遠(yuǎn)程交易撤回權(quán)的一個經(jīng)濟學(xué)批判
發(fā)布時間:2018-08-02 10:24
【摘要】:撤回權(quán)作為消費者保護(hù)領(lǐng)域重要的規(guī)制技術(shù),是一種賦予市場中特定弱勢主體即消費者的相對之力,是一種干預(yù)私法自治的手段。立法賦予消費者撤回權(quán)的本意在于增強消費者實現(xiàn)自己意思的能力,從而矯正消費者與經(jīng)營者之間的不平等,以實現(xiàn)私法自治下的社會公正。但正如其他干預(yù)私法自治的手段一樣,撤回權(quán)的干預(yù)也應(yīng)當(dāng)保持一個合適的程度,并且在若干私法自治的基本原則中實現(xiàn)平衡。撤回權(quán)的平衡性質(zhì)決定了經(jīng)濟分析方法在探討撤回權(quán)妥當(dāng)性方面具有相當(dāng)?shù)膬?yōu)越性。 我國《消費者權(quán)益保護(hù)法》所規(guī)定的撤回權(quán)是遠(yuǎn)程交易撤回權(quán)。遠(yuǎn)程交易撤回權(quán)在實踐中的意義主要體現(xiàn)在矯正遠(yuǎn)程交易中的結(jié)構(gòu)性信息不對稱。經(jīng)濟學(xué)的研究表明,經(jīng)營者和消費者之間的信息不對稱有可能導(dǎo)致檸檬市場或無效交易,兩者都是不可欲的社會效果,撤回權(quán)因此被認(rèn)為是可以實現(xiàn)社會效益。然而事實上遠(yuǎn)程交易撤回權(quán)在防止檸檬市場和無效交易中的作用總體而言被高估了。就防范檸檬市場而言,只有當(dāng)消費者可以掌握商品質(zhì)量信息時才有賦予消費者撤回權(quán)的必要,然而大多數(shù)的產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量信息對消費者而言是不易掌握的,而且商譽反饋機制對于防范檸檬市場的作用也被低估。就防止無效交易而言,需要試用來知曉的體驗信息只存在于個性化的商品之中,而大多數(shù)的商品卻是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的,而且通過各種創(chuàng)新形式的信息披露,,消費者可以比利用撤回權(quán)更加有效地獲知體驗信息。撤回權(quán)需要付出很多成本,其中主要的是法律關(guān)系不確定的成本、行使撤回權(quán)的社會成本以及法律成本。 由于撤回權(quán)在防范檸檬市場和無效交易上的作用是值得懷疑的,因此撤回權(quán)的社會總體效益不能獲得證實。就單筆交易的效益來看,撤回權(quán)導(dǎo)致的成本的最終承擔(dān)者是消費者,而市場的異質(zhì)性決定了不同的消費者對撤回權(quán)態(tài)度不同。賦予強制性的撤回權(quán)實際上剝奪了消費者選擇撤回權(quán)的自由,剝奪了經(jīng)營者選擇經(jīng)營方式的自由,并且阻礙了消費者和經(jīng)營者之間就撤回權(quán)達(dá)成有效交易,還會導(dǎo)致交叉補貼。強制性的撤回權(quán)限制自由、制造不公并且妨礙效率。與法律不對撤回權(quán)作出規(guī)定或只規(guī)定任意性的撤回權(quán)相比,強制性的撤回權(quán)是最差的立法模式。
[Abstract]:As an important regulatory technology in the field of consumer protection, the right of withdrawal is a relative force that endows the market with a specific vulnerable subject, that is, the consumer, and is a means of interfering with the autonomy of private law. The original intention of legislation is to strengthen the ability of consumers to realize their own intention, so as to correct the inequality between consumers and operators and to realize social justice under the autonomy of private law. But like other means of intervention in private autonomy, the intervention of the right of withdrawal should be maintained to a suitable degree and balanced among the basic principles of private autonomy. The balanced nature of the right of withdrawal determines that the economic analysis method has considerable advantages in discussing the appropriateness of the right of withdrawal. The right of withdrawal stipulated by the Consumer Rights and interests Protection Law of our country is the right of withdrawal of remote transaction. The significance of the right to withdraw remote transactions in practice is mainly reflected in the correction of structural information asymmetry in remote transactions. Economic studies show that the asymmetric information between operators and consumers may lead to lemon market or invalid transactions, both of which are not desirable social effects, so the right to withdraw is considered to be able to achieve social benefits. In fact, however, the role of remote trading revocation in preventing the lemon market and invalid trading is overvalued overall. As far as preventing the lemon market is concerned, it is necessary to give consumers the right to withdraw when they can grasp the quality information of the goods. However, most of the product quality information is difficult for consumers to grasp. Moreover, the role of goodwill feedback mechanism in preventing the lemon market is also underestimated. In terms of preventing invalid transactions, experience information that needs to be tested to know only exists in personalized goods, most of which are standardized and are disclosed through various innovative forms of information. Consumers can get experience information more effectively than using the right of withdrawal. The right of withdrawal requires a lot of costs, including the cost of uncertainty of legal relationship, the social cost of exercising the right of withdrawal and the cost of law. Since the role of withdrawal right in preventing lemon market and invalid transactions is doubtful, the overall social benefits of the right of withdrawal cannot be proved. From the point of view of the benefit of a single transaction, the ultimate burden of the cost caused by the right of withdrawal is the consumer, and the heterogeneity of the market determines the different attitudes of different consumers towards the right of withdrawal. The mandatory right of withdrawal actually deprives consumers of the freedom to choose the right to withdraw, deprives the operator of the freedom to choose the mode of operation, and hinders the effective transaction between the consumer and the operator on the right of withdrawal, and also leads to cross-subsidization. The compulsory right of withdrawal limits freedom, creates injustice and impairs efficiency. The compulsory right of withdrawal is the worst legislative model compared with the right of withdrawal which does not provide for the right of withdrawal or only provides for the arbitrary right of withdrawal.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號】:D922.294
本文編號:2159126
[Abstract]:As an important regulatory technology in the field of consumer protection, the right of withdrawal is a relative force that endows the market with a specific vulnerable subject, that is, the consumer, and is a means of interfering with the autonomy of private law. The original intention of legislation is to strengthen the ability of consumers to realize their own intention, so as to correct the inequality between consumers and operators and to realize social justice under the autonomy of private law. But like other means of intervention in private autonomy, the intervention of the right of withdrawal should be maintained to a suitable degree and balanced among the basic principles of private autonomy. The balanced nature of the right of withdrawal determines that the economic analysis method has considerable advantages in discussing the appropriateness of the right of withdrawal. The right of withdrawal stipulated by the Consumer Rights and interests Protection Law of our country is the right of withdrawal of remote transaction. The significance of the right to withdraw remote transactions in practice is mainly reflected in the correction of structural information asymmetry in remote transactions. Economic studies show that the asymmetric information between operators and consumers may lead to lemon market or invalid transactions, both of which are not desirable social effects, so the right to withdraw is considered to be able to achieve social benefits. In fact, however, the role of remote trading revocation in preventing the lemon market and invalid trading is overvalued overall. As far as preventing the lemon market is concerned, it is necessary to give consumers the right to withdraw when they can grasp the quality information of the goods. However, most of the product quality information is difficult for consumers to grasp. Moreover, the role of goodwill feedback mechanism in preventing the lemon market is also underestimated. In terms of preventing invalid transactions, experience information that needs to be tested to know only exists in personalized goods, most of which are standardized and are disclosed through various innovative forms of information. Consumers can get experience information more effectively than using the right of withdrawal. The right of withdrawal requires a lot of costs, including the cost of uncertainty of legal relationship, the social cost of exercising the right of withdrawal and the cost of law. Since the role of withdrawal right in preventing lemon market and invalid transactions is doubtful, the overall social benefits of the right of withdrawal cannot be proved. From the point of view of the benefit of a single transaction, the ultimate burden of the cost caused by the right of withdrawal is the consumer, and the heterogeneity of the market determines the different attitudes of different consumers towards the right of withdrawal. The mandatory right of withdrawal actually deprives consumers of the freedom to choose the right to withdraw, deprives the operator of the freedom to choose the mode of operation, and hinders the effective transaction between the consumer and the operator on the right of withdrawal, and also leads to cross-subsidization. The compulsory right of withdrawal limits freedom, creates injustice and impairs efficiency. The compulsory right of withdrawal is the worst legislative model compared with the right of withdrawal which does not provide for the right of withdrawal or only provides for the arbitrary right of withdrawal.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號】:D922.294
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 董文軍;;平等視野中的消費者權(quán)利解讀[J];法制與社會發(fā)展;2007年02期
本文編號:2159126
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