本文選題：盈余管理 + 所有權(quán)性質(zhì)��； 參考：《企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)》2017年08期

【摘要】：本文基于2011-2015年滬深兩市A股主板制造業(yè)上市公司數(shù)據(jù),實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了盈余管理、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)與費(fèi)用粘性之間的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),由于國(guó)有企業(yè)嚴(yán)重的代理沖突,其費(fèi)用粘性水平顯著高于非國(guó)有企業(yè);盈余管理與費(fèi)用粘性的關(guān)系不能一概而論。交叉項(xiàng)的研究結(jié)果表明,產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)費(fèi)用粘性的影響要強(qiáng)于盈余管理。對(duì)此,企業(yè)可要求管理者披露費(fèi)用粘性信息,以更好地了解企業(yè)的費(fèi)用控制問(wèn)題,降低信息不對(duì)稱;同時(shí),通過(guò)制定約束與激勵(lì)機(jī)制來(lái)弱化代理沖突。最后,本文提出設(shè)置費(fèi)用粘性水平這一考核指標(biāo),豐富了績(jī)效考核體系的內(nèi)容,也為企業(yè)的績(jī)效考核實(shí)踐提供了一定的借鑒意義。
[Abstract]:The relationship between earnings management, property property and cost stickiness is tested on the basis of the data of 2011-2015 A stock market listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities. It is found that the stickiness level of the state-owned enterprises is significantly higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises because of the serious agency conflict in the state-owned enterprises; the relationship between earnings management and cost stickiness is not almost all. The results of the cross term study show that the property property has a stronger influence on the stickiness of the cost than the earnings management. In this case, the enterprise may require managers to disclose the sticky information of the cost to better understand the cost control of the enterprise and reduce the information asymmetry. At the same time, by making the constraint and incentive mechanism to weaken the agency conflict. Setting the index of cost sticky level enriches the content of the performance appraisal system, and provides a certain reference for the performance appraisal practice of enterprises.
【作者單位】： 太原理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：山西省軟科學(xué)課題項(xiàng)目“山西省煤層氣產(chǎn)業(yè)盈利模式創(chuàng)新研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):2015041009-1)
【分類號(hào)】：F406.7;F424;F832.51
，

本文編號(hào)：1974083