基于博弈論的裝配式建筑政府補(bǔ)償機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-03-22 13:08
本文選題:裝配式建筑 切入點(diǎn):政府補(bǔ)償 出處:《建筑技術(shù)》2017年08期 論文類型:期刊論文
【摘要】:基于裝配式建筑成本高,推廣使用困難的特點(diǎn),提出裝配式建筑政府補(bǔ)償機(jī)制,分析主要利益相關(guān)主體,政府方、項(xiàng)目業(yè)主方、預(yù)制構(gòu)件廠商的相互關(guān)系,運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論和激勵(lì)理論,設(shè)計(jì)裝配式建筑的政府補(bǔ)償機(jī)制,并運(yùn)用博弈論模型進(jìn)行理論分析,為政府制定合理的補(bǔ)償機(jī)制強(qiáng)度提供依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Based on the characteristics of high cost of prefabricated construction and difficulty in popularizing it, the government compensation mechanism of prefabricated building is put forward, and the relationship among main stakeholders, government, project owner and prefabricated component manufacturer is analyzed. By using the theory of economic mechanism design and incentive theory, the government compensation mechanism of prefabricated building is designed, and the theoretical analysis is carried out by using game theory model, which provides the basis for the government to formulate reasonable compensation mechanism intensity.
【作者單位】: 沈陽建筑大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】:住房和城鄉(xiāng)建設(shè)部基金項(xiàng)目(2011-R3-27) 沈陽市城鄉(xiāng)建設(shè)委員會(huì)基金項(xiàng)目(sjw2013-07)
【分類號(hào)】:F224.32;F426.92
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本文編號(hào):1648784
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