本文選題：大股東 + 股權(quán)質(zhì)押��； 參考：《石河子大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)上市公司大多數(shù)都存在較為集中的股權(quán)情況,公司治理的委托代理問(wèn)題已經(jīng)從股東與管理層間的利益沖突轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榇蠊蓶|同中小股東間利益沖突。當(dāng)以謀求自身利益為目的時(shí),大股東憑借持有股權(quán)獲得較高的控制權(quán)地位,影響著上市公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)發(fā)展和利益相關(guān)者的投資決策。目前,我國(guó)上市公司頻繁出現(xiàn)大股東高份額質(zhì)押股權(quán)的現(xiàn)象。大股東不需要轉(zhuǎn)讓股權(quán),就可以借助股權(quán)質(zhì)押這種融資渠道在短期內(nèi)獲取大量資金。在股權(quán)質(zhì)押期間,被質(zhì)押的股權(quán)受到上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)和股票市場(chǎng)中股價(jià)波動(dòng)的影響,存在股價(jià)下跌甚至瀕臨質(zhì)押警戒線的可能,影響到全體股東的權(quán)益和上市公司的發(fā)展。而大股東將被質(zhì)押股權(quán)帶來(lái)的股東權(quán)益變動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)嫁給質(zhì)權(quán)人,這促使了大股東利益侵占的動(dòng)機(jī),危害了上市公司及利益相關(guān)者的合法權(quán)益。因此,研究大股東的股權(quán)質(zhì)押?jiǎn)栴}具有很強(qiáng)的理論價(jià)值和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文以深圳市同洲電子股份有限公司為案例,分析了大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)類型。依據(jù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響的主體,提出具有針對(duì)性的建議。首先,闡述了本文的研究背景和研究意義,從大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押動(dòng)機(jī),股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)類型和股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)應(yīng)對(duì)三個(gè)角度對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行整理和評(píng)述;其次,本文用到的相關(guān)概念和理論基礎(chǔ),從股權(quán)質(zhì)押制度和信息披露制度兩方面介紹了制度背景;再次,對(duì)同洲電子大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押的過(guò)程進(jìn)行了介紹,分析了大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押動(dòng)機(jī)和股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資中的利益侵占方式;最后,對(duì)大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行具體的分類和分析,并得出結(jié)論和政策建議。通過(guò)研究發(fā)現(xiàn),大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押行為被質(zhì)押股權(quán)的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)在質(zhì)押期間轉(zhuǎn)移給了質(zhì)權(quán)人,加深了大股東控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離程度,印證了大股東利用股權(quán)質(zhì)押獲取大量資金并進(jìn)行利益侵占的動(dòng)機(jī)。在此情況下,引發(fā)了大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、處置風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。針對(duì)于上述情況,本文提出了如下建議:(1)完善上市公司的內(nèi)部治理,制定對(duì)于大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押行為規(guī)范的公司制度,做好相應(yīng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)警和應(yīng)對(duì)機(jī)制;(2)加強(qiáng)中小股東和質(zhì)權(quán)人等利益相關(guān)者在公司經(jīng)過(guò)程中經(jīng)營(yíng)的參與程度和相關(guān)信息的知情權(quán);(3)進(jìn)一步完善大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押的制度規(guī)范和相應(yīng)的信息披露制度。
[Abstract]:Most of the listed companies in our country have concentrated stock rights. The principal-agent problem of corporate governance has changed from the conflict of interests between shareholders and management to the conflict of interests between large shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders.When the purpose is to seek for their own interests, the majority shareholders obtain a higher position of control by holding equity, which affects the management and development of listed companies and the investment decisions of stakeholders.At present, China's listed companies frequently appear the phenomenon of large shareholders' high shares of pledged shares.Large shareholders do not need to transfer equity, can use equity pledge this financing channel in the short term to obtain a large number of funds.During the period of stock pledge, the pledged shares are affected by the operating performance of listed companies and the fluctuation of stock price in the stock market. There is the possibility that the stock price will fall or even be close to the warning line of pledge, which will affect the rights and interests of all shareholders and the development of listed companies.However, the major shareholders pass on the risk of the change of shareholders' rights and interests brought by the pledge to the mortgagee, which promotes the motive of the major shareholders' interest encroachment and endangers the legitimate rights and interests of listed companies and stakeholders.Therefore, it is of great theoretical value and practical significance to study the issue of equity pledge of major shareholders.Taking Shenzhen Tongzhou Electronic Co., Ltd as an example, this paper analyzes the risk types of major shareholder equity pledge financing.According to the subject of risk influence, the paper puts forward some specific suggestions.First of all, this paper expounds the research background and significance of this paper, from the major shareholders' equity pledge motivation, equity pledge financing risk type and equity pledge financing risk should be three angles to collate and comment on the relevant literature of domestic and foreign scholars; secondly,This paper uses the relevant concepts and theoretical basis, from the equity pledge system and information disclosure system to introduce the system background; again, the process of Tongzhou electronic major shareholders equity pledge is introduced.The paper analyzes the motivation of major shareholders' equity pledge and the ways of interest encroachment in the financing of equity pledge. Finally, the paper classifies and analyzes the risk of major shareholders' equity pledge financing, and draws conclusions and policy recommendations.Through the research, it is found that the cash flow rights of the pledged shares are transferred to the mortgagee during the period of pledge, which deepens the separation degree between the control rights and the cash flow rights of the major shareholders.Confirmed that the major shareholders use equity pledge to obtain a large number of funds and interest usurpation motivation.In this case, it leads to moral hazard, disposal risk and market risk.In view of the above situation, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: 1) perfecting the internal governance of listed companies and establishing a company system that regulates the behavior of major shareholders' equity pledge.(2) strengthen the participation of stakeholders such as minority shareholders and hypothecators in the course of the company's operation and the right to know the relevant information. 3) further improve the system of equity pledge of large shareholders.Standardizing and corresponding information disclosure system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.6;F406.7

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