對縱向價格限制適用違法推定的檢討
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-02 08:50
【摘要】：《反壟斷法》對縱向價格限制僅做了原則性規(guī)定。當(dāng)前主流觀點認(rèn)為對其應(yīng)采用違法推定的規(guī)制方式,但這一觀點是值得商榷的。支持違法推定的觀點或來自對《反壟斷法》第14條條文以及其與第13條、第15條關(guān)系的誤讀;或來自不了解看似簡單的違法推定在執(zhí)法、司法過程中卻會造成更大的混亂,而合理原則卻能形成一個高效方便的分析問題的系譜;或來自誤認(rèn)為歐美在對壟斷協(xié)議的分析模式上存在根本差異,并誤讀了歐盟法中的有關(guān)規(guī)定。對縱向價格限制應(yīng)適用合理原則,最關(guān)鍵的是要積累找尋典型證明要素,從而構(gòu)建起結(jié)構(gòu)型合理原則的分析模式,提升《反壟斷法》適用的準(zhǔn)確和效率。具體說來,全文分為以下六個部分:第一部分,介紹研究背景與研究意義、研究現(xiàn)狀、研究方法。第二部分,提出問題——針對《反壟斷法》第14條縱向價格限制的適用問題進(jìn)行研究。第三部分,為了便于下文更徹底的檢討,務(wù)必先理清兩個判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)——本身違法/合理原則兩者的分析模式、歷史沿革以及最新發(fā)展趨勢。在壟斷行為的認(rèn)定上,本身違法逐漸被拋棄,而合理原則逐漸變成認(rèn)定壟斷協(xié)議的一般原則。當(dāng)前,經(jīng)過長期司法實踐的探索,在針對一些典型壟斷行為適用合理原則分析的過程中,逐漸形成了比較固定的分析模式,這突破了之前本身違法與合理原則的反壟斷認(rèn)定二分法,形成一個合理原則分析的系譜。第四部分,對我國發(fā)生的縱向價格限制的七個案件進(jìn)行實證分析,行政執(zhí)法機構(gòu)采用的違法推定分析模式,在實務(wù)中造成三個弊端:過分強調(diào)違法性;完全忽視正當(dāng)性;易造成反壟斷法規(guī)制的泛化。第五部分,對主張適用違法推定說的檢討。檢討一:壟斷協(xié)議的定義設(shè)置在第13條下,故不能適用于第14條。法條明確指出該定義的適用范圍是整部法律;同時既然對危害行為較大的橫向壟斷行為,法律都規(guī)定不能適用本身違法,那么對危害較小的縱向價格限制則更不能適用。檢討二:對縱向價格限制適用合理原則會導(dǎo)致第15條豁免制度被架空。第14條解決的是內(nèi)部平衡,而第15條解決的是外部平衡,是在第14條已經(jīng)分析出該行為競爭效用是負(fù)的基礎(chǔ)上,看其是否存有豁免情形,可見兩者分別規(guī)制不同內(nèi)容。檢討三:《反壟斷法》第14條法條中“禁止”的措辭以及將縱向價格限制單獨列舉,表明應(yīng)適用違法推定。法條對行為模式的處理只有三類:可以、應(yīng)當(dāng)、禁止,所以禁止表明的是法律對某種行為所持的一種否定的態(tài)度,違法可能需要進(jìn)一步考察有沒產(chǎn)生危險、或造成后果;列舉的目的有時僅在于提示這些形式的行為通常情況下符合壟斷協(xié)議的定義,但不是必然;同時禁止涵蓋的范圍也包含兜底條款,而兜底條款(如對限定最高價、搭售都包含其中)本身就包含的合理原則的分析方式,這會產(chǎn)生矛盾。檢討四:違法推定能增強提升執(zhí)法、司法的效率。看似簡單的違法推定在執(zhí)法、司法過程中卻會造成更大的混亂,而合理原則卻能形成一個高效方便的分析問題的系譜。對于結(jié)構(gòu)型合理原則,只需要考察最有助于識別某類行為的反競爭效果的某些因素,從而實現(xiàn)執(zhí)法、司法的程序性、輕巧性、高效性。檢討五:違法推定更符合以歐盟為藍(lán)本、利于學(xué)習(xí)借鑒。歐美在對壟斷協(xié)議的分析模式上不存在根本差異,這源于有學(xué)者對歐盟反壟斷法規(guī)制方式存在著一些誤讀。第六部分結(jié)語,應(yīng)采合理原則科學(xué)規(guī)制縱向價格限制。但合理原則不能以一種過于抽象的方式實現(xiàn),利用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究成果,通過積累形成典型證明要素,形成結(jié)構(gòu)形、模板化的合理原則分析模式,應(yīng)是我國反壟斷法的發(fā)展方向。
[Abstract]:"Antitrust law" has only made a principled provision to vertical price restrictions. The current mainstream view holds that it should be regulated by illegal presumption, but this view is debatable. The view that supports the presumption of law or from the fourteenth articles of the antitrust law and the misreading of the thirteenth and its fifteenth relations; or from the ununderstanding The simple presumption of law in law enforcement will cause more confusion in the judicial process, and the reasonable principle can form a pedigree of an efficient and convenient analysis of the problem; or from the mistaken opinion that there are fundamental differences in the analysis mode of the monopoly agreement between Europe and the United States, and misread the relevant provisions in the EU law. In principle, the most important thing is to accumulate the typical proof elements, thus construct the analytical model of the rational principle of structural type, and improve the accuracy and efficiency of the application of the antitrust law. In particular, the full text is divided into six parts: the first part, the research background and research significance, the research status, the research method, and the second part, put forward the questions - The study of the application of the fourteenth vertical price restrictions on the antitrust law. The third part, in order to facilitate a more thorough review of the following, must first clear the two criteria of judgment - the analysis model of their own illegal / reasonable principles, the historical evolution and the latest development trend. Abandonment, and the rational principle gradually become the general principle of determining the monopoly agreement. At present, through the exploration of long-term judicial practice, a relatively fixed analytical model has been formed in the process of the application of reasonable principles to some typical monopolies, which breaks through the antitrust dichotomy which was previously unlawful and reasonable. The fourth part is the empirical analysis of seven cases of vertical price restriction in China. The illegal presumption analysis model adopted by the administrative law enforcement agency causes three disadvantages in practice: overemphasizing the illegality; ignoring the legitimacy completely; making the regulation of the antitrust law easy to be generalized. Fifth part, Review 1. Review 1: the definition of a monopoly agreement is set under thirteenth articles, so it can not be applied to the fourteenth article. The law clearly points out that the scope of application of the definition is the whole law; at the same time, since the law stipulates that the law does not apply itself to the law, the law does not apply itself to the law. Price restriction is more inapplicable. Review two: the application of reasonable principles to the vertical price limit will lead to the overhead of fifteenth exemption systems. The fourteenth is the internal balance, and the fifteenth solution is the external balance. On the basis of the fourteenth analysis that the competitive utility is negative, it can be seen whether there is an exemption. Both of them regulate different contents respectively. Review three: the wording of "Prohibition" in the fourteenth articles of antitrust law and the listing of the vertical price restrictions individually show that the illegal presumption should be applied. There are only three types of handling of the behavior pattern in the law article: Yes, should, prohibit, so the prohibition indicates a negative state of law for a certain act. The purpose of the enumeration is sometimes only to suggest that the behavior of these forms is usually consistent with the definition of a monopoly agreement, but not necessarily; and the scope of the prohibition is also covered by the bottom of the pocket clause, and the bottom clause (for example, for the highest price limit, tying is included) An analysis of the rational principle contained in itself will create a contradiction. Review four: the presumption of law can enhance the efficiency of the law enforcement and the judiciary. The seemingly simple presumption of law will cause more confusion in the process of law enforcement and in the judicial process, but the reasonable principle can form a pedigree of efficient and convenient analysis. Then, we only need to examine some factors that are most helpful to identify the anti competitive effect of a certain kind of behavior, so as to realize the law enforcement, the procedural nature of the judicature, the lightness and the efficiency. Review five: the presumption of law is more consistent with the European Union as the blueprint for learning. There are some Misreading in the regulation mode of the anti monopoly law. The sixth part is the conclusion that the rational principle should be adopted to regulate the vertical price limit scientifically, but the rational principle can not be realized in an too abstract way. By using the research results of economics, the rational principle analysis mode of forming the structure form and formating the template should be formed by accumulating the typical proof elements. It is the development direction of China's antitrust law.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：揚州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D922.294
本文編號：2158887
[Abstract]:"Antitrust law" has only made a principled provision to vertical price restrictions. The current mainstream view holds that it should be regulated by illegal presumption, but this view is debatable. The view that supports the presumption of law or from the fourteenth articles of the antitrust law and the misreading of the thirteenth and its fifteenth relations; or from the ununderstanding The simple presumption of law in law enforcement will cause more confusion in the judicial process, and the reasonable principle can form a pedigree of an efficient and convenient analysis of the problem; or from the mistaken opinion that there are fundamental differences in the analysis mode of the monopoly agreement between Europe and the United States, and misread the relevant provisions in the EU law. In principle, the most important thing is to accumulate the typical proof elements, thus construct the analytical model of the rational principle of structural type, and improve the accuracy and efficiency of the application of the antitrust law. In particular, the full text is divided into six parts: the first part, the research background and research significance, the research status, the research method, and the second part, put forward the questions - The study of the application of the fourteenth vertical price restrictions on the antitrust law. The third part, in order to facilitate a more thorough review of the following, must first clear the two criteria of judgment - the analysis model of their own illegal / reasonable principles, the historical evolution and the latest development trend. Abandonment, and the rational principle gradually become the general principle of determining the monopoly agreement. At present, through the exploration of long-term judicial practice, a relatively fixed analytical model has been formed in the process of the application of reasonable principles to some typical monopolies, which breaks through the antitrust dichotomy which was previously unlawful and reasonable. The fourth part is the empirical analysis of seven cases of vertical price restriction in China. The illegal presumption analysis model adopted by the administrative law enforcement agency causes three disadvantages in practice: overemphasizing the illegality; ignoring the legitimacy completely; making the regulation of the antitrust law easy to be generalized. Fifth part, Review 1. Review 1: the definition of a monopoly agreement is set under thirteenth articles, so it can not be applied to the fourteenth article. The law clearly points out that the scope of application of the definition is the whole law; at the same time, since the law stipulates that the law does not apply itself to the law, the law does not apply itself to the law. Price restriction is more inapplicable. Review two: the application of reasonable principles to the vertical price limit will lead to the overhead of fifteenth exemption systems. The fourteenth is the internal balance, and the fifteenth solution is the external balance. On the basis of the fourteenth analysis that the competitive utility is negative, it can be seen whether there is an exemption. Both of them regulate different contents respectively. Review three: the wording of "Prohibition" in the fourteenth articles of antitrust law and the listing of the vertical price restrictions individually show that the illegal presumption should be applied. There are only three types of handling of the behavior pattern in the law article: Yes, should, prohibit, so the prohibition indicates a negative state of law for a certain act. The purpose of the enumeration is sometimes only to suggest that the behavior of these forms is usually consistent with the definition of a monopoly agreement, but not necessarily; and the scope of the prohibition is also covered by the bottom of the pocket clause, and the bottom clause (for example, for the highest price limit, tying is included) An analysis of the rational principle contained in itself will create a contradiction. Review four: the presumption of law can enhance the efficiency of the law enforcement and the judiciary. The seemingly simple presumption of law will cause more confusion in the process of law enforcement and in the judicial process, but the reasonable principle can form a pedigree of efficient and convenient analysis. Then, we only need to examine some factors that are most helpful to identify the anti competitive effect of a certain kind of behavior, so as to realize the law enforcement, the procedural nature of the judicature, the lightness and the efficiency. Review five: the presumption of law is more consistent with the European Union as the blueprint for learning. There are some Misreading in the regulation mode of the anti monopoly law. The sixth part is the conclusion that the rational principle should be adopted to regulate the vertical price limit scientifically, but the rational principle can not be realized in an too abstract way. By using the research results of economics, the rational principle analysis mode of forming the structure form and formating the template should be formed by accumulating the typical proof elements. It is the development direction of China's antitrust law.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：揚州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D922.294
【相似文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)會議論文 前1條
1 張海;;采用價格限制的手段,恐怕不能從根本上解決問題[A];中國物流與采購聯(lián)合會會員通訊總第33期-52期（2003年2月-12月）[C];2003年
相關(guān)重要報紙文章 前10條
1 周遠(yuǎn)居;油價不穩(wěn) 歐佩克也頭疼[N];廠長經(jīng)理日報;2000年
2 馬正紅;設(shè)定價格限制并非都合理合法[N];政府采購信息報;2013年
3 游石;什么是價格限制制度？[N];證券時報;2007年
4 早報記者 魯勛;南京取消普通住房價格限制[N];東方早報;2008年
5 記者 孫瑋懌 通訊員 鐘志宏;小化肥價格限制政策被取消[N];常德日報;2009年
6 建證期貨 邱海翔;投資者“誤讀”引發(fā)的思考[N];期貨日報;2007年
7 吳睿鶇;普通住房界定應(yīng)取消價格限制[N];中國消費者報;2011年
8 尚正;連續(xù)競價階段的價格籠子[N];上海證券報;2006年
9 記者 柳悅 實習(xí)生 李意;取消化肥價格限制[N];天津日報;2009年
10 本報記者;國家取消化肥價格限制政策[N];中國煤炭報;2009年
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前6條
1 郭驍;對縱向價格限制適用違法推定的檢討[D];揚州大學(xué);2017年
2 許衛(wèi)昌;縱向價格限制的反壟斷法規(guī)制研究[D];中國政法大學(xué);2007年
3 曹哲;證券市場的價格限制：貝葉斯方法[D];大連理工大學(xué);2008年
4 馮春華;縱向價格限制的經(jīng)濟(jì)分析與反壟斷法規(guī)制研究[D];中國政法大學(xué);2007年
5 馮岑;轉(zhuǎn)售價格限制的反壟斷法規(guī)制研究[D];南京航空航天大學(xué);2014年
6 郭陽陽;股指期貨價格限制水平設(shè)置的研究[D];華南理工大學(xué);2011年
，本文編號：2158887
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/falvlunwen/jingjifalunwen/2158887.html
最近更新
教材專著
