本文選題：股東派生訴訟　切入點(diǎn)：制度價(jià)值　出處：《華中科技大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文

【摘要】： 股東派生訴訟是指當(dāng)董事、經(jīng)理等公司高級(jí)職員實(shí)施越權(quán)行為或不當(dāng)行為使公司利益受損時(shí),或者公司利益受到公司外部第三人的侵害之時(shí),由于公司董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)或股東大會(huì)怠于起訴或者拒絕起訴時(shí),公司一個(gè)或多個(gè)股東代表公司對(duì)實(shí)施越權(quán)行為、不當(dāng)行為或其他侵權(quán)行為者提起訴訟,勝訴所得賠償或利益恢復(fù)都直接歸屬于公司的一種法律制度。此制度起源于英國的衡平法,在美國得到全面的發(fā)展,是現(xiàn)在世界上大多數(shù)市場經(jīng)濟(jì)國家所規(guī)定的公司法上的一項(xiàng)重要制度。 我國舊公司法并沒有規(guī)定股東派生訴訟,在學(xué)者們“千呼萬喚始出來”的股東派生訴訟制度被新修訂的《公司法》采納后彌補(bǔ)了這一立法空缺,適應(yīng)了市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的現(xiàn)代化發(fā)展,在規(guī)范大股東和董事的行為、維護(hù)中小股東權(quán)益方面有著特殊的作用,但“猶抱琵琶半遮面”——僅僅規(guī)定了一個(gè)條文即公司法152條,該條文的規(guī)定過于原則和粗糙,關(guān)于怎么適用并沒有作出明確的規(guī)定,造成司法實(shí)踐的困難。本論文在借鑒其他國家相對(duì)成熟的規(guī)定的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)我國股東派生訴訟制度的完善進(jìn)行了一些思考。 文章共分為四個(gè)部分: 第一部分為股東派生訴訟制度概述。本部分首先揭示了股東派生訴訟的含義和特征,考察了股東派生訴訟的歷史發(fā)展,接著對(duì)股東派生訴訟與股東直接訴訟的區(qū)別作了詳細(xì)的比較分析。 第二部分為股東派生訴訟的制度價(jià)值。本部分主要闡述股東派生訴訟的制度價(jià)值,首先在于約束經(jīng)營管理者、大股東和維護(hù)中小股東利益,其次以我國上市公司的公司治理困境為例,說明股東派生訴訟對(duì)加強(qiáng)公司治理平衡的重要意義。 第三部分為我國股東派生訴訟的立法現(xiàn)狀和司法實(shí)踐。本部分主要介紹我國新公司法確立的股東派生訴訟制度的主要內(nèi)容,及其存在的問題,在司法實(shí)踐部分主要通過新公司法頒布前后的幾個(gè)典型股東派生訴訟案例說明我國在股東派生訴訟方面的實(shí)踐和操作的困難,以此呼吁新的司法解釋的出臺(tái),便于股東派生訴訟的司法操作。 第四部分是在比較法視野下完善我國股東派生訴訟,主要對(duì)股東派生訴訟制度在我國如何完善進(jìn)行了設(shè)計(jì)。本部分主要著眼于股東派生訴訟制度比較發(fā)達(dá)的美國、日本和我國臺(tái)灣地區(qū)的公司法或商法關(guān)于股東派生訴訟的先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn),結(jié)合我國的實(shí)際情況,就股東派生訴訟制度的訴訟主體、管轄、案件受理費(fèi)、前置程序、在審理中的特殊問題如駁回起訴、和解、撤訴等以及訴訟費(fèi)用擔(dān)保和訴訟后果承擔(dān)等方面提出具體的建議。根據(jù)我國公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)集中型特點(diǎn)以及現(xiàn)實(shí)中出現(xiàn)的各種大股東、董事、監(jiān)事等公司高級(jí)職員侵害公司利益和中小股東的情況,筆者認(rèn)為現(xiàn)階段應(yīng)該鼓勵(lì)股東派生訴訟的提起,因此在提出具體建議的時(shí)候也傾向于擴(kuò)大派生訴訟的訴訟主體范圍;為方便股東提起訴訟,規(guī)定便于起訴的管轄制度;為避免加重股東起訴的負(fù)擔(dān),將股東派生訴訟定性為非財(cái)產(chǎn)性訴訟,降低案件受理費(fèi);前置程序應(yīng)該有條件地引進(jìn),并嚴(yán)格限制范圍等。
[Abstract]:Shareholder derivative litigation refers to when the board of directors, managers and other senior staff, the implementation of ultra vires or improper behavior to the interests of the company, or the interests of the company by the third person outside the company's infringement, due to the company's board of directors, the board of supervisors or the general meeting of shareholders fails to prosecute or refused to prosecute, the company one or more shareholders on behalf of the company for the implementation of ultra vires, litigation misconduct or other infringer, a legal system in favor of the compensation or benefits recovery are directly attributable to the company. This system originated in the United Kingdom law, obtain the comprehensive development in the United States, the company law is an important system now in most market economy countries in the world the provisions on the.
In our country the old company law does not stipulate the shareholder derivative litigation, scholars in the "time and again starting out" the shareholder derivative litigation system was revised "Company Law > post adoption to make up for the legislative vacancy, to adapt to the modern development of the market economy, in the standard large shareholders and directors, has a special role the maintenance of the rights and interests of minority shareholders, but the" veiled "-- simply provides a provision that Article 152 of company law, the provisions of the provisions are too principled and rough, about how the application is not clearly defined, resulting in the difficulty of judicial practice. This paper on the basis of provisions of other countries is relatively mature on the perfection of the shareholder derivative litigation system in our country.
The article is divided into four parts:
The first part is an overview of shareholder derivative litigation. This section first reveals the implications and characteristics of shareholder derivative litigation, examines the historical development of shareholder derivative litigation, and then makes a detailed comparative analysis of the difference between shareholder derivative litigation and shareholder direct litigation.
The second part is the value of the system of shareholder derivative litigation. This part mainly expounds the value of the system of shareholder derivative litigation, first of all is to restrain managers, shareholders and safeguarding the interests of small shareholders, followed by the governance of Chinese listed companies, for example, shows the importance of shareholder derivative litigation to strengthen corporate governance and balance.
The third part of our shareholder derivative litigation legislation and judicial practice. This part mainly introduces the establishment of the new company law of China's shareholder derivative litigation system, and the problems in the judicial practice mainly through several typical cases of shareholder derivative litigation before and after the promulgation of the new company law that practice and operation in general the derivative action in China, which calls for the new judicial interpretation issued for shareholder derivative litigation in the judicial operation.
The fourth part is to improve our shareholder derivative litigation in the perspective of comparative law, mainly on shareholder derivative litigation system in our country how to improve the design. This part mainly focuses on the shareholder derivative litigation system is developed in the United States, the advanced experience on the shareholder derivative litigation of company law or commercial law of Japan and China's Taiwan region, combined with the actual situation of our country, on the shareholder derivative litigation subject of litigation jurisdiction, the case acceptance fee, pre procedure, special problems in the trial of the rejected prosecution, reconciliation, withdrawal and the cost of litigation and litigation consequences and puts forward specific suggestions. According to various large shareholders, appeared in China's shareholding structure centralized characteristics and the reality of the directors, supervisors and senior staff of the company against the interests of the company and the minority shareholders, the author believes that at this stage should encourage shareholders derivative litigation A lawsuit filed, the scope of the subject of litigation on the specific proposals also tend to expand the derivative litigation; litigation for shareholders, under the jurisdiction of the provisions for the prosecution system; in order to avoid aggravating the burden of shareholder lawsuits, the shareholder derivative litigation as non property litigation, reduce the fees for accepting the case; procedural conditions the introduction should be, and strictly limit the scope.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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