本文關(guān)鍵詞： 昆藥集團(tuán) 股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案設(shè)計(jì) 財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)分析 盈余管理　出處：《石河子大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著公司控制權(quán)與所有權(quán)的分離,管理層與股東之間的代理問題成為公司治理中的一個(gè)重要問題,而激勵(lì)是解決代理問題的基本途徑和方法。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為激勵(lì)方式的一種,在解決代理沖突問題上是有其獨(dú)到之處的。在西方國家,股權(quán)激勵(lì)早已大行其道,但在我國股權(quán)激勵(lì)的廣泛開展就顯得比較滯后了:直到20世紀(jì)90年代,股權(quán)激勵(lì)這一激勵(lì)方式才被我國企業(yè)廣泛運(yùn)用。在開始之初,我國上市公司開展的股權(quán)激勵(lì)往往頗具“中國特色”,比較典型的有武漢模式、上海模式、深圳模式,不過由于其重監(jiān)管而輕激勵(lì),這些都算不上真正的股權(quán)激勵(lì),其實(shí)踐效果也不是很理想。進(jìn)入新世紀(jì)以來,隨著相關(guān)法律法規(guī)的進(jìn)一步完善,股權(quán)激勵(lì)開始真正普及開來,昆藥集團(tuán)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃正是在這種背景下開展的。由于該集團(tuán)的業(yè)績符合股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的一系列規(guī)定,該公司管理層先后在2014、2015、2016三個(gè)年度獲得相應(yīng)的限制性股票。此結(jié)局看似皆大歡喜:公司順利完成預(yù)定業(yè)績,管理層也因此獲得了豐厚的收益。但事實(shí)果真如此嗎?管理層有無可能通過機(jī)會(huì)主義行為獲取本不應(yīng)獲取的利益?本文以昆藥集團(tuán)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案為案例,深入探討股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案設(shè)計(jì)是否合理,研究執(zhí)行前后昆藥集團(tuán)相關(guān)財(cái)務(wù)狀況的變化以及在股權(quán)激勵(lì)過程中昆藥集團(tuán)管理層有無通過機(jī)會(huì)主義行為不當(dāng)獲益、損害外部投資者利益。首先,對(duì)本文的研究背景及研究意義進(jìn)行分析,并對(duì)國內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)以及股權(quán)激勵(lì)中的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為研究進(jìn)行總結(jié)回顧;其次,總結(jié)本文所使用的相關(guān)概念及理論,并對(duì)有關(guān)理論進(jìn)行細(xì)致的梳理分析;再次,對(duì)本文的案例公司進(jìn)行簡單介紹;接下來,通過同行業(yè)對(duì)比法與財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)法研究方案設(shè)計(jì)存否存在問題,接著運(yùn)用財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)法分析公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況,研究本次股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)的影響;而后,結(jié)合財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)與其他數(shù)據(jù)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)公司管理層在股權(quán)激勵(lì)中存在不當(dāng)獲利的行為。最后,總結(jié)本文的研究結(jié)論,首先激勵(lì)方案設(shè)計(jì)本身就存在一定的問題,其次,昆藥集團(tuán)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)總體上提高了企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)狀況,在股權(quán)激勵(lì)過程中并未采取分股利分配政策等行為侵害外部投資者利益,但是在股權(quán)激勵(lì)執(zhí)行過程中管理層存在機(jī)會(huì)主義行為:通過調(diào)整壞賬準(zhǔn)備的方式虛增了公司利潤。接下來,列出了相關(guān)建議:制定更加合理和完善的激勵(lì)制度;在企業(yè)內(nèi)部制度建設(shè)中,優(yōu)化企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制,提高企業(yè)的相關(guān)信息披露水準(zhǔn);在外部市場環(huán)境建設(shè)中,應(yīng)當(dāng)建立健全的資本市場,完善股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)法規(guī),此外,還應(yīng)當(dāng)加強(qiáng)經(jīng)理人市場建設(shè)。
[Abstract]:With the separation of corporate control and ownership, the agency between management and shareholders has become an important issue in corporate governance. The incentive is the basic way and method to solve the agency problem. As one of the incentive ways, the equity incentive has its unique characteristics in solving the agency conflict. In the western countries, equity incentive has long been popular. However, the extensive development of equity incentive in China appears to be lagging behind: until 1990s, equity incentive was not widely used by Chinese enterprises. At the beginning of the beginning. China's listed companies often carry out equity incentives with "Chinese characteristics", more typical of the Wuhan model, Shanghai model, Shenzhen model, but because of its heavy supervision and less incentive. These are not real equity incentive, its practical effect is not very ideal. In the new century, with the further improvement of relevant laws and regulations, equity incentive began to really popularize. It is against this backdrop that Kunming's equity incentive plan is being developed. Because the group's performance is in line with a series of provisions of the equity incentive plan, the company's management was in 20142015. The three years of 2016 get the corresponding restricted stock. The result seems to be happy: the company is doing well and its management is making a big profit. But is that true??? Is it possible for management to gain undeserving benefits through opportunistic behavior? This paper takes the equity incentive scheme of Kunming Pharmaceutical Group as a case to discuss whether the design of equity incentive scheme is reasonable. Study before and after the implementation of Kun Pharmaceutical Group related financial changes and in the process of equity incentive whether the management of Kunming Group through opportunism improper behavior to harm the interests of external investors. First of all. The research background and significance of this paper are analyzed, and the domestic and foreign scholars on equity incentive and equity incentive in the opportunistic behavior are summarized and reviewed; Secondly, summarizes the related concepts and theories used in this paper, and makes a detailed analysis of the relevant theories. Thirdly, the case of the company is briefly introduced; Next, through the same industry contrast method and the financial index method to study the scheme design existence question, then uses the financial index method to analyze the company's financial condition, studies this stock right incentive to the company financial index influence; Then, combined with financial indicators and other data research found that corporate management in equity incentive in the presence of improper profit behavior. Finally, summarize the conclusions of this paper. Firstly, there are some problems in the design of incentive scheme itself. Secondly, the equity incentive of Kunming Pharmaceutical Group has improved the financial situation of the enterprise as a whole. In the process of equity incentive, no dividend distribution policy has been taken against the interests of external investors. However, in the process of equity incentive implementation, the management has opportunistic behavior: by adjusting the preparation for bad debts, the profits of the company are increased. Next, the relevant suggestions are listed: to establish a more reasonable and perfect incentive system; In the enterprise internal system construction, the optimization enterprise internal governance mechanism, enhances the enterprise related information disclosure standard; In the construction of external market environment, we should establish a sound capital market, perfect the relevant laws and regulations of equity incentive, in addition, we should strengthen the construction of manager market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.72;F272.92

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 王君彩;張娟;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)、市場反應(yīng)與公司治理效果——基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的研究[J];中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2016年05期

2 袁振興;;股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的源條件、代理問題及其激勵(lì)效果——雛鷹農(nóng)牧股份公司股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的案例分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)之友;2016年02期

3 邵帥;周濤;呂長江;;產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)設(shè)計(jì)動(dòng)機(jī)——上海家化案例分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2014年10期

4 張娟;黃志忠;;高管報(bào)酬、機(jī)會(huì)主義盈余管理和審計(jì)費(fèi)用——基于盈余管理異質(zhì)性的視角[J];南開管理評(píng)論;2014年03期

5 周嘉南;雷霆;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)影響上市公司權(quán)益資本成本了嗎?[J];管理評(píng)論;2014年03期

6 許汝俊;龍子午;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)與經(jīng)理人機(jī)會(huì)主義行為研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2014年09期

7 徐倩;;不確定性、股權(quán)激勵(lì)與非效率投資[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2014年03期

8 周軍;翟燕;;會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性或高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)——不同代理沖突下的治理方式選擇[J];證券市場導(dǎo)報(bào);2013年02期

9 王燁;葉玲;盛明泉;;管理層權(quán)力、機(jī)會(huì)主義動(dòng)機(jī)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃設(shè)計(jì)[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2012年10期

10 肖淑芳;喻夢穎;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)與股利分配——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2012年08期

，

本文編號(hào)：1489570