本文選題：上市公司收購 + 目標公司　； 參考：《遼寧大學》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,隨著市場經(jīng)濟的高速發(fā)展,公司制度的不斷改革和變遷,上市公司收購合并現(xiàn)象越來越凸顯,主要體現(xiàn)在公司內(nèi)部對公司控制權(quán)的爭奪。這一制度的設(shè)計有兩大優(yōu)點:其一是能夠促進資源重組,使公司的資金和資產(chǎn)在最小的浪費情況下進行最大的利用,能夠為公司帶來最大的利益,也能達到一種優(yōu)勝劣汰的自然競爭狀態(tài);其二是能夠因此合并一些小型公司,使得上市公司朝著集團化發(fā)展,形成規(guī)模。但是這一制度的發(fā)展也會為公司內(nèi)部的治理結(jié)構(gòu)等方面帶來危險,許多公司通過采取各種反收購措施來阻止或拖延收購的進行,試圖扭轉(zhuǎn)公司被改組的局面。然而,在我國這一制度的是適用還有很大空白,法律的規(guī)定尚未成熟,存有很多不足之處。在實踐中,以董事為代表的公司管理層出于自己利益的考量,會濫用反收購措施來阻止收購的進行。但是在立法中設(shè)置反收購制度的目的是為了使目標公司能夠通過反收購來保全自己的公司,使其免受敵意收購,或者是在不可避免的被收購的情況下為公司和股東爭取最大的利益。由此可見,對反收購中目標公司管理層進行信義義務(wù)的規(guī)制是十分必要的。本文首先對闡述上市公司收購中目標公司董事信義義務(wù)產(chǎn)生的理論基礎(chǔ),包含的內(nèi)容以及設(shè)定這一制度的價值分析。其次,通過分析英美德三國對上市公司收購中目標公司董事信義義務(wù)的立法及評價,總結(jié)完善我國相關(guān)立法可以借鑒的經(jīng)驗。再次是以分析我國立法為切入點,從我國反收購決定權(quán)的歸屬不明確,董事信息披露的相關(guān)規(guī)定不完善,董事內(nèi)部信義義務(wù)之法律規(guī)制欠缺,董事違背信義義務(wù)的責任追究機制缺失等四個方面分析我國立法的不足之處。最后,針對存在的問題,在借鑒外國立法經(jīng)驗基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合我國國情,提出完善和構(gòu)建上市公司收購中目標公司的董事信義義務(wù)的法律建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of market economy and the constant reform and change of corporate system, the phenomenon of takeover and merger of listed companies becomes more and more prominent, which is mainly reflected in the internal competition for corporate control. The design of this system has two major advantages: one is that it can promote the reorganization of resources and maximize the use of the company's funds and assets with minimal waste, which can bring maximum benefits to the company. It can also achieve a natural competitive state of survival of the fittest; second, it can merge some small companies and make the listed companies develop towards collectivization and form a scale. However, the development of this system will also bring danger to the internal governance structure of the company. Many companies try to reverse the situation of corporate reorganization by taking various anti-takeover measures to prevent or delay the acquisition. However, there is still a big gap in the application of this system in our country, the provisions of the law are not mature, and there are many deficiencies. In practice, the management of the company represented by the directors will abuse the anti-takeover measures to prevent the acquisition from going on out of their own interests. But the purpose of setting up the anti-takeover system in the legislation is to enable the target company to protect its own company from hostile takeover through anti-takeover. Or fight for the best interests of the company and shareholders when it is inevitable to be acquired. Therefore, it is necessary to regulate the fiduciary duty of target company management in anti-takeover. This paper first expounds the theoretical basis, the content and the value analysis of the establishment of the target company directors' fiduciary obligation in the takeover of the listed company. Secondly, by analyzing the legislation and evaluation of the fiduciary duty of the target company in the acquisition of listed companies by Britain and Germany, the author summarizes the experience that can be used for reference in perfecting the relevant legislation of our country. The third is to analyze our legislation as a starting point, from the ownership of China's anti-takeover decision is not clear, director information disclosure of the relevant provisions are not perfect, the director's internal fiduciary duty of legal regulation is not enough. The deficiency of our legislation is analyzed from four aspects: the lack of accountability mechanism for directors violating fiduciary duty. Finally, in view of the existing problems, on the basis of foreign legislative experience, combined with the national conditions of our country, the author puts forward some legal suggestions on perfecting and constructing the directors' fiduciary duty of the target company in the acquisition of listed companies.
【學位授予單位】：遼寧大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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本文編號：1940636