反壟斷公益訴訟制度研究
[Abstract]:With the promulgation and implementation of the "antitrust law" as a watershed, China's anti-monopoly situation has undergone a dramatic change. With the deepening of the public awareness of the anti monopoly law, and the awakening of its own rights and social public welfare maintenance consciousness, many anti trust public welfare rights cases have emerged in practice, and more and more citizens and enterprises have come into being. In particular, the individuals who have been infringed by the monopoly law, especially the direct interests, are expected to be able to participate in the anti monopoly activities directly, to counteract the monopolistic acts in some ways, to realize the relief of their own rights and to safeguard the social and public interests. However, the Anti-monopoly Enforcement mechanism stipulated in China's antitrust law is mainly administrative and sporadic. It stipulates certain cases of criminal responsibility, and does not stipulate specific measures for public participation in antitrust litigation. It stipulates the civil liability of the monopolistic violators in principle only in the fiftieth article. This anti-monopoly implementation mechanism is unable to meet the requirements of the situation. Conform to the trend of development of the times and meet the needs of reality, it has begun to receive the attention and attention of academia and judicial practice.
The antitrust public interest litigation allows the market participants, such as natural persons, legal persons, non legal persons, and public welfare groups, to protect the national and social public welfare and protect their legitimate rights and interests from the legal rights of the court in the scope of the legal provisions. The prosecution, with its own characteristics and special system design, has a unique advantage in the implementation of antitrust. First, the anti trust public interest litigation caters to the "social standard" of the antitrust law, and the antitrust law can provide more effective protection to the social public interest through the antitrust public interest litigation and the damaged social public. The common interests carry out relief and complete their own legislative purposes and tasks, and there is a perfect agreement between them. Second, the antitrust public interest litigation breaks the "direct interest relationship" of the parties in the traditional civil procedure law and allows the natural persons, legal persons, non legal organizations and even non legal organizations that have no direct harm to the illegal acts of monopoly. Public interest groups take action to initiate public power to combat monopoly illegal behavior to the maximum extent. Three, use group litigation mode to solve antitrust litigation disputes, save litigation resources, improve litigation efficiency; four, the design of evidence system in antitrust public interest litigation, stimulating incentive mechanism to reflect the tendency of vulnerable groups. Protection, and the procuratorial organ intervenes in the antitrust public interest litigation, is more suitable to deal with the actual situation of the unequal strength of the two parties in the anti monopoly activities, which is beneficial to mobilize the enthusiasm of the private plaintiff and strengthen the power of the plaintiff.
On the premise of macro and overall grasp of the basic theory of antitrust public interest litigation system, this paper makes a comparative study of the antitrust public interest litigation system in several developed countries, such as the United States, Japan, Germany and other developed countries by using the method of empirical and comparative analysis. The Enlightenment of the construction of antitrust public interest litigation system, and further analysis of the existing problems in the implementation of anti-monopoly in China and the value of the introduction of anti trust public interest litigation in our country, and finally build the anti-monopoly litigation mode and rules adapting to the national conditions of our country. It is particularly worth putting forward that this article should be based on the advanced experience of this field in other countries. Set up a series of supporting incentive measures to serve the antitrust public interest litigation. Before this, there are few studies in this field in the domestic academic circles. The full text is expounded through five parts.
The first part is the introduction of specific cases, and then analyzes the background and significance of the topic selection.
The second part, under the premise of understanding the development process of antitrust public interest litigation, expatiate on its concept and connotation, and reveal the characteristics of antitrust public interest litigation, and analyze its theoretical basis from the legal and political economic level.
The third part introduces and compares the representative antitrust public interest litigation system in several countries of common law and continental law system, and grasps its enlightenment to the construction of China's antitrust public interest litigation system.
The fourth part analyzes the compatibility between antitrust and public interest litigation, and analyzes the value of the introduction of public interest litigation in antitrust from two angles of law and economy, and expounds the necessity of introducing antitrust into public interest litigation.
The fifth part, drawing on the advanced experience of foreign antitrust public interest litigation and combining with the specific circumstances of our country, constructs the rules of our country's antitrust public interest litigation, including the choice of our antitrust public interest litigation mode, the definition of the qualification of the plaintiff, the distribution of the burden of proof, the stimulation and encouragement mechanism, and the discussion of these aspects. A preliminary opinion on the establishment of a system of antitrust public interest litigation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號(hào)】:D922.294
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