本文選題：盈余管理 + 非經(jīng)常性損益�。� 參考：《石河子大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：中國(guó)股市在2015年可謂波瀾起伏,經(jīng)歷各種崩盤,面對(duì)瞬息萬(wàn)變無(wú)法太平的股市,投資者如何應(yīng)對(duì),是我們應(yīng)該考慮的大問(wèn)題。中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)30年來(lái)的迅速發(fā)展,各類規(guī)模企業(yè)不斷涌現(xiàn)。資本市場(chǎng)增長(zhǎng)率較快,然而同期可支配資金增長(zhǎng)不能滿足其要求,兩者之間矛盾日益突出。公司苦心積慮、不擇手段隱瞞虧損實(shí)情美化財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表,如此違規(guī)盈余管理,嚴(yán)重危害上市公司正常營(yíng)運(yùn)。虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表頻頻被曝光,引發(fā)了信貸危機(jī),進(jìn)而又導(dǎo)致了市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷、企業(yè)融資困難。然而,資金是企業(yè)的生命之源,為了快速融資眾多ST公司就又走進(jìn)了財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊的胡同,形成惡性循環(huán)。尤其是2008年的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)更加重了這個(gè)惡性循環(huán)。經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)后,紡織業(yè)國(guó)內(nèi)外需求下降,以紡織品進(jìn)出口為主要業(yè)務(wù)的南紡股份,收入下滑嚴(yán)重,于是嘗試多元化投資,但是由于投資面過(guò)大、投資速度快,幾年內(nèi)竟擁有50多家子孫公司,然而卻沒有獲得多少回報(bào)。在內(nèi)憂外患的情況下,雖大股東商貿(mào)公司豁免了相關(guān)債務(wù),但仍不能扭轉(zhuǎn)局面,加上內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)不完善、內(nèi)控不良、高管利欲熏心等多重原因,南紡股份在2006-2010年連續(xù)5年通過(guò)盈余管理手段,偽造利潤(rùn),成為造假典型。但是審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)卻僅僅對(duì)2011年南紡股份的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告出示“保留意見”,其他年份都是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)無(wú)保留意見,這樣的行為無(wú)非是助紂為虐,有違審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性和公正性。本文對(duì)南紡股份實(shí)例進(jìn)行分析,對(duì)公司盈余管理的原因和手段進(jìn)行深入分析,進(jìn)而發(fā)現(xiàn)公司在面臨內(nèi)外部壓力尤其是面臨退市危機(jī)時(shí)會(huì)產(chǎn)生盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī),但是盈余管理只能是緩兵之計(jì),不能真正改善經(jīng)營(yíng)窘?jīng)r、產(chǎn)生連續(xù)性的積極影響。最后又針對(duì)性地提出上市公司盈余管理的防范的措施,提出完善問(wèn)責(zé)制度,要建立高管為報(bào)表真實(shí)性背書制度,完善事務(wù)所選聘制度,嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行審計(jì)師強(qiáng)制輪換制度;并針對(duì)我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀,提出應(yīng)該賦予證監(jiān)會(huì)部分監(jiān)管特權(quán),建立及時(shí)停牌制度,并設(shè)立投資者“買者自付”的具體標(biāo)準(zhǔn),一定程度上更好的保護(hù)投資者權(quán)益。本文將對(duì)濫用盈余管理的上市公司敲個(gè)警鐘,對(duì)投資者識(shí)別舞弊行為理性投資,監(jiān)管者有效治理財(cái)務(wù)舞弊整頓資本市場(chǎng),有一定參考價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:China's stock market in 2015 can be described as ups and downs, after various crashes, in the face of the rapidly changing stock market, investors should consider how to deal with the big issue. With the rapid development of China's capital market over the past 30 years, enterprises of all sizes have been emerging. The growth rate of capital market is fast, but the growth of disposable capital can not meet its requirement in the same period, and the contradiction between them is becoming more and more serious. The company painstakingly conceals the fact of losses and beautifies the financial statements, thus violating earnings management seriously endangers the normal operation of listed companies. False financial statements are frequently exposed, causing credit crisis, and then leading to market economy downturn, corporate financing difficulties. However, capital is the life source of enterprises. In order to raise funds quickly, many St companies have entered the hutong of financial statement fraud, forming a vicious circle. In particular, the 2008 economic crisis has exacerbated this vicious circle. After the economic crisis, the demand of textile industry at home and abroad declined. The main business of textile import and export, the shares of Nanfang textile, suffered a serious decline in income, so they tried to diversify their investment. However, because of the overinvestment scope, the investment speed was fast. Within a few years, he owned more than 50 descendant companies, but not much in return. Under the circumstances of internal and external troubles, although the major shareholder trading companies have exempted the related debts, they still cannot reverse the situation. In addition, the internal structure is not perfect, the internal control is poor, and the executives are motivated by profit, and so on. Nanfang shares in 2006-2010 through earnings management for 5 consecutive years, false profits, become a typical fraud. However, the audit institutions only show "qualified opinion" on the financial report of Nanfang shares in 2011, other years are standard unqualified opinions, such behavior is nothing more than aiding the evil, which is contrary to the independence and impartiality of the audit. This paper analyzes the reasons and means of earnings management, and finds out that the company will have motive of earnings management in the face of internal and external pressure, especially in the face of delisting crisis. However, earnings management can only be delayed, can not really improve the operational distress, the positive impact of continuity. Finally, the paper puts forward the measures to prevent earnings management of listed companies, and puts forward to perfect the system of accountability system, to establish the system of endorsing the authenticity of statements by senior executives, to perfect the system of selecting and appointing firms, and to strictly implement the system of mandatory rotation of auditors; In view of the current situation of securities market supervision in China, it is suggested that the Securities Regulatory Commission should be given some special supervision privileges, establish a timely suspension system, and set up a specific standard of "buyer pays" to protect investors' rights and interests to a certain extent. In this paper, the listed companies abusing earnings management will be sounded a warning bell, investors will identify fraud rational investment, regulators will effectively control financial fraud to rectify the capital market, which has certain reference value.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F426.81;F406.7

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