本文選題：高新技術(shù)企業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：股權(quán)激勵　出處：《安徽大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著現(xiàn)代企業(yè)的發(fā)展,所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)逐步分離已經(jīng)成為主流趨勢。正是在這種大背景之下,使得企業(yè)在經(jīng)營效率和專業(yè)性方面得到了較大的提升,與此同時,委托代理所衍生的問題也應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。股東與經(jīng)營者兩者之間如何達(dá)成利益共識,是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)亟需解決的重要問題。美國在上世紀(jì)30年代誕生了股權(quán)激勵,通過數(shù)十年不斷實(shí)踐與發(fā)展,其已成為了解決委托代理及其衍生問題最重要的方法之一。2006年我國發(fā)布了第一份針對上市公司有關(guān)股權(quán)激勵的指導(dǎo)文件——《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法(試行)》,這被視為我國股權(quán)改革的開端。從股改至今,股權(quán)激勵在中國已經(jīng)有了十多年的實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn)。隨著國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的騰飛,股權(quán)激勵在我國企業(yè)中的運(yùn)用也越來越廣泛。股權(quán)激勵確實(shí)可以給企業(yè)帶來一些影響,然而,股權(quán)激勵究竟能否提高了公司的業(yè)績,它的實(shí)施能給企業(yè)帶來怎樣的效果,仍然是需要深入研究的問題。本文基于代理理論、人力資本理論等理論基礎(chǔ),選擇近年來熱門的公司治理模式——股權(quán)激勵,運(yùn)用規(guī)范研究法和案例分析法,梳理了相關(guān)資料文獻(xiàn),以—家中小型民營高新技術(shù)企業(yè)Y公司作為主體來研究其實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵的效用。以Y公司股權(quán)激勵的實(shí)施動因作為切入點(diǎn),分要素闡述研究了 Y公司的股權(quán)激勵方案。然后對Y公司財(cái)務(wù)效果及非財(cái)務(wù)效果進(jìn)行分析,可以看出Y公司在實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵后,經(jīng)營業(yè)績大幅上升,各項(xiàng)指標(biāo)呈良性發(fā)展,創(chuàng)新能力逐年提高。表明Y公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵帶來的是正面效應(yīng)。本文共分為六章。第一章是緒論,介紹了研究背景和意義,研究思路和方法,梳理了國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),并點(diǎn)出本文的創(chuàng)新和不足。第二章介紹了股權(quán)激勵的相關(guān)理論,包括其概念、模式、理論基礎(chǔ)及股權(quán)激勵效果的評價方法。第三章介紹了 Y公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵的動因及具體實(shí)施方案。首先對Y公司進(jìn)行簡要的介紹;然后分析了 Y公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵的動因;最后按要素詳細(xì)介紹了 Y公司股權(quán)激勵的實(shí)施方案。第四章分析了 Y公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵的效果,包括財(cái)務(wù)效果和非財(cái)務(wù)效果,并對實(shí)施效果進(jìn)行了總結(jié)。第五章分析了 Y公司成功實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵得出的啟示。最后一章是本文的研究結(jié)論與展望。
[Abstract]:With the development of modern enterprises, the separation of ownership and management rights has become the mainstream trend. The problems arising from principal-agent emerge as the times require. How to reach a consensus of interests between shareholders and managers is an important problem that needs to be solved in modern enterprises. Through decades of continuous practice and development, It has become one of the most important methods to solve the problem of principal-agent and its derivation. In 2006, our country issued the first guidance document on equity incentive of listed companies-< Management method of Equity incentive of listed companies (on trial) >. Is regarded as the beginning of China's equity reform. With the rapid development of national economy, equity incentive is more and more widely used in Chinese enterprises. Equity incentive can bring some influence to enterprises, however, Whether the equity incentive can improve the performance of the company and what kind of effect it can bring to the enterprise is still a problem to be deeply studied. This paper is based on the theory of agency theory, human capital theory and so on. Choosing the popular corporate governance model in recent years-equity incentive, using normative research method and case analysis method, combing the relevant documents, Take Y Company, a small and medium-sized private high-tech enterprise, as the main body to study the utility of implementing equity incentive, and take Y Company as the starting point for the implementation of equity incentive. After analyzing the financial effect and non-financial effect of Y Company, it can be seen that Y Company has a substantial increase in operating performance and a benign development of each index after the implementation of equity incentive. This paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, introduces the research background and significance, the research ideas and methods, combs the related literature at home and abroad. The second chapter introduces the relevant theory of equity incentive, including its concept, model, Chapter three introduces the motivation and the concrete implementation scheme of the equity incentive in Y Company. Firstly, it briefly introduces Y Company, then analyzes the motivation of the equity incentive in Y Company. Chapter four analyzes the effect of equity incentive in Y company, including financial effect and non-financial effect. The last chapter is the conclusion and prospect of this paper.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.6;F272.92

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