【摘要】：《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法》(試行)已經(jīng)在我國(guó)開(kāi)始實(shí)行起來(lái),同時(shí)一些關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)的規(guī)范正在被不停的完善當(dāng)中。因此,股權(quán)激勵(lì)這種方法已經(jīng)在上市公司流行起來(lái)。作為對(duì)激勵(lì)對(duì)象進(jìn)行長(zhǎng)久激勵(lì)的一種方法,股權(quán)激勵(lì)它是聯(lián)系經(jīng)營(yíng)者與所有者利益的紐帶,它的目的就是為了避免激勵(lì)對(duì)象的短期行為,將他們的目光轉(zhuǎn)移到企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展上來(lái)。企業(yè)股東與經(jīng)營(yíng)者之間存在的委托代理問(wèn)題可以通過(guò)股權(quán)激勵(lì)進(jìn)行處理,同時(shí)它能夠改善企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)效率。本文以聯(lián)化科技作為研究對(duì)象,聯(lián)化科技作為一家高新技術(shù)企業(yè),它在精細(xì)化工品方面的技術(shù)已經(jīng)達(dá)到了國(guó)際水平,尤其是在氨氧化法上引入腈基,達(dá)到了國(guó)際領(lǐng)先水平,因此選擇它作為案例研究具有一定的代表性。本文在分析案例時(shí)采用了事件研究法和比較分析法,首先,通過(guò)事件研究法對(duì)案例企業(yè)頒布股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案時(shí)的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)進(jìn)行研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)在公布股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案時(shí),信息有可能提前泄露。然后,通過(guò)采用橫向和縱向相結(jié)合的對(duì)比方式,分析企業(yè)在實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案前后的財(cái)務(wù)及相關(guān)指標(biāo)的變化,最后得出結(jié)論,聯(lián)化科技的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案沒(méi)有達(dá)到預(yù)期效果,至于造成聯(lián)化科技股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案沒(méi)有達(dá)到預(yù)期效果的原因,本文認(rèn)為,聯(lián)化科技在制定股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案時(shí),對(duì)行權(quán)條件和行權(quán)指標(biāo)的設(shè)置并不合理,行權(quán)條件設(shè)置偏低,行權(quán)指標(biāo)設(shè)置的相對(duì)單一,這主要是由于企業(yè)內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制不完善和績(jī)效考核體系設(shè)計(jì)成本高,相關(guān)法律缺失所導(dǎo)致的。同時(shí)在行權(quán)期限的設(shè)置也是存在問(wèn)題的,相對(duì)于一些成功實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的企業(yè),聯(lián)化科技的股權(quán)激勵(lì)的行權(quán)期限較短,這主要是由于當(dāng)前的職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng)不健全造成的。最后,本文總結(jié)上述研究,提出了幾點(diǎn)有關(guān)優(yōu)化股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的啟示:第一,在制定股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案時(shí)要設(shè)置合理的行權(quán)條件和行權(quán)指標(biāo);第二,在制定股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案時(shí)要合理設(shè)置行權(quán)期限;第三,完善企業(yè)內(nèi)部制度;第四,進(jìn)一步完善與股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)的法律法規(guī)制度;第五,加快資本市場(chǎng)的有效性建設(shè)。本文希望通過(guò)上述研究為更多類似的企業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案提供有價(jià)值的參考意見(jiàn)。
[Abstract]:The method of stock-stock incentive management of the listed company has already been put into practice in our country, and some of the regulations on equity incentive are being perfected. Therefore, the method of equity incentive has become popular in the listed company. As a method for the long-term motivation of the incentive objects, the equity incentive is the link between the operator and the owner's interests, the purpose of which is to avoid the short-term behavior of the incentive objects, and to transfer their eyes to the long-term development of the enterprise. The problem of the proxy agent existing between the enterprise shareholder and the operator can be treated by the equity incentive, and it can improve the operation efficiency of the enterprise. As a high-tech enterprise, the technology of chemical technology has reached the international level, especially in the ammonia oxidation process, and has reached the international leading level. Therefore, it has some representativeness as a case study. In this paper, the event research method and the comparative analysis method are used in the analysis of the case. First, the market response of the case enterprises with the equity incentive scheme is studied through the event research method, and it is found that the information may be leaked in advance when the equity incentive scheme is announced. Then, by using the combination of horizontal and vertical, the paper analyzes the changes of the financial and related indexes before and after the implementation of the stock-stock incentive scheme, and concludes that the equity incentive scheme of the combined technology has not reached the expected effect. As for the reason that the incentive scheme of the equity incentive for the joint science and technology has not reached the expected effect, the paper is of the opinion that, in the development of the stock-stock incentive scheme, the setting of the right and the right index is not reasonable, the setting of the right-to-right condition is low, and the set of the right-to-right index is relatively single, This is mainly due to the imperfection of the internal supervision mechanism of the enterprise and the high design cost of the performance appraisal system and the lack of relevant laws. At the same time, the setting of the time limit of the right time is also a problem, with respect to some enterprises that have successfully implemented the equity incentive, the right time limit of the equity incentive of the united science and technology is short, which is mainly due to the imperfect market of the current professional manager. In the end, this paper sums up the above-mentioned research, and puts forward some enlightenments to the optimization of the stock-stock incentive scheme: first, to set a reasonable right-to-right condition and a right-to-right index in the formulation of the stock-stock incentive scheme; secondly, to set the right-to-right period reasonably when the stock-stock incentive scheme is established; and thirdly, To improve the internal system of the enterprise; and fourthly, to further improve the legal and legal system related to the equity incentive; and, fifthly, to speed up the effective construction of the capital market. This paper hopes to provide valuable reference for more similar enterprise design equity incentive programs through the above-mentioned research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F426.7

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本文編號(hào)：2440092