【摘要】：著作權(quán)的行政救濟(jì),理論上有利于促使侵權(quán)外部性的內(nèi)部化,形成強(qiáng)大的威懾激勵侵害人的預(yù)防措施,減少侵權(quán)數(shù)量。行政執(zhí)法的威懾力有賴于加大查處概率和提高懲處力度,在我國,版權(quán)執(zhí)法信息成本和運行成本高昂,呈現(xiàn)出"低查處概率,低懲處強(qiáng)度"的非效率狀態(tài)。行政處罰與民事制裁具有同質(zhì)性,司法救濟(jì)更具優(yōu)越性,用民事制裁措施取代行政處罰是最為經(jīng)濟(jì)的制度安排。
[Abstract]:In theory, the administrative remedy of copyright is conducive to the internalization of the externality of infringement, the formation of powerful preventive measures to deter and motivate the infringer, and the reduction of the amount of infringement. The deterrent of administrative law enforcement depends on increasing the probability of investigation and punishment. In our country, the cost and operation cost of copyright law enforcement is high, showing the inefficient state of "low investigation probability and low punishment intensity". Administrative punishment and civil sanction have the same quality, and judicial remedy is more advantageous. It is the most economical system arrangement to replace administrative punishment with civil sanction measure.
【作者單位】： 中山大學(xué)法學(xué)院;
【分類號】：D923.41

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