本文關(guān)鍵詞： 夢潔家紡 股權(quán)激勵 事件研究法 杜邦分析　出處：《深圳大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：20世紀(jì)以來,隨著世界經(jīng)濟快速增長,企業(yè)的規(guī)模也越來越大,為應(yīng)對日趨復(fù)雜的企業(yè)管理活動,職業(yè)經(jīng)理人制度應(yīng)運而生。經(jīng)理人制度的產(chǎn)生,提高了企業(yè)管理的專業(yè)性,但也帶來了職業(yè)經(jīng)理人與企業(yè)所有者目標(biāo)偏離等種種代理問題。在此背景下,為有效激勵經(jīng)理人,減少企業(yè)所有者與職業(yè)經(jīng)理人之間的代理成本,股權(quán)激勵制度誕生了。我國自20世紀(jì)90年代引入股權(quán)激勵制度,隨著實行股權(quán)激勵的經(jīng)濟環(huán)境、法律環(huán)境日趨完善,近年上市公司紛紛推出股權(quán)激勵方案。由此,股權(quán)激勵實施對上市公司的財務(wù)影響及激勵效果問題,也就成為當(dāng)前財務(wù)理論界研究的熱點問題。本文以夢潔家紡股權(quán)激勵案例為研究對象,擬對上述問題進行深入研究,為上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵提供參考。本文通過運用事件研究法、EVA模型、杜邦分析等研究方法,以夢潔家紡股權(quán)激勵案例為研究對象,深入分析了夢潔家紡股權(quán)激勵財務(wù)效果、對經(jīng)營績效影響及股權(quán)激勵事件的市場反應(yīng)等問題。本文主要分為六個部分:第一部分緒論。主要介紹研究背景、意義、內(nèi)容及方法;第二部分股權(quán)激勵基礎(chǔ)理論與文獻綜述。簡要介紹了股權(quán)激勵的相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)理論及國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀;第三部分夢潔公司股權(quán)激勵案例簡介與動因分析。主要介紹股權(quán)激勵案例簡要情況,并以SWOT分析方法為框架對股權(quán)激勵的實施動因進行了分析;第四部分夢潔公司股權(quán)激勵實施效果分析。深入分析了股權(quán)激勵實施對公司財務(wù)活動、財務(wù)狀況、綜合績效EVA的影響及激勵事件的市場反應(yīng);第五部分股權(quán)激勵力度分析與效果分析。深入股權(quán)激勵實施對激勵對象的作用與效果;第六部分結(jié)論與建議�？偨Y(jié)研究結(jié)論并提出建議。通過上述研究,本文得出如下結(jié)論:(一)股權(quán)激勵實施對公司財務(wù)活動產(chǎn)生了積極影響;(二)股權(quán)激勵實施對公司財務(wù)狀況產(chǎn)生了積極正面的影響;(三)股權(quán)激勵實施對公司經(jīng)營績效的提高助益顯著;(四)股權(quán)激勵實施的市場反應(yīng)良好;(五)股權(quán)激勵實施對公司高管激勵效果顯著。
[Abstract]:Since 20th century, with the rapid growth of the world economy, the scale of enterprises has become larger and larger. In order to cope with the increasingly complex enterprise management activities, the professional manager system has emerged. However, it also brings all kinds of agency problems, such as the deviation of the target between the professional manager and the enterprise owner. In this context, in order to effectively motivate the manager and reduce the agency cost between the enterprise owner and the professional manager, The equity incentive system was born in China since 1990s. With the economic environment of equity incentive, the legal environment is becoming more and more perfect, and in recent years, listed companies have introduced equity incentive schemes. The financial impact and incentive effect of the implementation of equity incentive on listed companies has become a hot issue in the field of financial theory. This paper takes the case of Mengjie Home Textiles equity incentive as the research object, and intends to conduct a thorough study on the above issues. Through the methods of EVA model, DuPont analysis and so on, taking the case of Mengjie home textile stock incentive as the research object, this paper deeply analyzes the financial effect of the equity incentive of Mengjie Home Textiles. This paper is divided into six parts: the first part is introduction. It mainly introduces the research background, significance, content and methods; The second part is the basic theory and literature review of equity incentive. The third part introduces the case and motivation of equity incentive of Mengjie Company. It mainly introduces the case of equity incentive, and analyzes the motivation of equity incentive based on SWOT analysis method. 4th part of Mengjie Company equity incentive effect analysis. Deeply analyzed the impact of equity incentive implementation on the company's financial activities, financial situation, comprehensive performance of EVA and the market response of incentive events; 5th part of equity incentive strength analysis and effect analysis. Deep implementation of equity incentive on the role and effect of incentive objects; 6th part of the conclusions and recommendations. Summary of the conclusions and recommendations. Through the above research, This paper draws the following conclusions: (1) the implementation of equity incentive has a positive impact on the financial activities of the company. (2) the implementation of equity incentive has a positive and positive impact on the financial situation of the company (3) the implementation of equity incentive has a positive impact on the company's financial activities. (4) the market response of equity incentive is good and (5) the effect of equity incentive is remarkable.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：深圳大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.81;F272.92

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