發(fā)布時間：2018-05-03 17:36

  本文選題：城市更新 + 既有建筑綠色改造��； 參考：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著社會經(jīng)濟的快速發(fā)展,城市發(fā)展過程中產生的城市問題愈發(fā)突出,城市建設中整體高速發(fā)展與局部日漸衰落的矛盾愈發(fā)明顯,高能耗老舊建筑量大而廣與更新改造效率后勁不足的沖突愈發(fā)尖銳。因此,傳統(tǒng)的改造模式迫切需要改變創(chuàng)新。在此背景下,本文希望從城市更新視角出發(fā),針對PPP模式應用于既有建筑綠色改造項目的科學、合理性進行分析探討。本文首先通過對相關理論進行梳理和總結,從動力機制、改造效益、發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀、運營效果等方面分析了城市更新、既有建筑綠色改造、PPP模式三者之間的交互關系,構建了理論關聯(lián)分析。其次,從政策、資源、經(jīng)濟、操作等方面作為切入點,分析了城市更新視角下,既有建筑綠色改造PPP模式的可行性。接著,以城市更新視角下的可持續(xù)發(fā)展和以人為本為導向,引入了開發(fā)性改造思維,對改造項目的可實現(xiàn)拓展收益進行最大限度的發(fā)掘,并以此為基礎對既有建筑綠色改造PPP運作模式進行構思設計。最后,基于有限理性假設建立政企雙方演化博弈的優(yōu)化模型,從復制動態(tài)方程演化結果出發(fā),優(yōu)化分析博弈雙方群體的演化穩(wěn)定策略。在案例分析部分,本文首先以深圳市塘朗小學綠色改造項目為基礎,將設計的既有建筑綠色改造PPP運作模式應用到該項目中進行案例模擬。接著,結合演化博弈模型,用Matlab R2015b進行仿真分析,分析在初始參數(shù)、政府群體及私營群體優(yōu)化參數(shù)后的演化穩(wěn)定均衡。最后在案例分析和仿真分析的基礎上,為政府群體及投資群體提出相關決策建議。案例分析及仿真結果表明,在該項目中,投資群體通過增大市場反饋調整力度,加大挖掘潛在合理的拓展性收益,能夠影響博弈系統(tǒng)朝向收斂于最優(yōu)均衡解的方向發(fā)展。此外,政府群體的政策決策也是決定博弈雙方走向良性均衡的重要因素,政府群體通過適當加大對綠色改造的激勵策略,科學合理地實行政策干預和公眾參與,能有效促進博弈雙方向最優(yōu)演化穩(wěn)定均衡方向發(fā)展。最后,根據(jù)案例分析的結論,為PPP項目運作中的政府群體及投資群體提出相關決策建議,以期促進綠色改造項目的實施,推動城市更新的發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of social economy, the urban problems in the process of urban development become more and more prominent, and the contradiction between the overall high-speed development and the local decline in urban construction becomes more and more obvious. The conflict between the high energy consumption old buildings and the renewal efficiency is more and more acute. Therefore, the traditional transformation model urgently needs to change the innovation. Under this background, this paper hopes to analyze and discuss the science and rationality of the application of PPP model in the green reconstruction projects of existing buildings from the perspective of urban renewal. Firstly, through combing and summing up the relevant theories, this paper analyzes the interaction among the three modes of urban renewal, existing building green transformation and PPP from the aspects of power mechanism, transformation benefit, development status quo, operation effect and so on. Theoretical correlation analysis is constructed. Secondly, from the aspects of policy, resources, economy, operation and so on, this paper analyzes the feasibility of PPP model of green reconstruction of existing buildings from the perspective of urban renewal. Then, with the view of sustainable development and people-oriented under the perspective of urban renewal, this paper introduces the thinking of development-oriented transformation, and excavates the realizable and expanding benefits of the transformation project to the maximum extent. And on this basis, the green transformation of existing buildings PPP operation model for conceptual design. Finally, based on the hypothesis of finite rationality, the optimization model of evolutionary game between government and enterprise is established, and the evolutionary stability strategy of both groups is optimized by replicating the evolution results of dynamic equation. In the part of case analysis, based on the green transformation project of Tanglang Primary School in Shenzhen City, this paper applies the PPP operation mode of green transformation of existing buildings to the project to carry out the case simulation. Then, combined with the evolutionary game model, Matlab R2015b is used to simulate and analyze the evolution stability equilibrium after the initial parameters, the government group and the private group optimize the parameters. Finally, on the basis of case analysis and simulation analysis, some suggestions are put forward for government and investment groups. The case analysis and simulation results show that, in this project, the investment group can increase the market feedback and increase the potential and reasonable exploitation income, which can influence the development of game system towards converging to the optimal equilibrium solution. In addition, the policy decision of the government group is also the important factor that decides the game both sides to move toward the benign equilibrium. The government group carries out the policy intervention and the public participation scientifically and reasonably through appropriately increasing the incentive strategy to the green transformation. It can effectively promote the two sides of the game to the direction of optimal evolution and stable equilibrium. Finally, according to the conclusion of the case analysis, this paper puts forward the relevant decision suggestions for the government groups and investment groups in the operation of the PPP project, in order to promote the implementation of the green transformation project and promote the development of urban renewal.
【學位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.92;F283

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