【摘要】：人格權(quán)的發(fā)展經(jīng)歷了漫長(zhǎng)的歷史演變過(guò)程,其中最值得關(guān)注的,就是人格權(quán)從保護(hù)身份等級(jí)制度到保護(hù)人之為人的觀念變化,而這種變化,是與私法中“人”的概念分不開(kāi)的。從羅馬法中的“人可非人”,到現(xiàn)代民法主體制度中的“非人可人”,這不僅是人權(quán)發(fā)展的結(jié)果,更暗含了人格權(quán)制度的發(fā)展趨勢(shì):人格權(quán)是一個(gè)開(kāi)放性的概念,它的主體和內(nèi)容均處于不斷的擴(kuò)張之中,但歸根究底,人格權(quán)依舊是立足于保護(hù)人之自由、人之尊嚴(yán)的價(jià)值基礎(chǔ)之上的。本文通篇論述均服務(wù)于兩個(gè)設(shè)問(wèn):人格權(quán)在民法中是否享有獨(dú)立權(quán)利地位,以及人格權(quán)在民法典中是否應(yīng)當(dāng)獨(dú)立成編。筆者首先按照“人、人格、人格權(quán)”的邏輯推理過(guò)程,通過(guò)對(duì)人格權(quán)概念的深入剖析,明確人格權(quán)的主體、客體、特征及與憲法權(quán)利的關(guān)系,經(jīng)過(guò)全面的理論鋪墊以及正反兩方面的論證,得出人格權(quán)作為獨(dú)立民事權(quán)利的結(jié)論。在人格權(quán)是否應(yīng)獨(dú)立成編的問(wèn)題上,由于人格權(quán)的權(quán)利地位一章已經(jīng)從理論上論證了人格權(quán)法定,為避免重復(fù),筆者主要從立法技術(shù)上進(jìn)行探討。由于我國(guó)目前對(duì)人格權(quán)的保護(hù)主要是依靠侵權(quán)責(zé)任法,而侵權(quán)法中對(duì)人格權(quán)類型的列舉也是相對(duì)最全面的,因此人格權(quán)與侵權(quán)責(zé)任法的重復(fù)和沖突的問(wèn)題十分突出;此外,梁慧星教授還提出,人格權(quán)的內(nèi)容十分單薄,獨(dú)立成編將造成各分則之間不成比例。筆者針對(duì)這兩個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)性的問(wèn)題,首先從人格權(quán)當(dāng)為設(shè)權(quán)性質(zhì)的法律的角度,解答了與救濟(jì)性質(zhì)的侵權(quán)責(zé)任法的關(guān)系:互補(bǔ)而非沖突;其次,通過(guò)借鑒人大版《學(xué)者建議稿》中的人格權(quán)立法模式以及物權(quán)法的結(jié)構(gòu),得出人格權(quán)法應(yīng)由“總則+一般條款+具體人格權(quán)”三部分組成,并應(yīng)具有比重更加傾斜的總則部分的結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:The development of personality right has gone through a long historical evolution process, among which the most worthy of attention is the change of the concept of personality right from the protection of the status hierarchy system to the protection of the person as a person, which is inseparable from the concept of "person" in private law. From "people can not be human" in Roman law, to "not person and person" in the subject system of modern civil law, this is not only the result of the development of human rights, but also implies the development trend of personality right system: personality right is an open concept. Its subject and content are constantly expanding, but in the final analysis, the right of personality is still based on the value of protecting human freedom and human dignity. The whole article is devoted to two questions: whether the personality right has the independent right status in the civil law and whether the personality right should be made up independently in the civil code. First of all, according to the logical reasoning process of "person, personality right", through the thorough analysis of the concept of personality right, the author clarifies the subject, object, characteristic and the relation with constitutional right of personality right. The conclusion that personality right is an independent civil right is concluded through comprehensive theoretical foundation and both positive and negative arguments. On the question of whether personality right should be made up independently, because the right status of personality right has been theoretically proved that personality right is legal, in order to avoid repetition, the author mainly discusses from legislation technology. At present, the protection of personality right in our country mainly depends on tort liability law, and the enumeration of personality right type in tort law is relatively comprehensive, so the duplication and conflict between personality right and tort liability law are very prominent. Liang Huixing also pointed out that the content of personality rights is very thin, independent editing will cause the sub-rules out of proportion. In view of these two realistic questions, the author, first of all, from the point of view of the right of personality as the law of the nature of the right, answers the relationship between the law of tort liability of relief nature and the law of tort liability of the nature of relief: complementation rather than conflict; secondly, By drawing lessons from the legislative model of personality right and the structure of real right law in the draft proposed by scholars in the National people's Congress, it is concluded that the law of personality right should be composed of three parts: "specific personality right of general clause". And should have a more skewed proportion of the general part of the conclusion.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D923

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