【摘要】：全球貿(mào)易日益頻繁的今天，，灰色市場引發(fā)的問題逐漸凸顯。而高速發(fā)展的信息技術(shù)又為灰色市場插上了隱形的翅膀，使其高速擴(kuò)張、無孔不入。目前，對灰色市場的研究多聚焦于對品牌商的影響，以及從品牌商或政府一方的利益立場來談?wù)搶Σ呋蛘撸雎粤藢疑袌鲞\(yùn)作主體如代理商、經(jīng)銷商、消費者和非品牌擁有的生產(chǎn)商的研究。 灰色市場介于白色市場和黑色市場的中間地帶。在特定環(huán)境和時段內(nèi)，灰色市場的活躍有一定意義，如:豐富便利了消費者的購買選擇；向品牌商提供信號，警示其不完善的市場布局與營銷運(yùn)作；有利于發(fā)展中國家的技術(shù)引進(jìn)，加快全球技術(shù)趨同步伐；提供就業(yè)機(jī)會，促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮；增加市場競爭，一定程度上削弱個別企業(yè)一家獨大、市場壟斷地位。但是，長期而言，灰色市場對知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的沖擊，會減低品牌商研發(fā)的積極性，延緩科技進(jìn)步，而且灰色市場還是黑色市場滋生的溫床，因此灰色市場的蔓延不利于市場的健康運(yùn)行。近三十年，法律學(xué)界、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)界和政界研究人員密切關(guān)注灰色市場引發(fā)的系列問題，相關(guān)研究成果經(jīng)常發(fā)表。各國也根據(jù)具體的國情不斷地調(diào)整應(yīng)對灰色市場現(xiàn)象的措施，有美國等發(fā)達(dá)國家所采取絕對限制的做法，也有歐盟主張在會員國內(nèi)遵循權(quán)利用盡原則而完全支持灰色市場活動。一些學(xué)者認(rèn)為政府對灰色市場活動最好的態(tài)度就是不置可否，任其各利益相關(guān)者互相制衡。然而，這種做法的冒險之處在于，最終的均衡結(jié)果很可能向灰色渠道商和不法黑色市場商的利益嚴(yán)重傾斜，從而造成市場混亂，威脅社會和諧穩(wěn)定。因此，如何激勵政府與品牌商共同協(xié)作來規(guī)范市場交易、保障消費者權(quán)益，是一個亟待解決的重要問題。 鑒于上述情況，本文以灰色市場參與者之間的利益博弈為出發(fā)點全面地尋找利益相關(guān)者參與灰色市場的內(nèi)在需求和外在動力，從博弈過程與博弈均衡的角度分析灰色市場的成因、灰化程度以及向黑色市場的轉(zhuǎn)化。本文把落腳點放在透析市場主體之間的影響作用；同時，提示品牌商和政府在解決灰色市場問題上，可以通過改變自身行動的時間或者內(nèi)容來影響整個灰色市場的利益格局，從而得到有利于自身利益與社會發(fā)展的均衡路徑和均衡結(jié)果。
[Abstract]:With the increasing frequency of global trade, the problems caused by the grey market are becoming more and more prominent. The rapid development of information technology for the gray market inserted the invisible wings, so that its rapid expansion, everywhere. At present, the research on grey market mostly focuses on the influence on the brand, and discusses the countermeasures or policies from the perspective of the brand or the government, while neglecting the grey market operators such as agents, dealers, etc. Research on consumers and non-brand-owned producers. The grey market is between the white market and the black market. In the specific environment and period of time, the active grey market has certain significance, such as: rich and convenient for consumers to choose, to provide signals to brand merchants, warning their imperfect market layout and marketing operation; It is advantageous for developing countries to introduce technology, speed up the pace of global technology convergence, provide employment opportunities, promote economic prosperity, increase market competition, and to a certain extent weaken the monopoly position of individual enterprises. However, in the long run, the impact of the grey market on intellectual property rights will reduce the enthusiasm of brands in R & D and delay technological progress. Moreover, the grey market will also be the breeding ground for the black market. So the spread of the grey market is not conducive to the healthy operation of the market. In the last three decades, researchers in the legal, economic and political circles have paid close attention to a series of problems caused by the grey market. According to the specific national conditions, countries constantly adjust the measures to deal with the grey market phenomenon, such as the United States and other developed countries to take absolute restrictions, but also the European Union advocates to abide by the principle of exhaustion of rights in the member States and fully support the grey market activities. Some scholars argue that the government's best attitude toward grey market activity is to let its stakeholders check and balance each other. However, the risk-taking of this approach is that the final equilibrium result is likely to be heavily skewed towards the interests of gray channel and illegal black market dealers, thus causing market chaos and threatening social harmony and stability. Therefore, how to encourage the government to cooperate with brands to regulate market transactions and protect consumers' rights and interests is an important issue to be solved. In view of the above situation, this paper, based on the interest game between the participants in the grey market, looks for the internal demand and external motive force of the stakeholders to participate in the grey market. From the point of view of game process and game equilibrium, this paper analyzes the causes of grey market, the degree of grey market and the transformation to black market. At the same time, this paper points out that the brands and the government can influence the benefit pattern of the whole grey market by changing the time or content of their own actions in solving the grey market problem. In this way, the equilibrium path and the equilibrium result are obtained in favor of self-interest and social development.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東省社會科學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F723

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