本文關(guān)鍵詞： 職務(wù)發(fā)明 獎(jiǎng)酬 獎(jiǎng)酬計(jì)算基準(zhǔn)　出處：《華東政法大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)今全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)模式正向知識(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)模式轉(zhuǎn)變，以職務(wù)發(fā)明為代表的科學(xué)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新水平成為決定國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)力和綜合競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的關(guān)鍵因素。鼓勵(lì)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新成為各國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的核心部分，，鼓勵(lì)職務(wù)發(fā)明也應(yīng)當(dāng)成為企業(yè)增強(qiáng)核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的法寶。然而，我國(guó)職務(wù)發(fā)明申請(qǐng)量較低，企業(yè)與發(fā)明人或者設(shè)計(jì)人之間利益紛爭(zhēng)不斷，發(fā)明人或者設(shè)計(jì)人的“一獎(jiǎng)兩酬”得不到保障，且無(wú)法確定企業(yè)因該項(xiàng)職務(wù)發(fā)明而獲得的利潤(rùn)，難以要求企業(yè)支付《專利法實(shí)施細(xì)則》中規(guī)定的報(bào)酬，這大大的削弱發(fā)明人或者設(shè)計(jì)人的發(fā)明創(chuàng)造的積極性；甚至出現(xiàn)人才出走，臨近離退休人員將發(fā)明留幾年之后再申請(qǐng)專利的現(xiàn)象。這不僅削弱了企業(yè)的核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，也桎梏著科學(xué)技術(shù)的發(fā)展。尋求一種完善的職務(wù)發(fā)明獎(jiǎng)酬制度，保持雇主投資積極性和雇員發(fā)明積極性，激勵(lì)雙方的智力投資和物質(zhì)投資變得愈加重要。 本文首先指出當(dāng)前我國(guó)職務(wù)發(fā)明獎(jiǎng)酬制度在立法上和實(shí)踐中存在的問(wèn)題。從職務(wù)發(fā)明概念范圍的寬泛和界限不清、獎(jiǎng)酬支付形式的單一、報(bào)酬基準(zhǔn)難以確定、規(guī)章規(guī)定和協(xié)商約定的方式下不能平衡雙方權(quán)益、單位以其他形式使用該職務(wù)發(fā)明時(shí)發(fā)明人或者設(shè)計(jì)人的獎(jiǎng)酬得不到保障、而發(fā)明人或者設(shè)計(jì)人要維護(hù)自己獲酬權(quán)成本太高、以及法律未規(guī)定單位不支付獎(jiǎng)酬的懲罰性措施等多方面分析職務(wù)發(fā)明獎(jiǎng)酬制度的不足之處。 引用德國(guó)、美國(guó)和法國(guó)的雇員發(fā)明制度和這些國(guó)家職務(wù)發(fā)明獎(jiǎng)酬的給付方式和相關(guān)規(guī)定，借鑒法國(guó)“任務(wù)發(fā)明”的規(guī)定，建議我國(guó)職務(wù)發(fā)明內(nèi)涵中區(qū)分“職務(wù)發(fā)明”和“任務(wù)發(fā)明”，縮小職務(wù)發(fā)明的范圍，明確各不同方式下的獎(jiǎng)酬給付義務(wù)；借鑒美國(guó)雙方約定獎(jiǎng)酬的特點(diǎn)，建議當(dāng)事人可以提請(qǐng)有關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)職務(wù)發(fā)明獎(jiǎng)酬約定合同進(jìn)行審查；借鑒德國(guó)《私務(wù)中的雇員發(fā)明報(bào)酬規(guī)章》細(xì)化操作的方式，建議我國(guó)量化評(píng)估專利價(jià)值的方法，從法律價(jià)值度、技術(shù)價(jià)值度和經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值度三方面充分的量化職務(wù)發(fā)明專利的價(jià)值，給獎(jiǎng)酬的計(jì)算提供一個(gè)更明確更好量化的基準(zhǔn)。 基于上述分析和經(jīng)驗(yàn)，結(jié)合我國(guó)職務(wù)發(fā)明獎(jiǎng)酬制度的現(xiàn)狀，提出完善我國(guó)職務(wù)發(fā)明獎(jiǎng)酬制度的建議。立法上，建議適當(dāng)縮小職務(wù)發(fā)明范圍；約定獎(jiǎng)酬時(shí)，明顯不合理、限制或是排除一方權(quán)利的約定無(wú)效；建議明確單位以不同的方式使用職務(wù)發(fā)明時(shí)發(fā)明人或者設(shè)計(jì)人應(yīng)得的獎(jiǎng)酬計(jì)算基準(zhǔn)；提高法定獎(jiǎng)酬的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，豐富獎(jiǎng)酬形式；完善相關(guān)的監(jiān)督措施，監(jiān)督單位實(shí)施職務(wù)發(fā)明和支付獎(jiǎng)酬。實(shí)踐操作上，建議當(dāng)事人可以將職務(wù)發(fā)明獎(jiǎng)酬約定合同提請(qǐng)有關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)審查，對(duì)獎(jiǎng)酬約定合同進(jìn)行程序上和實(shí)質(zhì)上的審查；完善知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)評(píng)估機(jī)構(gòu)，即保障發(fā)明人或者設(shè)計(jì)人的知情權(quán)，也防止單位的經(jīng)營(yíng)信息被任意侵害，且更加科學(xué)合理的從多維度評(píng)價(jià)職務(wù)發(fā)明的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:At present, the global economic growth model is changing to the knowledge-based economy growth model. The level of scientific and technological innovation, represented by job inventions, has become a key factor in determining national economic growth and comprehensive competitiveness. Technological innovation is encouraged to become a core part of national economic development strategies, Encouraging job inventions should also become a magic weapon for enterprises to enhance their core competitiveness. However, the number of applications for job inventions in China is relatively low, and conflicts of interests between enterprises and inventors or designers are constant. The "one prize and two rewards" of the inventor or the designer are not guaranteed, and the profits made by the enterprise as a result of the invention cannot be ascertained, and it is difficult to require the enterprise to pay the remuneration stipulated in the detailed rules for the implementation of the Patent Law, This greatly reduces the initiative of inventors or designers to invent and create; there is even the phenomenon of talented people running away, and people leaving their inventions to apply for patents a few years later. This not only weakens the core competitiveness of an enterprise, The development of science and technology is also shackled. It is more and more important to seek a perfect system of reward and reward for job inventors, to maintain the enthusiasm of employers and employees to invent, and to encourage both sides to invest in intelligence and material investment. This paper first points out the problems existing in the legislation and practice of the present system of reward and reward for job inventors in our country, from the broad and unclear scope of the concept of "job invention", the single form of reward payment, and the difficulty of determining the remuneration standard. The rights and interests of both parties cannot be balanced in the manner stipulated in the regulations and agreed upon through consultation. When the unit uses the invention in other forms, the inventor or designer's reward is not guaranteed, and the inventor or designer has too high a cost to maintain his right to be paid. And the law does not stipulate that the unit does not pay the punitive measures and so on many aspects analyzes the duty invention reward system insufficiency. Referring to the employee invention system in Germany, the United States and France, as well as the payment methods and relevant regulations of the job invention awards in these countries, and drawing on the provisions of the French "mission invention", It is suggested that the connotation of "duty invention" and "task invention" in our country should be distinguished, the scope of job invention should be narrowed, the obligation of reward and payment in different ways should be defined, and the characteristics of the agreement between the two parties in the United States should be used for reference. It is suggested that the parties concerned may submit to the relevant institutions for examination of the contract for the appointment of awards and remuneration for service inventors; for reference to the detailed operation of the German regulations on compensation for Invention of employees in Private Affairs in Germany, it is suggested that the method of quantitative evaluation of the value of patents in China be adopted. From the legal value degree, the technical value degree and the economic value degree fully quantifies the duty invention patent value, provides a clearer and better quantification standard for the reward calculation. Based on the above analysis and experience, combined with the present situation of the system of reward and compensation for job inventors in our country, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to perfect the system of rewards and rewards for job inventors in our country. In legislation, it is suggested that the scope of job inventions should be narrowed appropriately. The agreement to limit or exclude the rights of one party is invalid; it is suggested that the standard of calculation of the remuneration due to the inventor or designer when the inventor or designer of the job invention be used by the unit in different ways be clearly defined; the standard of statutory reward should be raised and the form of reward should be enriched; Perfecting relevant supervision measures, supervising units to carry out job inventions and paying awards. In practice, it is suggested that the parties concerned may submit the contract for the award and remuneration of job inventors to the relevant institutions for examination, To conduct a procedural and substantive review of the contract on reward and remuneration; to perfect the intellectual property evaluation organization, that is, to protect the inventor's or the designer's right to know, and also to prevent the unit's business information from being arbitrarily infringed, And more scientific and reasonable evaluation of the economic value of job invention from multiple dimensions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D923.42

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