本文選題：形成權(quán) + 形成訴訟�。� 參考：《西南政法大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：作為實(shí)體法與程序法共同作用的場(chǎng),訴訟不僅涉及到公法與私法的交錯(cuò),而且是實(shí)體權(quán)利與程序形式的融合。法制的發(fā)展分解了羅馬法上的actio,但動(dòng)態(tài)的具體實(shí)現(xiàn)卻需要整合進(jìn)這種相互交融的關(guān)系。形成訴訟恰處于這種關(guān)系的邊緣地帶。實(shí)體法上的形成權(quán)被承認(rèn)以來,便與一些已存的訴訟形式相互印證與支持,形成權(quán)成為形成訴訟的權(quán)利依據(jù),形成訴訟被視為形成權(quán)的行使方式,二者共享塑造法律關(guān)系之特點(diǎn),并且打通了公法與私法、實(shí)體與程序之間的隔閡�；谛纬蓹�(quán)本身之暢快功能以及部門法研究的限制,形成權(quán)與形成訴訟具有天然的聯(lián)系成為自明之理,這對(duì)于實(shí)體法與訴訟法的學(xué)者都是承認(rèn)的,以至于對(duì)形成權(quán)與形成訴訟的研究出現(xiàn)了兩大部門法均較為忽視的現(xiàn)象。 實(shí)際上,形成權(quán)作為“私法中的權(quán)力”,主體之間并不是普通的權(quán)利義務(wù)關(guān)系,權(quán)利人之支配與相對(duì)人之屈從構(gòu)成了私法中的不平等領(lǐng)域,是權(quán)利人私力救濟(jì)的手段,與體現(xiàn)公力救濟(jì)思想的形成訴訟乃兩條平行運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的軌跡,形成訴訟自身多有不透明之處,并且對(duì)訴訟類型造成了不必要的困惑,其權(quán)利依據(jù)也需要重新定位,現(xiàn)有的解釋框架對(duì)此難以做出很好的解釋。本文正是從形成權(quán)之本質(zhì)入手,反思形成訴訟的形式標(biāo)準(zhǔn)及實(shí)體依據(jù),并對(duì)二者之關(guān)系進(jìn)行考察所進(jìn)行的努力。 除引言外,本文分五部分,共五萬余字。主要內(nèi)容如下： 第一部分,實(shí)體法上形成權(quán)之界定。從質(zhì)疑通說關(guān)于形成權(quán)概念的形式化之弊切入指出形成權(quán)之本質(zhì)在于對(duì)他人權(quán)利范圍的干涉,相對(duì)人處于屈從的法律地位,從而營(yíng)造了私法中的不平等領(lǐng)域,而公法性質(zhì)的形成訴權(quán)以及與形成權(quán)性質(zhì)存在齟齬的形成抗辯權(quán)并不符合形成權(quán)的邏輯構(gòu)造,應(yīng)當(dāng)排除出形成權(quán)外延范圍； 第二部分,形成訴訟的生成及展開。本部分考察了形成訴訟獲得獨(dú)立的基礎(chǔ)以及其本身存在的諸多問題。形成訴訟在實(shí)體權(quán)利總結(jié)出形成權(quán)概念的基礎(chǔ)上,在權(quán)利保護(hù)請(qǐng)求權(quán)說的推動(dòng)下,被認(rèn)為是出于對(duì)特定法益的考量而作出的技術(shù)安排,但是這一被視為形成權(quán)行使方式的訴訟形式,從確定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)到理論基礎(chǔ)均存在著論證不周的情況,有許多未成熟與不透明之處。訴的三分法并非“歷史的終點(diǎn)”。 第三部分,實(shí)體形成權(quán)與形成訴訟關(guān)系之檢討。基于前述對(duì)形成權(quán)的認(rèn)識(shí),其在權(quán)利體系中與支配權(quán)有著相似的邏輯理路,實(shí)為一種單方的支配領(lǐng)域,是權(quán)利人的私力救濟(jì)手段,與訴訟所代表的羅馬法的公力救濟(jì)思想有著本質(zhì)的差別,形成權(quán)與形成訴訟乃毫無干系的兩條平行軌跡,前者遠(yuǎn)較后者更有威懾力,國(guó)家因素礙于其統(tǒng)治功用僅有事后審查之地位。 第四部分,“形成權(quán)”與形成之訴關(guān)系再論。本部分對(duì)形成抗辯權(quán)及其所對(duì)抗的權(quán)利作了接續(xù)處理,既不同于形成權(quán)也不是法國(guó)法上的形成請(qǐng)求權(quán),而是處在二者中間的位置；而形成訴權(quán)并不能獨(dú)立支撐所謂的形成訴訟,其權(quán)利來源應(yīng)當(dāng)是一種主觀公法權(quán)利,由此顯現(xiàn)出一個(gè)關(guān)于“形成”的層次嚴(yán)密權(quán)利體系,將后者直接納入形成訴訟則跨越了一個(gè)論證階段,按照目前的解釋框架,形成訴訟與確認(rèn)訴訟均有不能令人滿意的地方。 第五部分,理論及實(shí)務(wù)問題之提示——代結(jié)論。通過前文之討論,得出本文所試圖論證的命題,并對(duì)今后的研究做一種方向性的提示,對(duì)于實(shí)務(wù)操作以及立法論上的選擇作出說明。
[Abstract]:As the field of the joint action of the substantive law and the procedural law, the litigation involves not only the interlacing of public law and private law, but also the integration of substantive rights and procedural forms. The development of the legal system decomposes the actio of the law of Rome, but the concrete realization of the dynamic needs to be integrated into this mutual integration. The formation of a lawsuit is just on the edge of this relationship. Since the right of formation in the substantive law has been recognized, it has been confirmed and supported with some existing litigation forms. The right to form is the basis for the right to form a lawsuit and forms the way to exercise the litigation as the right to form. The two share the characteristics of the legal relationship, and the gap between the public law and the private law, the entity and the procedure. The unblocked function of the right itself and the restriction of the research on the department law, the natural connection between the formation right and the formation of the lawsuit becomes self-evident, which is recognized by the scholars of the substantive law and the procedural law, so that the two major department laws have been neglected in the study of the right to form the right and the formation of the litigation.
In fact, the right of formation, as the power in the private law, is not an ordinary right and obligation relationship between the subjects. The domination of the right person and the relative person's submission constitute the unequal field in the private law, the means of the private relief of the right holders, and the two parallel running tracks with the formation of the public power relief thought, forming a lawsuit self. There are more opaque parts and unnecessary confusion about the type of litigation, and the basis of rights needs to be relocated. The existing interpretation framework is difficult to explain. This paper, starting with the essence of the right of formation, rethinks the form standard and actual basis of the formation of the litigation, and carries out the investigation of the relationship between the two. Hard work.
Besides the introduction, this article is divided into five parts, with a total of 50000 words.
The first part is the definition of the right of formation in the substantive law. From the formalization of the formalization of the concept of the right to form, it points out that the essence of the right of formation lies in the interference in the scope of the rights of others, the relative person is in the legal status of submission, thus creating the inequality in the private law, and the right to form the right to form the public law and the nature of the right to form the right of formation. The right of formation of disagreement does not conform to the logical structure of the right to form, and the scope of the right of formation should be excluded.
In the second part, the formation and expansion of the lawsuit is formed. This part examines the basis for the independence of the formation of litigation and the many problems that exist in itself. On the basis of the concept of the right to form the right to form the substantive rights, and on the impetus of the claim of the right to protect the rights, it is considered to be a technical security for the consideration of the specific legal interest. But this form of litigation, which is regarded as the form of the exercise of the right of formation, has a lot of immature and opaque places from the standard to the theoretical basis. There are many unripe and opaque places. The three point law of the lawsuit is not "the end of history".
The third part, the review of the relationship between the right to form a entity and the formation of a lawsuit. Based on the foregoing knowledge of the right to form, it has a similar logical logic in the right system with the right of domination. It is a unilateral domination field, a means of private relief for the rights of the right, and an essential difference from the public relief thought of the Rome law, represented by the lawsuit. There are two parallel trajectories of the right and the formation of a lawsuit, the former is far more deterrent than the latter, and the state factor is hindering the status of the post censorship of its ruling function only.
The fourth part, "the right to form" and the relationship of the formation of the formation of the relationship again. This part of the formation of the right to defend and the right to fight in succession, not only different from the right of formation and not in French law, but in the middle of the two, and the formation of the right to appeal can not support the so-called formation of litigation, its source of rights should be. When it is a kind of subjective public law right, it shows a hierarchy of strict right system of "formation", and the latter is directly included in the formation of litigation, and it has crossed a stage of demonstration. In accordance with the present interpretation framework, the litigation and the confirmation of litigation are unsatisfactory.
The fifth part, the hint of the theoretical and practical problems - the generation of the conclusion. Through the discussion of the previous article, we can draw the proposition that this article tries to demonstrate, and make a directional hint for the future research, and explain the practical operation and the choice of the legislative theory.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D913;D915.2

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