈的整體收益.研究還表明,在信息不對稱的情況下,適度競爭環(huán)境中,貿(mào)易信用合同能實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈整體收益最大化.
[Abstract]:This paper considers the design of trade credit contract in the supply chain with capital constraint under asymmetric information environment, in which retailers face the dilemma of capital shortage and have information superiority to their own competition type. Suppliers are willing to provide trade credit for retailers with insufficient funds. Based on the reserved income information of different retailers, this paper divides the competition environment of retailers into three types: high competition, moderate competition and low competition. The supplier applies the screening method to design the type of retailer in different competitive environment to improve the overall profit of the supplier and the supply chain. The research also shows that in the context of information asymmetry, in a moderately competitive environment, Trade credit contract can maximize the overall income of supply chain.
【作者單位】： 上海海事大學(xué)經(jīng)濟管理學(xué)院;復(fù)旦大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項目(71172039;71102043;70972046) 教育部新世紀(jì)優(yōu)秀人才支持資助項目(NCET-10-0340) 教育部人文社會科學(xué)研究青年基金資助項目(11YJC630153) 上海海事大學(xué)科研基金資助項目(20120084) 上海海事大學(xué)重點學(xué)科資助項目(XR0101)
【分類號】：F713.32;F715.5

【參考文獻】

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