本文選題：國(guó)有企業(yè) + 委托代理��； 參考：《武漢理工大學(xué)》2003年碩士論文

【摘要】： 本文適應(yīng)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的需要，在分析我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)委托代理關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)上提出國(guó)有企業(yè)委托風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的回避措施。全文共分四章，各章主要內(nèi)容概括如下： 第一章從企業(yè)委托代理的起源與演變、委托-代理一般理論的代理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)原理兩個(gè)方面，對(duì)企業(yè)委托代理的一般理論作一概述。企業(yè)委托代理關(guān)系起源于地理大發(fā)現(xiàn)以后所導(dǎo)致的世界經(jīng)濟(jì)史上的商業(yè)革命。16—18世紀(jì)，在地理大發(fā)現(xiàn)和新航路的推動(dòng)下，國(guó)際貿(mào)易快速發(fā)展。貿(mào)易規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大，需要有效率的商業(yè)組織相配合。在這一背景下，商業(yè)組織形式的創(chuàng)新之一，就是特許公司成為對(duì)外貿(mào)易的主要商業(yè)組織形式：一類是契約公司，另一類是早期的股份公司。18世紀(jì)90年代，美國(guó)的企業(yè)組織形式以合伙制為主，但為了適應(yīng)迅速擴(kuò)充的經(jīng)濟(jì)和聯(lián)邦政體的需要，美國(guó)率先對(duì)商法進(jìn)行調(diào)整，旨在確立股份公司的企業(yè)組織形式。美國(guó)對(duì)商法的高速，標(biāo)志著委托代理機(jī)制的確立�，F(xiàn)代股份公司表明，委托代理關(guān)系以分工和專業(yè)化為基礎(chǔ)，它在本質(zhì)上是一種合約。在這種合約下，一個(gè)人或更多人委托其他人代表他們來(lái)從事某些活動(dòng)，并相應(yīng)地把若干決策權(quán)托付給代理人。在這一契約關(guān)系中，人們將能夠主動(dòng)設(shè)計(jì)契約形式的當(dāng)事人稱為委托人，而將被動(dòng)地接受或拒絕契約形式中進(jìn)行選擇的當(dāng)事人稱為代理人�，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)中股東和經(jīng)理人之間的關(guān)系因此而成為典型的委托代理關(guān)系，其特征就是所有權(quán)與管理權(quán)相分離。 委托代理關(guān)系中，雙方都是自身效用最大化者。一方面作為擁有資本財(cái)貨的委托人之所以委托代理人，是因?yàn)樽非笫找娴淖畲蠡�。另一方面被委托的代理人追求的目�?biāo)是效用的最大化。這樣，有著獨(dú)立利益的代理人在自身利益最大化的過(guò)程中，不會(huì)自動(dòng)實(shí)現(xiàn)委托人收益的最大化，甚至基于機(jī)會(huì)主義動(dòng)機(jī)，在最大限度增進(jìn)自己利益的同時(shí)，可能造成委托人利益的損失，形成管理理論的代理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題。在委托代理關(guān)系中，代理人問(wèn)題具體表現(xiàn)為以下兩種基本類型：一是道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)(moral hazard)問(wèn)題；二是逆向選擇(adverse selection)問(wèn)題。阿羅(Arrow，1985)將這兩類現(xiàn)象分別稱為“隱蔽行動(dòng)”(hidden action)問(wèn)題和“隱蔽信息(hidden information)問(wèn)題。 理論與實(shí)踐兩個(gè)方面一直在探討委托代理關(guān)系中代理問(wèn)題的解決方案。那就是讓委托人利用兩種機(jī)制，把代理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降到最低程度。一是通過(guò)合理設(shè) 武漢理工大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文 一計(jì)代理契約，明確界定代理人的責(zé)任、權(quán)利和義務(wù)，并給予代理人最佳的行一 為激勵(lì)和約束，使代理人的行為目標(biāo)與委托人的目標(biāo)接近，減少代理人的機(jī) 會(huì)主義行為。二是通過(guò)代理人市場(chǎng)，在代理人之間引入競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制。競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制 —一確立后，委托人通過(guò)仔細(xì)考察代理人的業(yè)績(jī)，聲譽(yù)等，選擇“信得過(guò)’。的代 理人�，F(xiàn)在，為了解決代理問(wèn)題，理論和實(shí)踐都在探索委托代理關(guān)系的更有 ＿效的激勵(lì)與約束新模式，這些新模式包括獨(dú)立董事制度模式、股票期權(quán)模式 一和智力資本激勵(lì)模式、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資企業(yè)模式。一 第二章圍繞國(guó)有企業(yè)委托代理關(guān)系問(wèn)題，首先分析西方國(guó)有企業(yè)的委托 代理關(guān)系，，其次考察我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)委托代理關(guān)系的認(rèn)識(shí)與實(shí)踐，最后探討對(duì) 我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)委托代理關(guān)系進(jìn)行的再認(rèn)識(shí)與實(shí)踐。世界上幾乎所有的國(guó)家都 有國(guó)有企業(yè)。西方國(guó)有企業(yè)的組織形式基本上實(shí)行國(guó)家參與制（參股制），而 在管理上則采取控股公司模式。其國(guó)有企業(yè)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制分為貨幣激勵(lì)與非貨 幣，而約束機(jī)制包括所有權(quán)約束、內(nèi)部監(jiān)督和約束、外部監(jiān)督和約束。我國(guó) 國(guó)有企業(yè)被定義為社會(huì)主義全民所有制企業(yè)。在高度集權(quán)的非市場(chǎng)化條件下， 國(guó)有企業(yè)名為企業(yè)，其實(shí)是政府的附屬機(jī)構(gòu)，企業(yè)沒(méi)有自主經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)，－一政府從 上到下對(duì)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的經(jīng)營(yíng)形成大一統(tǒng)的包辦，企業(yè)中一般意義上的委托代理 關(guān)系消失。改革開(kāi)始以后，人們對(duì)集權(quán)體制進(jìn)行了猛烈的批判，隨之?dāng)U大企 業(yè)自主經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)，爾后實(shí)行企業(yè)承包制。企業(yè)承包制的實(shí)行使國(guó)有企業(yè)的行政 約束更不規(guī)范地?cái)U(kuò)大，政府作為發(fā)包方實(shí)際壟斷企業(yè)的一切。發(fā)包方可以任 意中止，而承包方卻不能隨便轉(zhuǎn)換，政府與企業(yè)的關(guān)系實(shí)質(zhì)上仍在非市場(chǎng)化 經(jīng)營(yíng)的舊體制上延續(xù)。20世紀(jì)故年代以前，國(guó)有企業(yè)改革方向的理論探討 集中到“所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離”的思路方面。圍繞這一基本思路，理論界提 出了許多改革設(shè)想。其中，國(guó)有企業(yè)體制改革實(shí)踐，是當(dāng)時(shí)理論研究成果的 結(jié)晶，代表了主流派——一漸進(jìn)式改革的改革思想。但是，它們遠(yuǎn)不是這一時(shí) 期研究成果的全部，其他比較有代表性的觀點(diǎn)有“變壓器理論”和“綜合制 約的經(jīng)理階層論”。20世紀(jì)90年代中期，通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)委托代理關(guān)系的再 認(rèn)識(shí)，理論界提出了國(guó)家持股的構(gòu)想、國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的股權(quán)化與債權(quán)化構(gòu)想、主 辦銀行制度的構(gòu)想，并對(duì)此進(jìn)行了實(shí)踐。 －一第三章以我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)委托代理關(guān)系的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與原因?yàn)轭}，分別討論我國(guó) ＿國(guó)
[Abstract]:This article is adapted to the needs of the national economic development and the economic system reform. On the basis of the analysis of the principal-agent relationship of the state owned enterprises in our country, this paper puts forward the avoidance measures of the trust risk of the state-owned enterprises. The full text is divided into four chapters, and the main contents of each chapter are summarized as follows:
The first chapter from the origin and evolution of the principal-agent, the principal agent general theory of the agency risk principle two aspects, an overview of the general theory of enterprise principal-agent. The enterprise principal-agent relationship originated in the world economic history of the business revolution.16 - eighteenth Century, in the geographical discovery and new navigation Under the impetus of the road, international trade has developed rapidly. The expansion of trade scale requires efficient business organizations to cooperate. In this context, one of the innovation of the form of business organization is that the Chartered Company has become the main business organization of foreign trade: one is the contract company and the other is the early stock company in the 90s.18 century. The form of enterprise organization is mainly in partnership, but in order to meet the needs of rapidly expanding economic and federal government, the United States is the first to adjust the commercial law to establish the organizational form of the joint stock company. The high-speed of the United States to the commercial law marks the establishment of the principal-agent mechanism. On the basis of specialization, it is essentially a contract in which a person or more person entrusts others to engage in certain activities on behalf of them and to give the agent a number of decisions accordingly. In this contractual relationship, the party who can actively design the contract form is called the client and will be passive. The party who accepts or refuses to choose in the form of contract is called agent. The relationship between shareholders and managers in modern enterprises is a typical principal-agent relationship, which is characterized by the separation of ownership and management.
In the principal-agent relationship, both sides are the maxims of their own utility. On the one hand, the principal who has the capital and goods is entrusted to the agent because it seeks the maximization of the income. On the other hand, the agent sought by the entrusted agent is the maximization of the utility. In this way, the agent with independent interests maximizes its own interests. In the process, it will not automatically realize the maximization of the principal's income, even based on the opportunist motivation. It may cause the loss of the principal's interests and form the agency risk in the management theory. In the principal-agent relationship, the agent problem is embodied in the following two basic types: one is the Dao The moral hazard problem; two is the adverse selection problem. AlO (Arrow, 1985) referred to these two types of phenomena as "hidden action" (hidden action) and "hidden information".
In the two aspects of theory and practice, we have been discussing the solution of agency problem in principal-agent relationship. That is to let the principal use two mechanisms to minimize the agency risk.
Master's degree thesis of Wuhan University of Technology
An agency contract, which clearly defines the responsibilities, rights and obligations of agents, and gives agents the best way to do so.
In order to encourage and restrain the agent's behavior goal and the client's goal, he can reduce the agent's machine.
The two is to introduce competition mechanism among agents through the agent market.
Once established, the trustor selects the "trustworthy" generation through careful inspection of the agent's performance, reputation and so on.
Now, in order to solve the agency problem, both theory and practice are exploring the relationship between principal and agent.
The new mode of incentive and restriction includes independent director system mode and stock option mode.
First, intellectual capital incentive mode, venture capital enterprise mode.
The second chapter focuses on the principal-agent relationship of state-owned enterprises. First, it analyzes the entrustment of western state-owned enterprises.
Secondly, we examine the understanding and practice of the principal-agent relationship in China's state-owned enterprises.
The recognition and practice of principal-agent relationship in state-owned enterprises in China. Almost all the countries in the world
There are state-owned enterprises. The organizational form of the western state-owned enterprises basically implements the state participation system (shareholding system).
In management, the mode of holding company is adopted. The incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises is divided into monetary incentive and non cash incentive.
The constraint mechanism includes ownership restriction, internal supervision and restriction, external supervision and restriction.
State owned enterprises are defined as socialist enterprises owned by the whole people. Under the condition of highly centralized and non marketization,
The state-owned enterprise is called an enterprise, but it is actually a subsidiary organ of the government.
From top to bottom, the operation of state-owned assets is unified, and the principal-agent in general sense of enterprises is arranged.
After the reform began, people criticized the centralization system fiercely, and then expanded it.
The enterprise shall have the right to operate independently, and then the enterprise contract system shall be implemented.
The restriction is more irregular. The government acts as the owner of the actual monopoly of the enterprise.
The contractor will not be able to switch freely, but the relationship between the government and the enterprises is still non marketable.
The old system of operation extends the theoretical direction of the reform direction of state-owned enterprises before the.20 century.
Focus on the idea of "separation of ownership from management".
A lot of reform ideas have been put forward. Among them, the reform practice of state-owned enterprises is the result of theoretical research at that time.
Crystallizing represents the mainstream school - the idea of gradual reform.
All other research results are representative of the "transformer theory" and "comprehensive system".
In the middle of the.20 century, in 90s, the principal-agent relationship of state-owned enterprises was re established.
In theory, the theorists put forward the concept of State Shareholding, and the concept of stock ownership and creditor's rights of state-owned assets.
The idea of running a banking system has been put into practice.
The first third chapters discuss the risks and causes of the principal-agent relationship in China's state-owned enterprises.
State
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2003
【分類號(hào)】：F276.1

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6 張媚芳（作者單位：市委黨校）;搞活國(guó)有企業(yè)要重視企業(yè)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略[N];盤(pán)錦日?qǐng)?bào);2005年

7 記者 張娟;打好國(guó)有企業(yè)改革攻堅(jiān)戰(zhàn)[N];天水日?qǐng)?bào);2005年

8 中國(guó)鋁業(yè)公司黨組副書(shū)記、副總經(jīng)理 中國(guó)鋁業(yè)股份有限公司總裁 熊維平;國(guó)有企業(yè)如何構(gòu)建和諧社會(huì)（上）[N];中國(guó)有色金屬報(bào);2005年

9 中國(guó)鋁業(yè)公司黨組副書(shū)記、副總經(jīng)理 中國(guó)鋁業(yè)股份有限公司總裁 熊維平;國(guó)有企業(yè)如何構(gòu)建和諧社會(huì)（下）[N];中國(guó)有色金屬報(bào);2005年

10 中共青島市委組織部;國(guó)有企業(yè)人才激勵(lì)機(jī)制創(chuàng)新對(duì)策[N];組織人事報(bào);2005年

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1 張萬(wàn)成;我國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)軌時(shí)期企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)選擇問(wèn)題研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2004年

2 周昊;國(guó)有企業(yè)分拆上市的法律分析[D];中國(guó)政法大學(xué);2005年

3 周權(quán)雄;雙重任務(wù)、共同代理與國(guó)有企業(yè)創(chuàng)新激勵(lì)[D];暨南大學(xué);2010年

4 李天庚;國(guó)有企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理研究[D];中南大學(xué);2003年

5 徐晨光;國(guó)有企業(yè)董事會(huì)運(yùn)行機(jī)制研究[D];湖南大學(xué);2005年

6 孟令國(guó);中國(guó)企業(yè)管理層隱性激勵(lì)機(jī)制研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2006年

7 章迪誠(chéng);中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)改革的制度變遷研究[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2008年

8 羅志先;國(guó)有企業(yè)產(chǎn)權(quán)改革的法治基礎(chǔ)[D];中共中央黨校;2001年

9 孔新宇;國(guó)有企業(yè)民營(yíng)化方式的國(guó)際比較[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2003年

10 金珍慶;中韓國(guó)有企業(yè)改制及其相關(guān)保護(hù)小股東權(quán)益問(wèn)題之研究[D];中國(guó)政法大學(xué);2004年

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1 趙輝;國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者薪酬激勵(lì)體系設(shè)計(jì)探討[D];天津師范大學(xué);2005年

2 王鸞鳳;我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)改革的委托代理理論分析[D];武漢大學(xué);2004年

3 曾愛(ài)軍;國(guó)有企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)動(dòng)力機(jī)制研究[D];湖南大學(xué);2003年

4 肖海翔;國(guó)有企業(yè)管理層收購(gòu)的融資體系安排及定價(jià)機(jī)制研究[D];湖南大學(xué);2004年

5 黃新炎;國(guó)有企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)管理中存在的典型問(wèn)題[D];對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2004年

6 徐麗敏;國(guó)有企業(yè)重組改制中的債務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移法律問(wèn)題研究[D];對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2005年

7 郭懷平;論我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新[D];廈門(mén)大學(xué);2001年

8 劉汪敏;關(guān)于對(duì)進(jìn)一步深化國(guó)有企業(yè)改革的探討[D];廈門(mén)大學(xué);2001年

9 張曉紅;資本結(jié)構(gòu)與國(guó)有企業(yè)“債轉(zhuǎn)股”[D];中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院研究生院;2001年

10 黃佩珍;國(guó)有企業(yè)人力資源管理問(wèn)題研究[D];華中師范大學(xué);2004年

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