“實(shí)際惡意”原則論綱
本文選題:實(shí)際惡意 + 公眾人物; 參考:《吉林大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文
【摘要】:由于我國(guó)現(xiàn)行法律很難實(shí)現(xiàn)媒體言論與公眾人物名譽(yù)權(quán)之間的平衡,存在過(guò)度限制媒體的現(xiàn)象,基于美國(guó)適用“實(shí)際惡意”原則達(dá)到的實(shí)際效果,在很多學(xué)者的呼吁下,我國(guó)司法實(shí)踐引入了美國(guó)誹謗法中“實(shí)際惡意”原則。但是因?yàn)槲覈?guó)與美國(guó)的文化傳統(tǒng)、理論基礎(chǔ)、基本國(guó)情和社會(huì)觀念諸多方面的不同,導(dǎo)致該原則在我國(guó)司法適用中出現(xiàn)了種種問(wèn)題,也反映出各種矛盾,比如法律名詞概念模糊、歸責(zé)原則的規(guī)定和實(shí)踐存在矛盾、適用范圍界定不清等。所以根據(jù)“實(shí)際惡意”原則適用時(shí)的問(wèn)題,在理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界出現(xiàn)了反對(duì)的聲音,有一部分學(xué)者提出我國(guó)并不適合適用“實(shí)際惡意”原則,認(rèn)為在該原則的適用過(guò)程中體現(xiàn)出的文化內(nèi)涵和世界觀與我國(guó)傳統(tǒng)觀念不符,同時(shí)適用該原則會(huì)與我國(guó)現(xiàn)有的法律規(guī)定產(chǎn)生矛盾。 雖然有些學(xué)者提出了反對(duì)觀點(diǎn),但筆者依然認(rèn)為引入“實(shí)際惡意”原則并適用于我國(guó)司法實(shí)踐中是有必要的。本文通過(guò)總結(jié)“實(shí)際惡意”原則在美國(guó)和我國(guó)的發(fā)展軌跡,對(duì)反對(duì)在我國(guó)適用該原則觀點(diǎn)的提出進(jìn)行了厘清,歸納出悖論的理論根據(jù),并對(duì)此加以批判,從傳統(tǒng)文化基礎(chǔ)到現(xiàn)階段的法律規(guī)定,從理論價(jià)值到現(xiàn)實(shí)意義,對(duì)“實(shí)際惡意”原則適用的模糊問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了正本清源。筆者采用了邏輯思維論證法和實(shí)證分析法,同時(shí)結(jié)合我國(guó)的司法現(xiàn)狀,,得出“實(shí)際惡意”原則的本質(zhì)其實(shí)是媒體侵害公眾人物名譽(yù)權(quán)的侵權(quán)構(gòu)成要件的嚴(yán)格化,而構(gòu)成要件收縮是為了鼓勵(lì)媒體主動(dòng)報(bào)道,是對(duì)主動(dòng)監(jiān)督公眾人物行為的媒體的保護(hù),最終是通過(guò)對(duì)公眾人物私德的監(jiān)督達(dá)到社會(huì)利益最大化的目的;而我國(guó)引入“實(shí)際惡意”原則的宗旨應(yīng)該是《憲法》第41條中規(guī)定的監(jiān)督權(quán),媒體作為公民監(jiān)督權(quán)實(shí)現(xiàn)的途徑,當(dāng)其報(bào)道自由與公眾人物的名譽(yù)權(quán)保護(hù)發(fā)生沖突時(shí),應(yīng)當(dāng)把這種沖突看作是公權(quán)力和私權(quán)利的沖突,是實(shí)現(xiàn)公共利益最大化的必要手段和必然要求,不應(yīng)該把其當(dāng)作是簡(jiǎn)單的公民言論自由與私人名譽(yù)權(quán)保護(hù)之間的,私權(quán)利與私權(quán)利的沖突。 本文的目的是為了使“實(shí)際惡意”原則符合我國(guó)的現(xiàn)有法律法規(guī),適用于我國(guó)的司法實(shí)踐,使其不論與法學(xué)理論還是司法實(shí)務(wù)都能更好的結(jié)合。希望通過(guò)對(duì)“實(shí)際惡意”原則發(fā)展軌跡的分析和現(xiàn)有矛盾的解決,可以更好的滿足公民的監(jiān)督權(quán)和知情權(quán),在實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)公共利益最大化的同時(shí),平衡新聞?wù)鎸?shí)性和時(shí)效性的共同要求。也希望可以為未來(lái)民法典正式確立“實(shí)際惡意”原則做出貢獻(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:Because the current law of our country is very difficult to realize the balance between the media speech and the reputation right of public figures, there exists the phenomenon of excessive restriction of the media. Based on the practical effect achieved by the application of the "actual malice" principle in the United States, many scholars have called for it. Our judicial practice introduces the principle of "actual malice" in American libel law. However, because of the differences in cultural traditions, theoretical foundations, basic national conditions and social concepts between China and the United States, various problems have arisen in the judicial application of this principle, which also reflects various contradictions. For example, the concept of legal noun is vague, the stipulation and practice of imputation principle are contradictory, and the scope of application is unclear. Therefore, according to the problem when the principle of "actual malice" applies, there are voices of opposition in the theoretical and practical circles. Some scholars have suggested that our country is not suitable for the application of the principle of "actual malice". It is considered that the cultural connotation and world outlook embodied in the application of the principle are not consistent with the traditional concept of our country, and that the application of the principle will produce contradictions with the existing laws and regulations of our country. Although some scholars have put forward opposing views, the author still thinks that it is necessary to introduce the principle of "actual malice" and apply it to the judicial practice of our country. This paper summarizes the development of the "actual malice" principle in the United States and China, clarifies the viewpoint of opposing the application of the principle in China, sums up the theoretical basis of the paradox, and criticizes it. From the foundation of traditional culture to the legal provisions of the present stage, from the theoretical value to the practical significance, the fuzzy problem of the application of the principle of "actual malice" has been thoroughly cleared up. The author adopts the method of logical thinking argumentation and empirical analysis, and at the same time, combining with the judicial situation of our country, draws the conclusion that the essence of the principle of "actual malice" is actually the strictness of the constitutive elements of media infringement of public figures' reputation right. The contraction of constitutive elements is to encourage the media to report actively, is to actively monitor the behavior of public figures of the media protection, and ultimately through the supervision of the private morality of public figures to achieve the purpose of maximizing social interests; The purpose of introducing the principle of "actual malice" in our country should be the supervisory power stipulated in Article 41 of the Constitution. The media, as a way to realize the right of supervision of citizens, should have a conflict between the freedom of reporting and the protection of the reputation rights of public figures. Such conflicts should be regarded as conflicts between public and private rights, as necessary means and necessary requirements for maximizing the public interest, and not as a simple link between the freedom of expression of citizens and the protection of private reputation rights, The conflict between private rights and private rights. The purpose of this paper is to make the principle of "actual malice" conform to the existing laws and regulations of our country and apply to the judicial practice of our country, so that it can be better combined with the theory of law and judicial practice. It is hoped that through the analysis of the development track of the "actual malice" principle and the solution of the existing contradictions, it can better satisfy the citizens' right to supervise and know, and at the same time realize the maximization of the social public interest. Balance news authenticity and timeliness of the common requirements. It also hopes to contribute to the establishment of the principle of "actual malice" in the future civil code.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號(hào)】:D923
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