本文選題：股權(quán)激勵 + 公司高管��； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度下經(jīng)營權(quán)和所有權(quán)分離產(chǎn)生了代理問題,資本主義發(fā)達國家通過股權(quán)激勵來防止這一現(xiàn)象的發(fā)生,希望消除股東和經(jīng)理人之間的矛盾,使公司經(jīng)營步入正常軌道,共同促進企業(yè)績效上升。隨著中國經(jīng)濟的蓬勃發(fā)展,效仿該制度的企業(yè)越來越多,股權(quán)激勵也進入到一個“黃金時期”,研究股權(quán)激勵對日后我國上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵方案具有一定的現(xiàn)實意義。文章主要探究股權(quán)激勵對于公司績效是否起到應(yīng)有作用,選取海信電器作為本文的研究對象,在闡述股權(quán)激勵的理論基礎(chǔ)上,對其股權(quán)激勵三次行權(quán)的結(jié)果分析后發(fā)現(xiàn)海信電器存在代理行為。通過財務(wù)分析法對海信電器在股權(quán)激勵前后的2009-2017年的盈利能力、償債能力、成長能力、營運能力的數(shù)據(jù)分析后,發(fā)現(xiàn)海信電器在股權(quán)激勵期間公司業(yè)績表現(xiàn)良好及其市場狀況較佳都極有可能是其高管操縱所致,其公司業(yè)績在激勵方案實施后并沒有相應(yīng)得到提升;作者還發(fā)現(xiàn)海信電器高管設(shè)置短期的有效期、行權(quán)期間低買高賣股票來獲得個人所得稅的減免,進一步使其利益最大化;文章還對海信電器在證券市場的表現(xiàn)進行了分析,在剔除其他宏觀干擾環(huán)境下,驗證其股權(quán)激勵方案并未發(fā)揮應(yīng)有作用。通過研究海信電器的案例,作者認(rèn)為海信電器股權(quán)激勵方案存在這些問題:內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善;業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)過于簡單;行權(quán)、減持高管操控嚴(yán)重;激勵對象設(shè)定過于集中。因此應(yīng)該規(guī)范我國企業(yè)實施股權(quán)激勵計劃,完善上市公司的內(nèi)部治理,落實內(nèi)部監(jiān)督約束機制,合理設(shè)計遞延性的股權(quán)激勵方案,適當(dāng)培育職業(yè)經(jīng)理人儲備空間,設(shè)計遞延性的股權(quán)激勵方案,對經(jīng)理人定期業(yè)績考核,以此防止股權(quán)激勵淪為新時期經(jīng)濟體制下企業(yè)高管或股東之間謀求私利的新工具,從而才能有助于我國企業(yè)和經(jīng)濟市場良好發(fā)展。作者在案例上選用了兼具上市公司和國有企業(yè)性質(zhì)的海信電器,當(dāng)前中國處于經(jīng)濟體制改革的變革時期,國有企業(yè)作為中國改革的重要部分,勢必要求我們對此重視,研究其公司內(nèi)部治理問題對于以后能夠切實地解決中國國企績效低下、缺乏競爭力的問題。
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, the separation of management right and ownership has caused the agency problem. The capitalist developed countries prevent this phenomenon by means of equity incentive, hoping to eliminate the contradiction between shareholders and managers, and make the company operate on a normal track. Jointly promote enterprise performance rise. With the vigorous development of Chinese economy, more and more enterprises emulate the system, and equity incentive has entered a "golden period". The study of equity incentive has certain practical significance for the future implementation of equity incentive scheme of listed companies in China. This paper mainly explores whether equity incentive plays a due role in corporate performance, selects Hisense Electric as the research object of this paper, and expounds the theoretical basis of equity incentive. After analyzing the results of three exercise of equity incentive, it is found that Hisense Electric has agency behavior. After analyzing the data of Hisense Electric's profitability, solvency, growth capacity and operating capacity in 2009-2017 before and after equity incentive through financial analysis, It is found that the good performance of Hisense Electric during the period of equity incentive and its better market condition are probably caused by the manipulation of its executives, and its performance has not been promoted correspondingly after the implementation of the incentive scheme. The author also finds that Hisense executives set short term of validity, buy low and sell stocks in order to obtain personal income tax relief during the exercise of power, and further maximize the benefits of Hisense, and analyze the performance of Hisense Electric in the stock market. The equity incentive scheme does not play its due role in eliminating other macroscopical disturbance environment. By studying the case of Hisense Electric, the author thinks that there are some problems in the scheme: the internal governance structure is not perfect; the performance appraisal index is too simple; the exercise of power, the reduction of executive control is serious; the incentive object is set too centralized. Therefore, we should standardize the implementation of equity incentive plan for Chinese enterprises, perfect the internal governance of listed companies, implement the internal supervision and restraint mechanism, reasonably design deferred equity incentive schemes, and properly cultivate the professional managers' reserve space. To design a deferred equity incentive scheme to assess managers' performance regularly, so as to prevent equity incentive from becoming a new tool for seeking personal interests among executives or shareholders in the new economic system. Only then can help our country enterprise and the economic market good development. In the case, the author chooses Hisense Electric, which is both listed company and state-owned enterprise. At present, China is in the period of economic system reform. As an important part of China's reform, the state-owned enterprise is bound to require us to attach importance to it. The study of internal governance can effectively solve the problem of low performance and lack of competitiveness of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.6;F272.92;F406.7

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