本文關(guān)鍵詞：制造業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響研究　出處：《哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：制造業(yè)是支撐經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的重要領(lǐng)域。近年來(lái),中國(guó)在由"制造大國(guó)"向"制造強(qiáng)國(guó)"轉(zhuǎn)型,因此,制造業(yè)上市公司的健康發(fā)展意義重大。在制造業(yè)上市公司中,高管薪酬一直居高不下,高管會(huì)因?yàn)樾匠陝?dòng)機(jī)而進(jìn)行盈余管理。此外,為了保證經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康穩(wěn)定的發(fā)展,學(xué)術(shù)界也十分的關(guān)注會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的研究。為了解決這樣一系列的問(wèn)題,以制造業(yè)上市公司為基點(diǎn),詳細(xì)的探討了制造業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響問(wèn)題。首先通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者在相關(guān)領(lǐng)域的成果進(jìn)行回顧,總結(jié)和歸納學(xué)者們已完成了的研究成果。對(duì)高管薪酬、盈余管理、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行了界定,梳理所需要的相關(guān)理論。將委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、激勵(lì)理論、最優(yōu)契約理論作為研究的理論依據(jù)。然后通過(guò)對(duì)高管薪酬、盈余管理、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行總結(jié),并對(duì)三者之間的影響機(jī)理進(jìn)行分析。再次,通過(guò)實(shí)證模型的構(gòu)建,以制造業(yè)上市公司從2010年到2015年,共計(jì)6548組數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。通過(guò)實(shí)證分析,制造業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與盈余管理之間存在著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,即制造業(yè)上市公司的高管薪酬越高會(huì)使得盈余管理的幅度越大。制造業(yè)上市公司盈余管理與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間存在著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,即盈余管理幅度增大會(huì)降低公司的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性。制造業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間存在著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,即高管薪酬過(guò)高也使得會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性下降。為了保證制造業(yè)上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性水平不受損害,需要對(duì)制造業(yè)上市公司的高管薪酬進(jìn)行限制,同時(shí)也需要規(guī)范制造業(yè)上市公司的盈余管理行為,防止過(guò)度盈余管理行為的發(fā)生。最后,從宏觀和微觀的角度分別提出了改善制造業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性影響的措施。
[Abstract]:Manufacturing industry is an important field to support economic growth. In recent years, China is transforming from a "manufacturing power" to a "manufacturing power". Therefore, the healthy development of listed manufacturing companies is of great significance. Executive compensation has been high, executives will be motivated by earnings management. In addition, in order to ensure the healthy and stable development of the economy. Academia is also very concerned about accounting conservatism research. In order to solve such a series of problems, the manufacturing listed companies as the basis point, a detailed discussion of the manufacturing listed companies executive compensation. The impact of earnings management on accounting conservatism. Firstly, by reviewing the achievements of domestic and foreign scholars in related fields, summarizing and summarizing the research results that scholars have completed. For executive compensation, earnings management. The related concepts of accounting conservatism are defined, and the relevant theories are combed out. The principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and incentive theory are introduced. The optimal contract theory as the theoretical basis for the study. Then through the executive compensation earnings management accounting conservatism of the status quo and analysis of the impact mechanism between the three. Again. Through the construction of empirical model, the manufacturing listed companies from 2010 to 2015, a total of 6548 groups of data as research samples, empirical test. There is a positive correlation between executive compensation and earnings management of listed manufacturing companies. That is, the higher the executive compensation of listed companies in manufacturing industry, the larger the margin of earnings management. There is a negative correlation between earnings management and accounting conservatism of listed manufacturing companies. That is, the increase of earnings management will reduce the accounting conservatism. There is a negative correlation between executive compensation and accounting conservatism of listed manufacturing companies. In order to ensure that the level of accounting conservatism of listed manufacturing companies is not damaged, it is necessary to restrict the executive compensation of listed manufacturing companies. At the same time, we also need to regulate the earnings management behavior of listed manufacturing companies to prevent excessive earnings management behavior. Finally, from the macro and micro point of view, we propose to improve the executive compensation of listed manufacturing companies. The measures of earnings management's influence on accounting conservatism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F406.7;F425

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