本文選題：新三板 + 做市商制度��； 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：中國(guó)的新三板市場(chǎng)經(jīng)歷了倆次擴(kuò)容以后已經(jīng)成為了中小企業(yè)直接融資的場(chǎng)外資本市場(chǎng),為適應(yīng)新的交易環(huán)境,新三板市場(chǎng)改變?cè)薪灰追绞?通過(guò)做市商做市實(shí)現(xiàn)股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓。做市商制度在歐美市場(chǎng)得到發(fā)展和完善,為歐美資本市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展做出了不可估量的貢獻(xiàn)。但在國(guó)內(nèi),并沒(méi)有充足的做市商制度建設(shè)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)可供借鑒,因此在新三板市場(chǎng)引入做市商制度,不得不立足于國(guó)內(nèi)資本市場(chǎng)的基本情況,參照歐美市場(chǎng)的成功經(jīng)驗(yàn)一步步探索。原三板市場(chǎng)開(kāi)始擴(kuò)容至全國(guó)中小企業(yè)股份轉(zhuǎn)讓系統(tǒng)成立,越來(lái)越多的公司順利在新三板市場(chǎng)掛牌,融資及股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓需求得到大幅度提升,在這種背景下推出通過(guò)券商做市的交易方式,顯然是符合市場(chǎng)規(guī)律的,同時(shí)還有利于激發(fā)投資者投資熱情。但就現(xiàn)有的法律法規(guī)及制度框架來(lái)看,在新三板市場(chǎng)實(shí)行做市商制度還是會(huì)存在一定的問(wèn)題,比如說(shuō)做市商在做市過(guò)程中所承擔(dān)的義務(wù)與其享有的權(quán)利不協(xié)調(diào),缺乏做市動(dòng)力;以及對(duì)做市商的監(jiān)管力度不夠,新三板做市商有可能會(huì)壟斷報(bào)價(jià)、甚至合謀操縱市場(chǎng)價(jià)格,侵害投資者利益。即使是在做市商制度發(fā)展十分成熟的美國(guó)NASDAQ市場(chǎng)及英國(guó)倫敦市場(chǎng),也曾經(jīng)出現(xiàn)過(guò)類(lèi)似的問(wèn)題,甚至可以認(rèn)為任何一個(gè)資本市場(chǎng)從做市商制度的開(kāi)始實(shí)行、發(fā)展、完善的過(guò)程中都會(huì)存在一系列的問(wèn)題,唯有堅(jiān)持不斷地發(fā)現(xiàn)問(wèn)題、解決問(wèn)題才能實(shí)現(xiàn)做市商制度的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展。一旦承擔(dān)的義務(wù)過(guò)重,權(quán)利保障又不足,做市商的做市積極性必將受到重創(chuàng),促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)也是無(wú)從談起。新三板市場(chǎng)對(duì)做市商的買(mǎi)賣(mài)價(jià)差做出了5%的限制,但這種只有上線(xiàn)沒(méi)有下線(xiàn)的限制無(wú)疑會(huì)將做市商的利潤(rùn)壓制最低甚至?xí)l(fā)生虧損。但同時(shí),做市商所要承擔(dān)的義務(wù)包括雙邊報(bào)價(jià)、推薦掛牌、信息披露等,高成本高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的義務(wù)承擔(dān),缺少足夠的權(quán)利激勵(lì)。參照美國(guó)、臺(tái)灣等資本市場(chǎng)的制度建設(shè),新三板市場(chǎng)需要增加對(duì)做市商的權(quán)利激勵(lì),減免做市商的部分交易費(fèi)用,降低做市商的做市成本;并減少做市商的義務(wù)性規(guī)定�；旌闲妥鍪猩讨贫葘�(duì)做市商串謀報(bào)價(jià)有一定的抑制作用,但新三板市場(chǎng)所實(shí)行的傳統(tǒng)型做市商制度監(jiān)管的最大難點(diǎn)就是預(yù)防做市商相互合謀,維持市場(chǎng)的買(mǎi)賣(mài)價(jià)差。因此,相關(guān)監(jiān)管部門(mén)需要對(duì)做市商的做市行為進(jìn)行全程監(jiān)管,尤其是報(bào)價(jià)監(jiān)管和信息披露監(jiān)管更是關(guān)注重點(diǎn)。一方面設(shè)置定期評(píng)估考核制度,對(duì)考核成績(jī)優(yōu)異的給予獎(jiǎng)勵(lì),考核不合格的做市商及時(shí)予以淘汰;另一方面,建立科學(xué)的信息披露制度,確保信息披露的及時(shí)性和充分性。本文的出發(fā)點(diǎn)就是通過(guò)總結(jié)發(fā)達(dá)資本市場(chǎng)的做市商制度完善的經(jīng)驗(yàn),并分析國(guó)內(nèi)某些資本市場(chǎng)試行做市商制度沒(méi)有獲得成功的原因,探索出完善新三板市場(chǎng)的做市商法律制度構(gòu)建的路徑。
[Abstract]:After two expansions, China's new third board market has become the over-the-counter capital market for direct financing of small and medium-sized enterprises. In order to adapt to the new trading environment, the new third board market has changed the original trading mode and realized equity transfer through market making. The market maker system has been developed and perfected in the European and American markets, which has made inestimable contribution to the healthy development of the European and American capital markets. But in our country, there is not enough experience to learn from the construction of market maker system, so the introduction of market maker system in the new third board market has to be based on the basic situation of domestic capital market and explore step by step with reference to the successful experience of European and American markets. The original third Board market began to expand to the establishment of the national small and medium-sized enterprises share transfer system. More and more companies were successfully listed in the new third board market, and the demand for financing and equity transfer was greatly increased. In this context, the introduction of securities trading through the market is clearly in line with the market law, but also conducive to stimulate investor investment enthusiasm. However, from the point of view of the existing laws, regulations and institutional framework, there will still be some problems in the implementation of the market-maker system in the new third board market. For example, the obligations undertaken by the market-makers in the process of making the market are not in harmony with their rights, and they lack the motivation to do the market. And not enough supervision of market makers, the new third board market makers may monopolize prices, or even collusive manipulation of market prices, against the interests of investors. Even in the NASDAQ market of the United States and the London market in the United Kingdom, where the market maker system is very mature, there have been similar problems. It can even be considered that any capital market has developed from the beginning of the market maker system. There will be a series of problems in the process of perfection. Only by constantly discovering and solving the problems can the market maker system develop in the long run. Once the obligation is too heavy and the protection of rights is insufficient, the enthusiasm of market makers will be hit hard, and it is impossible to promote the market flow. The new third-market has imposed a 5% limit on market makers' price differentials, but such restrictions, which only go up and down without going offline, will undoubtedly put the market makers' profits at a minimum and even lead to losses. But at the same time, the obligations of market makers include bilateral quotation, recommendation listing, information disclosure, high cost and high risk obligation, lack of sufficient right incentive. Referring to the system construction of the capital markets such as the United States and Taiwan, the new third board market needs to increase the right incentive to the market makers, reduce some transaction costs of the market makers, reduce the market making costs of the market makers, and reduce the compulsory regulations of the market makers. The mixed market maker system can restrain the market maker collusive quotation to some extent, but the biggest difficulty of the traditional market maker system supervision is to prevent the market makers colluding with each other and to maintain the market price difference. Therefore, relevant regulatory authorities need to supervise the market making behavior of market makers throughout the process, especially the regulation of quotation and information disclosure is the focus of attention. On the one hand, the regular evaluation and assessment system should be set up to reward those with excellent results and eliminate the market makers who are not qualified. On the other hand, a scientific information disclosure system should be established to ensure the timeliness and adequacy of information disclosure. The starting point of this paper is to summarize the experience of perfecting the market maker system in developed capital markets, and to analyze the reasons why the market maker system has not been successful in some domestic capital markets. Explore the way to perfect the market maker legal system of the new three-board market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D922.287

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