【摘要】：知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法從產(chǎn)生之日便交織在一起，它們之間既存在共同目標(biāo)，又具有沖突和矛盾的一面。共同目標(biāo)體現(xiàn)在鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)新和促進(jìn)消費(fèi)者福利。沖突則主要在于它們鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)新和促進(jìn)消費(fèi)者福利的方式不同：反壟斷法是通過(guò)反對(duì)限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、維護(hù)市場(chǎng)有效競(jìng)爭(zhēng)來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)，因?yàn)橄拗聘?jìng)爭(zhēng)會(huì)損害現(xiàn)實(shí)和潛在的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)；而知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法則是通過(guò)授予某種限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的方式，如通過(guò)保護(hù)專有權(quán)，給予權(quán)利人一段時(shí)間內(nèi)的排他性權(quán)利來(lái)激勵(lì)人們?cè)谥R(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域的創(chuàng)新活動(dòng)。雖然知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法保護(hù)權(quán)利人的排他性權(quán)利，但知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)與一般財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)一樣在反壟斷法上并無(wú)根本的區(qū)別，因?yàn)橹R(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)也具有限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的可能性，難免會(huì)受到反壟斷法的制約。也就是說(shuō)，一方面，權(quán)利人有權(quán)通過(guò)其發(fā)明創(chuàng)造等受知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)的智力成果獲取競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)地位甚至壟斷地位；另一方面，因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的本質(zhì)是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)也是促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新的途徑之一，反壟斷法不允許知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)人憑借其壟斷地位而嚴(yán)重妨礙、限制或者扭曲市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。 對(duì)于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法是否應(yīng)該干預(yù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的問(wèn)題，理論界有兩種截然相反的觀點(diǎn)。一種是不干預(yù)論，這種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為即使某一特定知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)確實(shí)給權(quán)利人帶來(lái)了壟斷力，這種排他性權(quán)利也應(yīng)該受到保護(hù)，免于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法審查；競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法的適用只會(huì)給知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)制度的激勵(lì)機(jī)制造成負(fù)面影響。政策制定者在打擊限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為時(shí)犯錯(cuò)的可能性和各種錯(cuò)誤的代價(jià)決定了譴責(zé)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性行為的成本比豁免限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為的成本要高。因此，建議競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法執(zhí)法者不要干預(yù)與知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)有關(guān)的創(chuàng)新市場(chǎng)。美國(guó)在微軟拆分案對(duì)待知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)壟斷的態(tài)度是不干預(yù)論。當(dāng)微軟面臨壟斷而被起訴面臨拆分的危險(xiǎn)時(shí)，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)界達(dá)成了一種前所未有的默契，痛斥美國(guó)反壟斷法。與不干預(yù)論相反的是歐盟委員會(huì)一貫持有的干預(yù)論，這種干預(yù)的基礎(chǔ)是互補(bǔ)理論�；パa(bǔ)理論認(rèn)為：知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法授予排他性權(quán)利的事實(shí)并不意味著知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)規(guī)則之間存在固有的沖突。實(shí)際上，這兩個(gè)法律制度都以促進(jìn)消費(fèi)者福利和資源的有效分配為基本目標(biāo)。創(chuàng)新是一個(gè)開(kāi)放的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)所必要的、動(dòng)態(tài)的組成部分。知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)通過(guò)鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)投資開(kāi)發(fā)新產(chǎn)品、新技術(shù)來(lái)促進(jìn)動(dòng)態(tài)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，而競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法通過(guò)給企業(yè)實(shí)施競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新。所以，二者均為促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)所必須。除了知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)制度的保護(hù)外，企業(yè)投資創(chuàng)新也需要來(lái)自其他企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力。沒(méi)有知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者可以通過(guò)模仿來(lái)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，而不需要自己投資更好的新產(chǎn)品；沒(méi)有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力，就不能保證知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)人獲得壟斷利潤(rùn)后會(huì)繼續(xù)投資創(chuàng)新。尤其在迅猛發(fā)展的高科技領(lǐng)域，某個(gè)擁有事實(shí)上或法律上的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)企業(yè)很容易將整個(gè)市場(chǎng)收歸己有，此后該知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)企業(yè)就可能排除這一市場(chǎng)原本存在的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，為擴(kuò)張知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)而開(kāi)始尋租活動(dòng)。由此可見(jiàn)，在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)狀態(tài)下，一個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者可以通過(guò)投資創(chuàng)新贏得未來(lái)的壟斷利潤(rùn)，但反過(guò)來(lái)，在壟斷狀態(tài)下，一個(gè)支配地位企業(yè)不需要繼續(xù)投資未來(lái)的創(chuàng)新就能獲得壟斷利潤(rùn)。所以，以互補(bǔ)理論為基礎(chǔ)的干預(yù)論主張，動(dòng)態(tài)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)受到限制時(shí)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法應(yīng)該干預(yù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域。 近年來(lái)，跨國(guó)公司屢屢在我國(guó)通過(guò)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)策略如拒絕許可、超高定價(jià)、強(qiáng)制性一攬子許可、設(shè)置“專利叢林”等手段，濫用其因?yàn)閾碛兄R(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)而獲得的市場(chǎng)支配地位，排擠競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，危及我國(guó)民族企業(yè)的發(fā)展，損害消費(fèi)者福利。在我國(guó)，從理論上講，知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用的情況也不僅僅發(fā)生在跨國(guó)公司身上，國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)同樣也可能發(fā)生知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用的情況。但目前由于我國(guó)本土企業(yè)在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)方面還處于相對(duì)劣勢(shì)，而跨國(guó)公司實(shí)力雄厚，技術(shù)先進(jìn)，持有的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)也很多，較之我國(guó)一般企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)更容易發(fā)生知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用的問(wèn)題，其影響也更大。所以經(jīng)常見(jiàn)諸報(bào)端的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位行為主要是跨國(guó)公司所為。 在中國(guó)并不是真的不存在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位的問(wèn)題，只是因?yàn)楹芏嗲闆r下沒(méi)有相應(yīng)的法律規(guī)范才使一些行為沒(méi)有受到應(yīng)有的制裁。如何防止知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)制度背離其立法初衷和淪為創(chuàng)新壟斷的工具，是我國(guó)反壟斷法需要解決的一個(gè)重要問(wèn)題。過(guò)度保護(hù)的權(quán)利必然導(dǎo)致權(quán)利的濫用。尤其在我國(guó)自主創(chuàng)新水平較低，技術(shù)相對(duì)落后，而外來(lái)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)力量強(qiáng)大的狀況下，知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)立法已與國(guó)際接軌，降低知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)水平不可行，因此不能不強(qiáng)化知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)反壟斷規(guī)制。強(qiáng)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)與強(qiáng)反壟斷法規(guī)制是一個(gè)硬幣的兩面，是為我國(guó)技術(shù)發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)騰飛保駕護(hù)航的兩大支柱。因此，兩手都要抓，而且兩手都要硬。相對(duì)于知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)來(lái)說(shuō)，我國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)反壟斷問(wèn)題顯得更為突出，已經(jīng)迫在眉睫，但我國(guó)在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)反壟斷方面的立法卻不完善。如何在保護(hù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)之間找到平衡點(diǎn)，即一方面保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制，使其充分發(fā)揮“給天才之火添加了利益之油”的功能，以最終豐富公共產(chǎn)品和提高消費(fèi)者福利，另一方面又要維護(hù)市場(chǎng)的有效競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，將知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域的排除、限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)限于為激勵(lì)創(chuàng)新所必需的范圍之內(nèi)，這是我國(guó)急需解決的問(wèn)題。 從國(guó)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)看，歐盟競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法的首要目標(biāo)是建立統(tǒng)一的內(nèi)部市場(chǎng)，對(duì)利用知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)來(lái)限制商品貨物自由流動(dòng)和限制自由競(jìng)爭(zhēng)等行為進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格規(guī)制，歐洲法院因此創(chuàng)立了一系列規(guī)制知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用的原則和判例。歐盟對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用的規(guī)制主要是通過(guò)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)。與美國(guó)那種對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為，尤其是知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位行為較為寬松的態(tài)度相比，歐盟的經(jīng)驗(yàn)更適合今天的中國(guó)。 在濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位的規(guī)制上，我國(guó)《反壟斷法》更多地借鑒了歐盟競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法的模式。我國(guó)已頒布并實(shí)施的《反壟斷法》對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)反壟斷行為只有原則性的規(guī)定，具體內(nèi)容言之甚少，反壟斷法在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域的適用成了理論和實(shí)踐中的難點(diǎn)問(wèn)題。在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位方面，歐盟積累了一些案例和行政執(zhí)法經(jīng)驗(yàn)，出臺(tái)了《歐盟運(yùn)行條約》第102條(下文簡(jiǎn)稱TFEU第102條)的執(zhí)法指南，學(xué)術(shù)研究成果也較為豐富，這些為我國(guó)在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域?yàn)E用市場(chǎng)支配地位行為方面的立法和執(zhí)法提供了借鑒；此外，歐盟一直在探討的效果分析方法改革對(duì)我國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域?yàn)E用市場(chǎng)支配問(wèn)題分析方法具有一定的參考意義。基于以上認(rèn)識(shí)，本文對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域?yàn)E用市場(chǎng)支配地位的歐盟競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法規(guī)制進(jìn)行了研究，具體內(nèi)容如下。 第一章從知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法的關(guān)系著手，從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法學(xué)角度對(duì)這一問(wèn)題展開(kāi)分析，比較了各種學(xué)說(shuō)的優(yōu)劣，回顧了歐美等競(jìng)爭(zhēng)執(zhí)法先進(jìn)國(guó)家和地區(qū)對(duì)二者關(guān)系處理的歷史，就競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法能否干預(yù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域問(wèn)題形成研究的基本立場(chǎng)。 第二章對(duì)歐盟競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法規(guī)制知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位的一般方法做了深入探討，闡述了歐盟競(jìng)爭(zhēng)判例法中傳統(tǒng)的形式主義分析方法和歐盟委員會(huì)一直在呼吁采用的TFEU第102條效果分析方法，并就效果方法能否適用于知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位案件做了比較分析。 第三章和第四章，針對(duì)歐盟知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域?yàn)E用市場(chǎng)支配地位案件中涉及的具體行為分別進(jìn)行了分析，對(duì)構(gòu)成要件、判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等逐一展開(kāi)了論述，并指出了歐盟委員會(huì)和法院對(duì)具體案件處理中存在的不足。拒絕許可是歐盟知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為中最為典型的一種，在例外情況下可能構(gòu)成知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位行為。典型案例主要有IBM案、Volvo案和Renault案、Magill案、IMSHealth案和微軟案。這些案例的發(fā)展，使歐盟對(duì)拒絕許可反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為的構(gòu)成要件越來(lái)越明晰，新產(chǎn)品規(guī)則、二級(jí)市場(chǎng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和關(guān)鍵設(shè)施標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等都在本文中得到了詳細(xì)的論述。濫用專利申請(qǐng)制度是一種新型的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域?yàn)E用市場(chǎng)支配地位行為，歐盟委員會(huì)的制藥行業(yè)調(diào)查報(bào)告和最新的案例對(duì)該行為都持積極的規(guī)制態(tài)度，有一定的可取之處，但也存在一些遺留的問(wèn)題，對(duì)此本文也做了相應(yīng)探討。 最后，結(jié)合我國(guó)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)立法狀況，國(guó)際知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)水平，我國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的關(guān)系以及我國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域?yàn)E用市場(chǎng)支配地位現(xiàn)狀和我國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)反壟斷立法現(xiàn)狀等，在借鑒歐盟經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)完善我國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域?yàn)E用市場(chǎng)支配地位規(guī)制從原則到具體分析方法都提出了對(duì)策與建議，以期對(duì)《關(guān)于知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域反壟斷執(zhí)法的指南》的制定提供一些有益的參考。
[Abstract]:Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law have been intertwined from the very day of their emergence. They have both common objectives and conflicting and contradictory aspects. Competition is controlled and effective competition is maintained in the market to achieve the goal, because restriction of competition will damage the actual and potential competition; while intellectual property law encourages people to innovate in the field of knowledge economy by granting some form of restriction of competition, such as protection of exclusive rights and granting the obligee exclusive rights for a period of time. Intellectual property law protects the exclusive rights of the obligee, but there is no fundamental difference between intellectual property rights and general property rights in anti-monopoly law, because intellectual property rights also have the possibility of restricting competition and will inevitably be subject to anti-monopoly law. That is to say, on the one hand, the obligee has the right to be protected by intellectual property rights through his invention and creation. On the other hand, because the essence of market economy is competition, competition is also one of the ways to promote innovation, anti-monopoly law does not allow intellectual property owners to rely on their monopoly status to seriously hinder, restrict or distort market competition.
There are two opposing views on whether competition law should intervene in intellectual property rights. One is non-intervention, which holds that even if a particular intellectual property right does bring monopoly power to the obligee, the exclusive right should be protected from the review of competition law. The incentive mechanism of the intellectual property system has a negative impact. The likelihood of policymakers making mistakes in combating restrictive competition and the cost of all kinds of mistakes determine that the cost of condemning competitive behavior is higher than that of exempting restrictive competition. When Microsoft faces the danger of being sued for fragmentation, the American economists have reached an unprecedented tacit agreement to denounce the US antitrust law. The theory of complementarity holds that the fact that exclusive rights are granted by intellectual property law does not imply an inherent conflict between intellectual property rights and competition rules. In fact, both legal systems aim at promoting the effective distribution of consumer welfare and resources. Intellectual property promotes dynamic competition by encouraging firms to invest in new products and technologies, while competition law promotes innovation by imposing competitive pressures on firms. Therefore, both are necessary to promote innovation and competition. Competitive pressures. Without intellectual property protection, competitors can compete by imitation without having to invest in better new products; without competitive pressures, there is no guarantee that intellectual property owners will continue to invest and innovate after gaining monopoly profits. Especially in the fast-growing high-tech sector, where there are de facto or legal standards. It is easy for an intellectual property enterprise to own the whole market, and thereafter the intellectual property enterprise may eliminate the original competition in this market and start rent-seeking activities for the expansion of intellectual property rights. In this situation, a dominant firm does not need to continue to invest in future innovation to obtain monopoly profits. Therefore, the intervention theory based on complementarity theory advocates that competition law should intervene in the field of intellectual property when dynamic competition is restricted.
In recent years, multinational corporations have repeatedly abused their dominant position in the market because of their intellectual property rights, excluded competitors, endangered the development of China's national enterprises and damaged the welfare of consumers by means of intellectual property strategies such as refusing to license, overpricing, compulsory licensing package and setting up a "patent jungle". Theoretically speaking, the abuse of intellectual property rights is not only happened to transnational corporations, but also to domestic enterprises. However, at present, the domestic enterprises are still at a relative disadvantage in the aspect of intellectual property rights, and the transnational corporations are powerful, advanced in technology, and hold a lot of intellectual property rights, compared with them. Generally speaking, the abuse of intellectual property rights is more likely to occur in Chinese enterprises, and its impact is even greater. Therefore, the abuse of market dominance of intellectual property rights, which is often seen in newspapers, is mainly caused by multinational corporations.
In China, there is no real problem of abusing the dominant position of the intellectual property rights in the market, only because there are no corresponding legal norms in many cases, some acts are not subject to due sanctions. Excessive protection of the rights will inevitably lead to abuse of rights. Especially in China, the level of independent innovation is low, technology is relatively backward, and foreign intellectual property rights are powerful, intellectual property legislation has been in line with international standards, reducing the level of intellectual property protection is not feasible, therefore, we must strengthen the anti-monopoly regulation of intellectual property rights. Strong intellectual property protection and strong anti-monopoly laws and regulations are two sides of a coin, which are the two pillars of China's technological and economic development. How to find a balance between the protection of competition and the protection of intellectual property, that is, the incentive mechanism to protect intellectual property, so that it can give full play to the function of "adding oil to the fire of genius" in order to enrich public goods and improve consumer welfare, on the other hand, to maintain the balance? It is an urgent problem for China to protect the effective competition in the market, exclude the intellectual property field and limit the competition to the range necessary to stimulate innovation.
From the international experience, the primary objective of EU competition law is to establish a unified internal market and strictly regulate the use of intellectual property rights to restrict the free flow of goods and restrict free competition. Therefore, the European Court of Justice has created a series of principles and precedents to regulate the abuse of intellectual property rights. This is mainly achieved through competition law. Compared with the more relaxed attitude of the United States towards anti-competitive intellectual property rights, especially the abuse of market dominance, the EU experience is more suitable for China today.
As for the regulation of abusing the dominant position of the market, China's Anti-monopoly Law draws more lessons from the model of the EU Competition Law. The EU has accumulated a number of cases and administrative law enforcement experience in the abuse of market dominance over intellectual property rights. It has issued a law enforcement guide to Article 102 of the Operational Treaty of the EU (hereinafter referred to as Article 102 of the TFEU). The academic research results are also relatively rich. These are the legislation on abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights in China. In addition, the reform of the effect analysis method which the EU has been discussing has certain reference significance to the analysis method of the abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights in China. Next.
The first chapter starts with the relationship between intellectual property protection and competition law, analyzes this issue from the perspective of economics and competition law, compares the advantages and disadvantages of various theories, reviews the history of dealing with the relationship between the two in advanced countries and regions of competition law enforcement, such as Europe and the United States, and makes a basic Study on whether competition law can interfere in the field of intellectual property. Position.
Chapter 2 discusses the general methods of regulating the abuse of market dominance of intellectual property rights by EU competition law, expounds the traditional formalism analysis method in EU competition case law and the TFEU Article 102 effect analysis method which the European Commission has been calling for, and discusses whether the effect method can be applied to the abuse of intellectual property rights market. A comparative analysis of field dominance cases is made.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively analyze the specific acts involved in the cases of abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights in the European Union, discuss the constitutive requirements and the criteria of judgment one by one, and point out the deficiencies in the handling of specific cases by the European Commission and the courts. Typical cases are IBM, Volvo and Renault, Magill, IMSHealth and Microsoft. The development of these cases has made the EU increasingly clear about the components of anti-competitive refusal to license, and new product rules. The abuse of patent application system is a new type of abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights. The European Commission's investigation report on the pharmaceutical industry and the latest cases have a positive regulatory attitude towards the abuse of market dominance. But there are still some problems left behind, and this is also discussed in this paper.
Finally, based on the current situation of China's intellectual property legislation, the international intellectual property protection level, the relationship between China's intellectual property protection and economic growth, the abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property in China and the current situation of China's intellectual property anti-monopoly legislation, we can draw on the experience of the European Union to improve the field of intellectual property in China. The regulation of abuse of market dominant position has put forward countermeasures and suggestions from the principle to the concrete analysis method, with a view to providing some useful reference for the formulation of the Guidelines on Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement in the Field of Intellectual Property Rights.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D996.1

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