本文選題：高管薪酬　切入點(diǎn)：相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)　出處：《沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在當(dāng)今知識(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代,高管人員對(duì)公司的重要性不言而喻,并已經(jīng)逐漸成為公司的一種核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,這也使得高水平的薪酬成為公司吸引和留住高級(jí)管理人才的重要武器。但隨之而來(lái)的問(wèn)題是,高管薪酬是否與其業(yè)績(jī)相匹配。因此,如何準(zhǔn)確客觀地衡量公司業(yè)績(jī),并以此制定出高效合理的高管薪酬制度成為了近些年的研究熱點(diǎn)。由于公司的業(yè)績(jī)很大程度上受到一些外生性因素的影響,因此有必要通過(guò)一套可過(guò)濾外部環(huán)境影響的業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)方法來(lái)刻畫(huà)高管的經(jīng)營(yíng)能力和努力程度,相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。對(duì)于成長(zhǎng)性公司的高管來(lái)說(shuō),公司成長(zhǎng)性越高,面臨的不確定性就越大,因此相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)的使用能夠?yàn)楦吖芴峁┰诓环�(wěn)定的環(huán)境下,對(duì)抗共同的外生性沖擊的保證,降低其所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。那么我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬合約中是否存在使用相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)的證據(jù)?公司成長(zhǎng)性與高管薪酬合約中相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)的使用程度之間存在什么關(guān)系?這是本文要研究的問(wèn)題。本文選取2012年至2014年滬深兩市的制造業(yè)上市公司為研究樣本,利用SPSS22.0統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件,通過(guò)理論與實(shí)證相結(jié)合的方法檢驗(yàn)了我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬合約中是否存在使用相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)的證據(jù),即高管薪酬的制定是否參照了同行業(yè)業(yè)績(jī),并進(jìn)一步考察了公司成長(zhǎng)性與高管薪酬合約中相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)使用程度的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果表明,當(dāng)選取資產(chǎn)收益率和股票回報(bào)率分別作為會(huì)計(jì)回報(bào)和股票回報(bào)方面的指標(biāo)來(lái)衡量公司業(yè)績(jī)時(shí),存在使用相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)的證據(jù)。進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn)的結(jié)果表明,公司成長(zhǎng)性越高,高管薪酬合約中相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)的使用程度越低,即兩者呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。據(jù)此,本文結(jié)合我國(guó)上市公司的實(shí)際情況,從科學(xué)評(píng)價(jià)公司業(yè)績(jī)方面提出了一些合理的建議,以期望能夠較好地完善我國(guó)上市公司的高管薪酬制度。
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, the importance of executives to the company is self-evident, and has gradually become a core competitiveness of the company. This also makes high levels of pay an important weapon for companies to attract and retain senior managers. But the question is whether executive pay matches their performance. So how to accurately and objectively measure corporate performance? It has become a research focus in recent years to establish an efficient and reasonable executive compensation system. The performance of the company is largely influenced by some exogenous factors. Therefore, it is necessary to use a set of performance evaluation methods which can filter the external environmental impact to describe the management ability and the degree of effort of the executives, and the relative performance evaluation emerges as the times require. For the executives of the growth companies, the higher the growth, the higher the growth. The greater the uncertainty, the more the use of relative performance evaluations can provide executives with the assurance to withstand common exogenous shocks in an unstable environment. Reduce the risk it faces. Then is there evidence of the use of relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contracts of listed companies in China? What is the relationship between corporate growth and the relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contracts? This is the question to be studied in this paper. This paper selects manufacturing companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2012 to 2014 as the research samples, and uses SPSS22.0 statistical software. Through the combination of theory and empirical methods, this paper tests whether there is evidence of relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contracts of listed companies in China, that is, whether the formulation of executive compensation refers to the performance of the same industry. Furthermore, the relationship between corporate growth and relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contracts is investigated. When the return on assets and the return on stock are selected as the indicators of accounting return and stock return respectively to measure the performance of the company, there is evidence of using relative performance evaluation. The further test results show that the higher the growth of the company, the higher the performance of the company. The lower the degree of relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contract is, the negative correlation exists between the two. According to the actual situation of listed companies in China, this paper puts forward some reasonable suggestions from the aspect of scientific evaluation of company performance. In order to hope to be able to better improve the executive compensation system of listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F425;F272.5

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