P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)貸款監(jiān)管法律問題研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-12 13:53
【摘要】：最初在國外誕生之時，P2P平臺僅僅充當著信息中介的角色，不直接參與借貸行為，但P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)貸款這一新型借貸方式一經(jīng)傳入我國，就有了異化發(fā)展的趨勢，其更多的演化成為一種信用中介，直接參與借貸行為，不免有涉及金融機構(gòu)之嫌。在我國，P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)借貸模式大致可以分為以下三種：線上傳統(tǒng)模式、線下債權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓模式和復合擔保模式。其中，線上傳統(tǒng)模式發(fā)展到現(xiàn)在僅剩拍拍貸一家，在此模式下，借貸行為的風險更多的表現(xiàn)為信用風險、技術(shù)風險、逆向選擇和道德風險等；宜信貸為典型的債權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓模式，其通過將債權(quán)拆分和轉(zhuǎn)讓，使得P2P平臺成為一個資金中介樞紐平臺，可以說是一種無牌照、無監(jiān)管的“影子銀行”。該模式面臨的最大風險在于經(jīng)營風險以及涉嫌非法集資、非法吸收公眾存款和涉嫌個人放貸的法律風險。復合擔保模式下，相比傳統(tǒng)模式而言，擔保機構(gòu)也參與到了借貸行為當中，可以減少部分借貸行為中的信用風險，但卻也增加了擔保與關(guān)聯(lián)交易風險等等�？梢�，無論哪一種運營模式，都不可避免的會面臨各種風險，要想將風險的危害降到最低，就必須找到風險的成因加以防范。 P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)貸款活動中的種種風險，其成因可以概括為以下三點：第一，對該行業(yè)缺乏有效監(jiān)管。在2014年以前，我國的P2P行業(yè)一直處于無政府監(jiān)管的狀態(tài)，這種監(jiān)管缺失造成行業(yè)混亂和無序經(jīng)營，導致P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)貸款一直游離于我國金融監(jiān)管體系之外，風險頻發(fā)。第二，個人信用體系不完善。P2P借貸平臺無法像銀行一樣，獲取到相對完善的征信信息，在審核借款人資信時，P2P借貸平臺往往只能依靠有限的信息進行判斷，，當然，行業(yè)的信用風險也便隨之而來。第三，借貸行為中的信息不對稱問題，這是逆向選擇和道德風險形成的最主要原因。在市場上，由于交易雙方信息不對稱，加之利益的驅(qū)動，必然會發(fā)生優(yōu)質(zhì)借款人會逐步退出市場，借款人的總體質(zhì)量下降，形成“劣幣驅(qū)逐良幣”現(xiàn)象。 近年來，隨著P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)貸款模式的不斷發(fā)展，借貸行為中形成的法律關(guān)系也日趨復雜，除了一般的借貸法律外，還存在著擔保和債權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓等特殊的法律關(guān)系，這就影響到對于P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)貸款平臺的定性，筆者認為應該將P2P平臺分為類金融機構(gòu)和信用中介來分類定性，并以此進行分類監(jiān)管。 P2P平臺等互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融的風險監(jiān)管問題已引起業(yè)界高度關(guān)注。2015年1月20日，銀監(jiān)會宣布新設(shè)普惠金融部，規(guī)定P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)貸款由其監(jiān)管，至此，P2P行業(yè)的監(jiān)管主體最終確定，但具體的監(jiān)管細則仍處于空白缺失狀態(tài)。本文認為，監(jiān)管主體雖已確定，卻還存在一些問題，資產(chǎn)證券化的過程并不是銀監(jiān)會所能監(jiān)管的范圍，這種特殊的P2P模式由證監(jiān)會監(jiān)管更為適宜。 P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)貸款的監(jiān)管應充分考慮到類金融機構(gòu)型平臺和信用中介型平臺之間的不同，在市場準入監(jiān)管、持續(xù)經(jīng)營監(jiān)管和市場退出監(jiān)管中堅持分類監(jiān)管的原則，只有這樣才能使監(jiān)管更加具有針對性。
[Abstract]:At the beginning of its birth in foreign countries, P2P platform only acted as an information intermediary, not directly involved in lending behavior. However, as soon as P2P network lending, a new lending method, was introduced into China, there was a trend of alienation. More of it evolved into a credit intermediary, directly involved in lending behavior, it is unavoidable to involve financial institutions. In our country, P2P network lending mode can be divided into three kinds: online traditional mode, offline creditor's rights transfer mode and compound guarantee mode. By splitting and transferring the creditor's rights, the P2P platform becomes a capital intermediary hub platform, which can be said to be a "shadow bank" without license and supervision. Under the compound guarantee mode, compared with the traditional mode, the guarantee institution also participates in the lending behavior, which can reduce the credit risk of some lending behavior, but also increase the risk of guarantee and related party transactions and so on. If we want to minimize the risk, we must find out the cause of the risk and guard against it.
The causes of the risks in P2P network lending activities can be summarized as follows: First, there is a lack of effective supervision over the industry. Before 2014, the P2P industry in China has been in a state of anarchic supervision. This lack of supervision has caused confusion and disorderly operation of the industry, leading to the P2P network lending has been dissociated from China's financial supervision system. Second, the personal credit system is imperfect. P2P lending platform can not get relatively perfect credit information like banks. When examining the credit of borrowers, P2P lending platform can only rely on limited information to judge, of course, the credit risk of the industry will follow. Third, information in lending behavior. Asymmetry is the main reason for adverse selection and moral hazard. In the market, due to the asymmetric information of both sides of the transaction, coupled with the drive of interests, high-quality borrowers will gradually withdraw from the market, the overall quality of borrowers will decline, resulting in the phenomenon of "bad money expelling good money".
In recent years, with the continuous development of P2P network lending model, the legal relationship formed in the lending behavior is becoming more and more complex. In addition to the general lending law, there are also special legal relationships such as guarantee and transfer of creditor's rights, which affects the qualitative analysis of P2P network lending platform. The author thinks that the P2P platform should be classified into financial institutions. And credit intermediaries to classify and identify, and to classify supervision.
On January 20, 2015, the Banking Regulatory Commission announced the establishment of a new GSP Finance Department, stipulating that P2P network loans should be supervised by it. So far, the regulatory body of the P2P industry has been finalized, but the specific regulatory rules are still in a blank state. However, there are still some problems. The process of asset securitization is not the scope that the CBRC can supervise. This special P2P model is more suitable for the supervision of the CSRC.
The supervision of P2P network loan should take full account of the differences between financial institution-like platform and credit intermediary platform, and insist on the principle of classified supervision in market access supervision, continuous operation supervision and market exit supervision. Only in this way can the supervision be more targeted.
【學位授予單位】：山西財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.28
本文編號：2239204
[Abstract]:At the beginning of its birth in foreign countries, P2P platform only acted as an information intermediary, not directly involved in lending behavior. However, as soon as P2P network lending, a new lending method, was introduced into China, there was a trend of alienation. More of it evolved into a credit intermediary, directly involved in lending behavior, it is unavoidable to involve financial institutions. In our country, P2P network lending mode can be divided into three kinds: online traditional mode, offline creditor's rights transfer mode and compound guarantee mode. By splitting and transferring the creditor's rights, the P2P platform becomes a capital intermediary hub platform, which can be said to be a "shadow bank" without license and supervision. Under the compound guarantee mode, compared with the traditional mode, the guarantee institution also participates in the lending behavior, which can reduce the credit risk of some lending behavior, but also increase the risk of guarantee and related party transactions and so on. If we want to minimize the risk, we must find out the cause of the risk and guard against it.
The causes of the risks in P2P network lending activities can be summarized as follows: First, there is a lack of effective supervision over the industry. Before 2014, the P2P industry in China has been in a state of anarchic supervision. This lack of supervision has caused confusion and disorderly operation of the industry, leading to the P2P network lending has been dissociated from China's financial supervision system. Second, the personal credit system is imperfect. P2P lending platform can not get relatively perfect credit information like banks. When examining the credit of borrowers, P2P lending platform can only rely on limited information to judge, of course, the credit risk of the industry will follow. Third, information in lending behavior. Asymmetry is the main reason for adverse selection and moral hazard. In the market, due to the asymmetric information of both sides of the transaction, coupled with the drive of interests, high-quality borrowers will gradually withdraw from the market, the overall quality of borrowers will decline, resulting in the phenomenon of "bad money expelling good money".
In recent years, with the continuous development of P2P network lending model, the legal relationship formed in the lending behavior is becoming more and more complex. In addition to the general lending law, there are also special legal relationships such as guarantee and transfer of creditor's rights, which affects the qualitative analysis of P2P network lending platform. The author thinks that the P2P platform should be classified into financial institutions. And credit intermediaries to classify and identify, and to classify supervision.
On January 20, 2015, the Banking Regulatory Commission announced the establishment of a new GSP Finance Department, stipulating that P2P network loans should be supervised by it. So far, the regulatory body of the P2P industry has been finalized, but the specific regulatory rules are still in a blank state. However, there are still some problems. The process of asset securitization is not the scope that the CBRC can supervise. This special P2P model is more suitable for the supervision of the CSRC.
The supervision of P2P network loan should take full account of the differences between financial institution-like platform and credit intermediary platform, and insist on the principle of classified supervision in market access supervision, continuous operation supervision and market exit supervision. Only in this way can the supervision be more targeted.
【學位授予單位】：山西財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.28
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