本文選題：法條競合 + 想象競合　； 參考：《遼寧大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：法條競合理論在刑法理論中占有重要地位。我國刑法理論界對法條競合的相關(guān)理論進行了深入的研究并有所成效。但是在針對一般條款對于特殊條款的截堵問題，法條競合與想象競合的界分，以及法條競合的適用原則等基本問題上，仍然不能達成共識，需要進一步深入的探討。同時，由于法條競合問題在理論上的模糊性，導致司法者在承辦案件的過程中不能準確的處理這種繁雜的法條競合問題。所以，無論是在理論層面還是司法實踐中，都有對此問題作出深刻探討之必要。 本文在全面梳理關(guān)于法條競合實踐難題即一般條款對于特殊條款的封堵功能問題，法條競合與想象競合的區(qū)別問題，法條競合中從一重處罰原則問題既有研究成果之基礎(chǔ)上，進行了進一步的探討，并提出了解決之道。 全文分為以下幾部分： 第一部分：先由針對一般條款對于特殊條款的封堵功能的相關(guān)案例引發(fā)出對于封堵功能的反思，進而歸納和分析一般條款對于特殊條款的封堵功能的實踐中的做法和理論爭議，最后對相關(guān)爭議進行評析，深入論證一般條款不具有封堵功能的原因。筆者認為一般條款對于特殊條款的封堵違背了罪行法定的基本原則，忽視了立法者設(shè)立特殊條款的目的。 第二部分：先由法條競合與想象競合易混淆的相關(guān)案例引發(fā)的問題，總結(jié)法條競合與想象競合區(qū)別在理論上的不同觀點，以及實踐中的不同作法，最終確定法條競合與想象競合區(qū)分標準。筆者認為只存在包容關(guān)系的法條競合，，法條之間的交叉關(guān)系不能構(gòu)成法條競合。我們只有注意到這個關(guān)鍵區(qū)別，才能很好把握兩者的界限。 第三部分：先由法條競合中重法優(yōu)于輕法的相關(guān)案例引發(fā)的問題，進一步歸納出法條競合可否適用從一重處罰原則的理論之爭即肯定說和否定說。最后分析肯定說的缺陷，以及對法條競合不應當適用從一重處罰原則提出我自己的見解。從一重處罰原則違背了罪刑法定的基本原則，法條競合的從一重處罰原則違背了立法本意，超越了立法設(shè)定的選擇范圍。從立法本意來看，從一重處罰并不存在于立法者授權(quán)的選擇范圍內(nèi)，若司法者在由于特別條款的處罰較輕而選擇適用較重一般條款，就是對立法權(quán)的僭越。
[Abstract]:The theory of concurrence of laws and articles occupies an important position in the theory of criminal law. The theoretical circle of criminal law of our country has carried on the thorough research to the related theory of the law article concurrence, and has carried on the result. However, there is still no consensus on the basic issues such as the blocking of special clauses in general terms, the boundary division between the competing articles of law and imaginative competition, as well as the applicable principles of competing articles of law, and so on, which need to be further explored. At the same time, because of the ambiguity in theory, the judiciary can not deal with this complicated problem in the process of handling cases accurately. Therefore, whether in theory or judicial practice, there is a need to make a profound study of this issue. On the basis of the existing research results, this paper comprehensively combs the practical problems concerning the overlapping of laws, that is, the blocking function of the general clauses for the special clauses, the difference between the competing articles of laws and the imaginative concurrence, and the principle of single penalty in the competition of articles of law. Further discussion was carried out and solutions were put forward. The full text is divided into the following parts: The first part: from the general clause to the special clause plugging function related cases to trigger the reflection on the plugging function, and then induces and analyzes the practice and the theory dispute of the general clause for the special clause blocking function. Finally, the related disputes are analyzed and the reasons why the general clause does not have plugging function are discussed in depth. The author thinks that the general clause forbids the special clause violates the basic principle of crime and neglects the purpose of legislator to set up special clause. The second part: firstly, the problems caused by the confusion between the competing of articles of law and the competing of imagination are discussed, and the different viewpoints in theory and the different practices in practice are summarized. Finally determine the distinction standard between the law and the imagination. The author thinks that there is only an inclusive relationship between articles of law, and the cross relationship between articles of law can not constitute a combination of articles of law. Only by paying attention to this crucial difference can we grasp the boundary between the two. The third part: firstly, the problem caused by the case that the law is more important than the light law, and the theory of whether the law can be applied from the principle of double punishment, that is, the affirmative theory and the negation theory. Finally, this paper analyzes the defects of affirmation theory, and puts forward my own opinion on the principle of double punishment which should not be applied to the concurrence of articles of law. The principle of single punishment violates the basic principle of legality, and the principle of concurrent punishment violates the original intention of legislation and exceeds the scope of choice set by legislation. From the point of view of legislative intention, from the perspective of legislative intent, the choice of heavy punishment does not exist in the scope of the legislative authorization. If the judiciary chooses to apply the heavier general clause because of the lighter punishment of the special clause, it is a violation of the legislative power.
【學位授予單位】：遼寧大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D914

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