本文關(guān)鍵詞： 投資者反應(yīng) 研發(fā)投入 企業(yè)資源 環(huán)境波動(dòng) 信號(hào)作用　出處：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在全球化的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)代,創(chuàng)新能力是企業(yè)能夠在全球市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中獲得一席之地的最為重要的企業(yè)內(nèi)部因素。從資源基礎(chǔ)觀的視角來(lái)看,研發(fā)活動(dòng)提高企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新能力,通過(guò)產(chǎn)出新產(chǎn)品與技術(shù)使企業(yè)獲得不可替代性和不可模仿性的資源,進(jìn)而提高企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì),使企業(yè)產(chǎn)生持久的業(yè)績(jī)?cè)鲩L(zhǎng)。鑒于研發(fā)活動(dòng)對(duì)企業(yè)未來(lái)發(fā)展?jié)摿λ鸬降闹匾饔?于是便成為投資者在評(píng)價(jià)企業(yè)未來(lái)價(jià)值過(guò)程中所重點(diǎn)關(guān)注的企業(yè)因素。但由于我國(guó)上市公司仍然存在著非常嚴(yán)重的信息披露質(zhì)量過(guò)低等問(wèn)題,使得外部投資者在企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新方面處于信息的劣勢(shì)。由于投資者無(wú)法獲取所有有關(guān)研發(fā)項(xiàng)目進(jìn)展與收益的真實(shí)信息,因此無(wú)法對(duì)研發(fā)投入的潛在價(jià)值做出準(zhǔn)確的判斷,使得上市公司與外部投資者之間出現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重的信息不對(duì)稱問(wèn)題。但通過(guò)對(duì)現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的梳理,發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)有研究大部分都是從企業(yè)的視角來(lái)研究研發(fā)投入的價(jià)值,而很少?gòu)男畔⒉粚?duì)稱問(wèn)題的視角出發(fā),來(lái)研究投資者對(duì)研發(fā)投入價(jià)值的評(píng)價(jià)過(guò)程。針對(duì)現(xiàn)有研究的不足,本文主要研究在信息不對(duì)稱的情況下,投資者對(duì)研發(fā)投入的反饋,在投資者評(píng)價(jià)研發(fā)價(jià)值的過(guò)程中有哪些因素影響了投資者對(duì)研發(fā)投入的價(jià)值做出判斷,以及研發(fā)投入的信息價(jià)值又是通過(guò)哪些路徑傳遞給投資者�；谑袌�(chǎng)信號(hào)理論、戰(zhàn)略匹配理論和資源基礎(chǔ)觀理論,研發(fā)投入被看做是具有不確定質(zhì)量的信息。為減小信息不對(duì)稱,對(duì)研發(fā)投入的潛在價(jià)值做出更為合理的判斷,本文認(rèn)為投資者會(huì)尋找企業(yè)有意或者無(wú)意所發(fā)出的信號(hào),來(lái)判斷研發(fā)投入的價(jià)值。進(jìn)一步,基于戰(zhàn)略匹配理論,企業(yè)是否具有與研發(fā)活動(dòng)相匹配的資源以及研發(fā)活動(dòng)是否與外部環(huán)境相匹配為投資者評(píng)價(jià)研發(fā)投入的潛在的價(jià)值提供了進(jìn)一步的參考信息。于是,本文認(rèn)為研發(fā)的匹配資源和外部環(huán)境波動(dòng)便是投資者用以判斷研發(fā)投入潛在質(zhì)量的信號(hào),也就是說(shuō)研發(fā)的匹配資源與外部環(huán)境對(duì)投資者產(chǎn)生了信號(hào)作用。對(duì)于研發(fā)投入的信息價(jià)值傳遞問(wèn)題,本文認(rèn)為,企業(yè)所釋放的技術(shù)資源信號(hào)可以提高研發(fā)投入的信息有效性,進(jìn)而促進(jìn)研發(fā)投入的價(jià)值傳遞。因此,本文認(rèn)為研發(fā)投入的信息價(jià)值通過(guò)技術(shù)資源路徑傳遞給投資者。以上分析建構(gòu)了全文的理論框架與研究假設(shè),為后續(xù)的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)提供了理論基礎(chǔ)。首先,本文實(shí)證研究了在信息不對(duì)稱的情況下,投資者對(duì)研發(fā)投入的直接反饋。以2008年到2011年間的我國(guó)醫(yī)藥行業(yè)上市公司為樣本,運(yùn)用SPSS19.0軟件對(duì)樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行OLS回歸方程檢驗(yàn),發(fā)現(xiàn)在信息不對(duì)稱的情況下,投資者對(duì)研發(fā)投入產(chǎn)生正向的反饋。其次,分別檢驗(yàn)了財(cái)務(wù)資源與高管團(tuán)隊(duì)的信號(hào)作用。本文用成長(zhǎng)能力、盈利能力與資本結(jié)構(gòu)(負(fù)債水平)來(lái)表征企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)資源,分別論述了以上三方面因素在投資者評(píng)價(jià)研發(fā)投入質(zhì)量過(guò)程中所起到的信號(hào)作用,并對(duì)以上假設(shè)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)果表明,成長(zhǎng)能力具有正向的信號(hào)作用,負(fù)債水平具有負(fù)向的信號(hào)作用,盈利能力不具有信號(hào)作用。應(yīng)用Modprobe軟件,對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)資源的信號(hào)作用進(jìn)行有條件的交互效應(yīng)分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)只有當(dāng)成長(zhǎng)能力處于很高水平時(shí),負(fù)債水平處在較低水平時(shí),信號(hào)作用才顯著。同時(shí),本文用高管規(guī)模、高管任期、高管持股和高管薪酬來(lái)表征高管團(tuán)隊(duì),通過(guò)理論論述來(lái)假設(shè)以上因素可能的信號(hào)作用方向,并對(duì)假設(shè)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。發(fā)現(xiàn)高管規(guī)模具有正向信號(hào)作用、高管持股和高管薪酬都具有負(fù)向信號(hào)作用,高管任期不具有信號(hào)作用。通過(guò)有條件的交互效應(yīng)分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)無(wú)論高管規(guī)模處于哪一個(gè)水平,信號(hào)作用都是顯著的,高管持股只有處于較低水平時(shí),信號(hào)作用才顯著,而高管薪酬只有處于較高水平時(shí),信號(hào)作用才顯著。再次,檢驗(yàn)了環(huán)境波動(dòng)的信號(hào)作用,以及在不同環(huán)境波動(dòng)下,財(cái)務(wù)資源和高管團(tuán)隊(duì)的信號(hào)作用。本文用技術(shù)環(huán)境波動(dòng)和市場(chǎng)環(huán)境波動(dòng)來(lái)表征環(huán)境波動(dòng),通過(guò)實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),本文發(fā)現(xiàn),市場(chǎng)環(huán)境波動(dòng)具有正向的信號(hào)作用,技術(shù)環(huán)境波動(dòng)具有負(fù)向的信號(hào)作用,通過(guò)有條件的交互效應(yīng)分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)只有當(dāng)市場(chǎng)環(huán)境波動(dòng)的水平處于較高或較低時(shí),其信號(hào)作用才顯著,而對(duì)于技術(shù)環(huán)境來(lái)說(shuō),無(wú)論處于哪一個(gè)水平,其信號(hào)作用都是顯著的;在市場(chǎng)波動(dòng)和技術(shù)波動(dòng)程度高的環(huán)境下,財(cái)務(wù)資源和高管團(tuán)隊(duì)的信號(hào)作用更為顯著。最后,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了技術(shù)資源的價(jià)值傳遞信號(hào)作用。本文首先在理論上分析了技術(shù)資源對(duì)于研發(fā)投入所產(chǎn)生的具有中介效應(yīng)的信號(hào)作用,構(gòu)建了技術(shù)資源在研發(fā)投入與投資者反饋之間的中介效應(yīng)模型,并進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)果表明,新產(chǎn)品是企業(yè)將研發(fā)投入價(jià)值傳遞給投資者的唯一路徑,新技術(shù)與新專利并沒(méi)有產(chǎn)生具有中介效應(yīng)的信號(hào)作用。從信息不對(duì)稱問(wèn)題出發(fā),本文研究投資者對(duì)研發(fā)投入的反饋,以及在反饋過(guò)程中企業(yè)資源與環(huán)境波動(dòng)所起到的信號(hào)作用。在理論上,本文首次將市場(chǎng)信號(hào)理論引入到研發(fā)價(jià)值領(lǐng)域,豐富了該領(lǐng)域的研究視角;構(gòu)建了在信息不對(duì)稱情況下,投資者對(duì)研發(fā)投入反應(yīng)的理論模型,以及研發(fā)投入信息價(jià)值的傳遞過(guò)程模型。在實(shí)踐上,使得投資者了解企業(yè)與自身的信號(hào)傳遞博弈過(guò)程,幫助投資者做出更為合理的投資決策;使企業(yè)更加了解投資者對(duì)信號(hào)的解讀,幫助企業(yè)獲得來(lái)自投資者的正向反饋。
[Abstract]:In the era of globalization, the innovation ability is the most important internal factors for enterprises to obtain a space for one person in the global market competition. From the resource-based view of research and development activities to improve the innovation ability of enterprises, through the production of new products and technologies to enable enterprises to get the irreplaceable and imitative resources, and improve the competitive advantage of enterprises, so that enterprises have a lasting growth. In view of research and development activities to play an important role in the future development potential of the enterprise, they will become investors in the evaluation of enterprise value in the future the process focus attention enterprise factors. But because of China's listed companies are still very serious information the disclosure of low quality and other issues, the external investors at a disadvantage in the innovation of enterprise information. Because investors can not obtain the progress of all relevant research and development project The real income information, to the potential value of R & D investment to make accurate judgments, resulting in serious problems of information asymmetry between listed companies and external investors. But based on existing literature, found that the existing research is mostly on the R & D investment value from the enterprise perspective, while seldom from the information asymmetry problem from the angle of research to investors on the R & D investment value evaluation process. Aiming at the shortage of existing research, this paper mainly studies in the case of asymmetric information, investors in the R & D investment feedback, the factors which influence the investors to judge the value of R & D investment in R & D value in the evaluation of investors, as well as the value of information R & D investment and transfer to investors through which the market signal path. Based on the theory of strategic matching theory and resource based view of Science The R & D investment is regarded as uncertain quality information. In order to reduce the information asymmetry, the potential value of R & D investment to make more reasonable judgment, this paper argues that investors will be looking for signals from companies intentionally or unintentionally, to determine the value of R & D investment. Further, the matching strategy based on the theory of whether the enterprise has matching and research activities and resources research and development activities and the external environment is matched to provide further reference information for investors to evaluate the potential value of R & D investment. So, the research of matching resources and external environment fluctuation is used to judge the signal investors R & D investment potential quality, that is to say, the development of resources with the external environment has a signal to investors. The information value of R & D investment transfer, this paper argues that the release of enterprise technology The signal can improve the effectiveness of information resources investment in research and development, and promote the value of R & D investment transfer. Therefore, the information value of R & D investment transfer to investors through technical resources path. The above analysis constructs a theoretical framework and research hypothesis of the thesis, provides a theoretical basis for the subsequent empirical test. First, this paper empirical research in the case of asymmetric information, investors direct feedback on R & D investment. From 2008 to 2011 years of China's pharmaceutical industry listed companies as a sample, using the sample data to test the regression equation OLS SPSS19.0 software, found in the case of asymmetric information, investors have positive feedback on the R & D investment. Secondly, test the signal of financial resources and senior management team. The growth ability, profitability and capital structure (debt) to characterize the enterprise property Service resources, signal respectively discusses the above three factors play in the evaluation of investors in the process of R & D investment quality, and through the empirical test of the above hypothesis. The results show that the signal has a positive growth ability, debt has a negative effect to the signal level, profitability has no signal. The application of Modprobe software. Analyze the interaction effect of conditional signal effect on financial resources, found only when the ability to grow at a very high level, the level of debt in the low level, signal effect was significant. At the same time, the executive scale, executive tenure, managerial ownership and executive compensation to characterize the executive team, the direction of the signal through the theory assume that the above factors, and tested the hypothesis. The scale has a positive signal that the executive function, executive ownership and executive pay has a negative Signal, executive tenure does not have a signal. Through the interaction of conditional analysis, found that the scale at which a executive level signal are significant, executive ownership only is in the low level, signal effect is significant, and executive compensation only at a high level, the signal effect significantly again. The role of environmental inspection, signal fluctuations, and fluctuations in different environment, signal functions of financial resources and senior management team. The technology of environmental fluctuations and market fluctuation to characterize environmental fluctuations, through the empirical test, this paper found that the market environment has positive fluctuation signal, environment fluctuation has a negative signal to the through the interaction, condition analysis, found that only when the market fluctuation level is higher or lower, the signal effect is significant, and for environmental technology , no matter in which one level, the signal effect is significant; in the market volatility and the volatility of high technology environment, signal function of financial resources and the executive team is more significant. Finally, empirical test of the technology resource value signal. This paper first analyzed the resources the signal generated by the R & D investment has a mediating effect, constructing the technical resources in R & D investment intermediary effect model and feedback between investors, and conduct empirical tests. The results show that the new product is the enterprise R & D investment value passed to the only path of investors, new technology and new patent and did not produce a signal with the mediating effect. From the point of view of the problem of asymmetric information, this paper studies investors feedback on R & D investment, as well as in the feedback process of enterprise resource and environmental fluctuations play a letter No.. In theory, the market theory is introduced into the research field of signal value, enrich the research perspective in this field; built in the condition of information asymmetry, investors in the theoretical model of R & D investment reaction, and R & D investment value of information transfer process model. In practice, the signal for investors to understand the enterprise with the passing game process, help investors make more reasonable investment decision; to enable enterprises to better understand that investors interpret the signal, help the enterprise to obtain positive feedback from investors.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F406.7;F426.72
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本文編號(hào)：1460557