知識產(chǎn)權(quán)許可不公平高價的反壟斷規(guī)制
發(fā)布時間:2018-08-13 18:31
【摘要】:反壟斷法禁止的不公平高價格僅限于由于制度性原因造成的,長期可持續(xù)進入壁壘保護下的壟斷企業(yè)過高定價行為,反壟斷法并不禁止一般知識產(chǎn)權(quán)許可高價格。但在標準必要專利的情況下,違背FRAND許可承諾的不合理高許可費是一種傷害競爭的濫用市場支配地位行為,應(yīng)該受到反壟斷法的禁止。在反壟斷審查當中,對于FRAND合理許可費的判定應(yīng)該綜合考慮專利的事前遞增價值貢獻和在標準多個互補專利中的價值貢獻比例,并根據(jù)個案采用科學(xué)的計算方法來確定,從而實現(xiàn)防止專利劫持和許可費疊加的目標。
[Abstract]:The unfair high price prohibited by antimonopoly law is limited to the excessive pricing behavior of monopoly enterprises under the protection of long-term sustainable entry barriers due to institutional reasons. Anti-monopoly law does not prohibit the general intellectual property rights license high price. However, in the case of standard necessary patent, the unreasonable high license fee which violates the promise of FRAND license is an abuse of market dominant position, which is harmful to competition, and should be prohibited by antimonopoly law. In the antitrust examination, the reasonable license fee for FRAND should be determined by considering the contribution of increasing patent value in advance and the proportion of value contribution in standard multiple complementary patents, and the scientific calculation method should be used to determine the case. In order to achieve the goal of preventing patent hijacking and license fee superposition.
【作者單位】: 浙江財經(jīng)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院;
【分類號】:D997.1
本文編號:2181823
[Abstract]:The unfair high price prohibited by antimonopoly law is limited to the excessive pricing behavior of monopoly enterprises under the protection of long-term sustainable entry barriers due to institutional reasons. Anti-monopoly law does not prohibit the general intellectual property rights license high price. However, in the case of standard necessary patent, the unreasonable high license fee which violates the promise of FRAND license is an abuse of market dominant position, which is harmful to competition, and should be prohibited by antimonopoly law. In the antitrust examination, the reasonable license fee for FRAND should be determined by considering the contribution of increasing patent value in advance and the proportion of value contribution in standard multiple complementary patents, and the scientific calculation method should be used to determine the case. In order to achieve the goal of preventing patent hijacking and license fee superposition.
【作者單位】: 浙江財經(jīng)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院;
【分類號】:D997.1
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