本文選題：電子廢棄物　切入點(diǎn)：生產(chǎn)者責(zé)任延伸制度　出處：《現(xiàn)代管理科學(xué)》2017年07期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)電器電子產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)者責(zé)任延伸制度正在逐步建立發(fā)展,引入第三方征信機(jī)構(gòu)參與制度建設(shè)之必然。文章通過(guò)博弈論,構(gòu)建政府、企業(yè)和第三方征信機(jī)構(gòu)三方博弈模型,求解均衡,得出不同行為主體做決策的影響因素。結(jié)果表明:企業(yè)是否履行生產(chǎn)者責(zé)任延伸制度與政府監(jiān)管力度和獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制有關(guān),加大監(jiān)管力度,加強(qiáng)對(duì)企業(yè)獎(jiǎng)懲能夠促進(jìn)使企業(yè)更好的履行生產(chǎn)者責(zé)任延伸制度,同時(shí)引入第三方征信機(jī)構(gòu),降低政府監(jiān)管成本,有利于電器電子產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)責(zé)任延伸制度實(shí)施。
[Abstract]:The extended system of producer responsibility of electrical and electronic products in China is being established and developed step by step, and the third party credit agency is introduced into the construction of the system. Through game theory, this paper constructs a game model between government, enterprise and third party credit agency. The results show that whether or not enterprises fulfill the extended system of producer responsibility is related to the government supervision, reward and punishment mechanism, and strengthen the supervision. Strengthening the reward and punishment of enterprises can promote the extension system of producer responsibility for enterprises, at the same time, introduce third-party credit agencies, reduce the cost of government supervision and control, which is conducive to the implementation of the extended system of responsibility for the production of electrical and electronic products.
【作者單位】： 中國(guó)人民大學(xué)環(huán)境學(xué)院;國(guó)家信息中心;
【基金】：國(guó)家重點(diǎn)研發(fā)計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目(項(xiàng)目號(hào):2016YFA0602601)
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F426.6

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本文編號(hào)：1578154