廣東省戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)專利聯(lián)盟合作博弈研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-10-15 10:21
【摘要】：從跨國企業(yè)的先進做法來看,組建專利聯(lián)盟已經(jīng)成為一種重要的知識產(chǎn)權(quán)競爭利器,通過建立專利壁壘對中國企業(yè)進行專利圍剿,阻礙中國企業(yè)進入市場。在這種背景下,我國廣東省戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)也陸續(xù)組建了相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè)專利聯(lián)盟,所組建模式大概分為以下三種：一是企業(yè)自發(fā)創(chuàng)建,政府積極支持；二是協(xié)會統(tǒng)籌創(chuàng)建,政府培育推動；三是政府主導創(chuàng)建,各方聯(lián)動發(fā)展。在組建專利聯(lián)盟過程中,政府、企業(yè)、高校和科研機構(gòu)以及中介機構(gòu)都發(fā)揮了不同的作用,都是專利聯(lián)盟的參與主體,且這些聯(lián)盟尚處于發(fā)展的初級階段,有別于目前學術(shù)界研究比較多的國外成熟型專利聯(lián)盟,其主要目的是促進企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新和專利應(yīng)訴能力,而不是進行專利許可交易。 本文以合作博弈為研究方法,以廣東省戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)為背景,詳細分析該背景下組建的專利聯(lián)盟的需求,然后介紹“政產(chǎn)學研介”各主體在專利聯(lián)盟中發(fā)揮的作用,重點研究專利聯(lián)盟技術(shù)創(chuàng)新合作和專利訴訟合作過程中的收益分配及成本分擔問題。具體來講,本文主要研究內(nèi)容包括以下三個方面： 1、根據(jù)目前已有的專利聯(lián)盟、戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟、產(chǎn)學研聯(lián)盟等研究成果,界定“政產(chǎn)學研介”專利聯(lián)盟的具體內(nèi)涵,并以中山市半導體照明行業(yè)知識產(chǎn)權(quán)聯(lián)盟為實例進行分析。目前廣東省戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)組建的專利聯(lián)盟多屬于防御性質(zhì),再加上中外市場化程度的不同,除了企業(yè)之外,政府、學研方和中介機構(gòu)在聯(lián)盟的組建和合作過程中都發(fā)揮了重要作用。目前組建的專利聯(lián)盟的主要作用不是進行專利交叉許可和交易,而是技術(shù)創(chuàng)新合作和專利訴訟合作。 2、運用基于科布道格拉斯生產(chǎn)函數(shù)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新投入產(chǎn)出模型,引進人力投入L和資金投入K兩個變量,分析不同參與主體合作模式下的創(chuàng)新收益,得出“政產(chǎn)學研介”五位一體同時參與為最優(yōu)合作技術(shù)創(chuàng)新合作模式。然后基于Shapley值法對該創(chuàng)新收益在參與主體間進行合理分配,發(fā)現(xiàn)各主體分配獲得收益均優(yōu)于不合作時的收益。 3、通過目前企業(yè)專利訴訟現(xiàn)狀分析及所遇問題進行相關(guān)假設(shè),然后建立合作博弈模型分析,得到最優(yōu)的專利信息檢索和防御布局成本投入,最后基于Rubinstein討價還價模型求出成本分擔系數(shù)。
[Abstract]:From the point of view of the advanced practices of multinational enterprises, the establishment of patent alliance has become an important competitive tool for intellectual property rights. Through the establishment of patent barriers, Chinese enterprises are encircled and suppressed by patent, which hinders the entry of Chinese enterprises into the market. In this context, the strategic emerging industries in Guangdong Province have also set up a patent alliance for related industries one after another. The models for the establishment of these alliances can be divided into the following three types: first, the spontaneous establishment of enterprises, with the active support of the government; and second, the establishment of associations as a whole. The government cultivates the promotion; third, the government leads the establishment, the each side linkage development. In the process of forming patent alliances, the government, enterprises, universities and scientific research institutions and intermediary organizations all play different roles, all of which are the main bodies of patent alliances, and these alliances are still in the initial stage of development. Different from the foreign mature patent alliance, which has been studied more in academic circles at present, its main purpose is to promote the technological innovation and patent response ability of enterprises, rather than to carry out patent licensing transactions. This paper takes the cooperative game as the research method, takes the strategic emerging industry of Guangdong Province as the background, analyzes in detail the demand of the patent alliance formed under this background, and then introduces the role played by the main bodies of the "politics, industry, education and research" in the patent alliance. This paper focuses on the distribution and cost sharing of technology innovation cooperation and patent litigation cooperation in patent alliance. Specifically, the main contents of this paper include the following three aspects: 1, according to the existing research results of patent alliance, strategic alliance, industry-study-research alliance, define the specific connotation of patent alliance of "politics, industry, education and research". And take Zhongshan semiconductor lighting industry intellectual property alliance as an example to carry on the analysis. At present, most patent alliances set up by strategic emerging industries in Guangdong Province are defensive in nature. In addition to the differences in the degree of marketization between China and foreign countries, in addition to enterprises, the government, Researchers and intermediaries play an important role in the formation and cooperation of the alliance. The main role of the patent alliance currently being formed is not to carry out patent cross-licensing and transaction, but to cooperate in technological innovation and patent litigation. 2. Using the input-output model of technological innovation based on Cobb Douglas production function. By introducing the variables of manpower input L and capital input K, this paper analyzes the innovation income under the cooperation mode of different participants, and draws the conclusion that "government, industry, education and research" is the best cooperative technological innovation cooperation mode. Then, based on the Shapley value method, the innovation income is reasonably distributed among the participants. It is found that the income of each subject is better than that of non-cooperation. 3. Through the analysis of the current situation of patent litigation and the problems encountered in the enterprise, the author establishes a cooperative game model. The optimal patent information retrieval and defense layout cost input are obtained. Finally, the cost sharing coefficient is calculated based on Rubinstein bargaining model.
【學位授予單位】：廣東工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F276.44;F273.7;F224.32
本文編號：2272236
[Abstract]:From the point of view of the advanced practices of multinational enterprises, the establishment of patent alliance has become an important competitive tool for intellectual property rights. Through the establishment of patent barriers, Chinese enterprises are encircled and suppressed by patent, which hinders the entry of Chinese enterprises into the market. In this context, the strategic emerging industries in Guangdong Province have also set up a patent alliance for related industries one after another. The models for the establishment of these alliances can be divided into the following three types: first, the spontaneous establishment of enterprises, with the active support of the government; and second, the establishment of associations as a whole. The government cultivates the promotion; third, the government leads the establishment, the each side linkage development. In the process of forming patent alliances, the government, enterprises, universities and scientific research institutions and intermediary organizations all play different roles, all of which are the main bodies of patent alliances, and these alliances are still in the initial stage of development. Different from the foreign mature patent alliance, which has been studied more in academic circles at present, its main purpose is to promote the technological innovation and patent response ability of enterprises, rather than to carry out patent licensing transactions. This paper takes the cooperative game as the research method, takes the strategic emerging industry of Guangdong Province as the background, analyzes in detail the demand of the patent alliance formed under this background, and then introduces the role played by the main bodies of the "politics, industry, education and research" in the patent alliance. This paper focuses on the distribution and cost sharing of technology innovation cooperation and patent litigation cooperation in patent alliance. Specifically, the main contents of this paper include the following three aspects: 1, according to the existing research results of patent alliance, strategic alliance, industry-study-research alliance, define the specific connotation of patent alliance of "politics, industry, education and research". And take Zhongshan semiconductor lighting industry intellectual property alliance as an example to carry on the analysis. At present, most patent alliances set up by strategic emerging industries in Guangdong Province are defensive in nature. In addition to the differences in the degree of marketization between China and foreign countries, in addition to enterprises, the government, Researchers and intermediaries play an important role in the formation and cooperation of the alliance. The main role of the patent alliance currently being formed is not to carry out patent cross-licensing and transaction, but to cooperate in technological innovation and patent litigation. 2. Using the input-output model of technological innovation based on Cobb Douglas production function. By introducing the variables of manpower input L and capital input K, this paper analyzes the innovation income under the cooperation mode of different participants, and draws the conclusion that "government, industry, education and research" is the best cooperative technological innovation cooperation mode. Then, based on the Shapley value method, the innovation income is reasonably distributed among the participants. It is found that the income of each subject is better than that of non-cooperation. 3. Through the analysis of the current situation of patent litigation and the problems encountered in the enterprise, the author establishes a cooperative game model. The optimal patent information retrieval and defense layout cost input are obtained. Finally, the cost sharing coefficient is calculated based on Rubinstein bargaining model.
【學位授予單位】：廣東工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F276.44;F273.7;F224.32
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