本文選題：上市金融國(guó)企 + 國(guó)企高管�。� 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文試圖解決的問(wèn)題在于如何完善上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬不合理的問(wèn)題。針對(duì)上市金融國(guó)企高管“政治與商業(yè)”的雙重身份、嚴(yán)重的在職消費(fèi)與隱性福利、自定薪酬等各種典型問(wèn)題,筆者試圖從法律的視角解讀本土化問(wèn)題的表征與本質(zhì),并提出一攬子的解決方案。本文總共3萬(wàn)余字,分為五個(gè)部分。第一部分著眼于介紹我國(guó)上市金融高管薪酬的歷史沿革及現(xiàn)狀分析;第二部分則是在制度上分析目前我國(guó)上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬的制度設(shè)定以及上市金融國(guó)企與非上市金融國(guó)企在薪酬制度上的異同;第三部分著重介紹英美上市金融高管薪酬的法律制度以及它們對(duì)中國(guó)金融國(guó)企高管薪酬制度的借鑒意義;第四部分分析了我國(guó)上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬的特殊問(wèn)題及解決方法;第五部分則對(duì)我國(guó)上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬的法律規(guī)制提出了建設(shè)性的意見(jiàn)。第一部分,回顧與總結(jié)。我國(guó)上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬制定具有強(qiáng)制性變遷和漸進(jìn)性變遷的特征,目前上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬仍然不合理,體現(xiàn)在無(wú)法與業(yè)績(jī)掛鉤,自定薪酬、國(guó)企隱性福利嚴(yán)重等特殊的問(wèn)題,而上述問(wèn)題產(chǎn)生的機(jī)理在于出資人的“虛置”,經(jīng)理人權(quán)力的膨脹以及國(guó)企高管“政治與商業(yè)”地位的雙重身份。第二部分,剖析與比較。我國(guó)上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬制度可以用事前安排和事后救濟(jì)措施進(jìn)行劃分。在事前安排方面,本文分別從制定主體、制定依據(jù)以及信息披露方面對(duì)我國(guó)上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬制定進(jìn)行了梳理;在事后救濟(jì)中,文章著重介紹了股東派生訴訟以及證券瑕疵披露責(zé)任。同時(shí)文章也試圖從出資人代表、“零元薪酬問(wèn)題”以及薪酬制定依據(jù)方面對(duì)上市金融國(guó)企與非上市金融國(guó)企在高管薪酬安排上進(jìn)行對(duì)比。第三部分,借鑒與學(xué)習(xí)。文章介紹了英美法中上市高管薪酬制度,認(rèn)為中國(guó)上市金融企業(yè)應(yīng)當(dāng)學(xué)習(xí)西方長(zhǎng)期股權(quán)激勵(lì)的制度設(shè)計(jì),并強(qiáng)化信息和制定程序的披露。第四部分,思考與解密。文章針對(duì)“經(jīng)理人權(quán)力”、“在職消費(fèi)與期權(quán)行使”、“權(quán)衡高管政治與經(jīng)濟(jì)地位”、“公共事業(yè)單位改革中的人才流失”的角度對(duì)上市金融國(guó)企高管的本土化問(wèn)題進(jìn)行全面解釋,并提出了自己的意見(jiàn)。第五部分,展望與建議。筆者認(rèn)為中國(guó)上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬制度的法律規(guī)制仍然還有很多完善的空間。中國(guó)的立法者應(yīng)當(dāng)從薪酬委員會(huì)、出資人代表審查,信息披露、股東派生訴訟、高管不合理薪酬追回制度等角度全面重構(gòu)中國(guó)上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬的法律體系,最終試圖建立完善合理的中國(guó)上市金融國(guó)企高管薪酬制度。
[Abstract]:This paper attempts to solve the problem of how to improve the listed financial state-owned enterprise executives pay unreasonable. In view of the dual identity of "politics and commerce", the serious problems of in-service consumption and implicit welfare, self-determined salary and other typical problems, the author tries to interpret the characterization and essence of localization from the perspective of law. And put forward a package of solutions. There are more than 30,000 words in this paper, which are divided into five parts. The first part focuses on introducing the history and current situation of listed financial executive compensation in China. The second part is the institutional analysis of the current listed financial SOEs executive compensation system settings and listed financial SOEs and non-listed financial SOEs in the pay system similarities and differences; The third part mainly introduces the legal system of British and American listed financial executives' compensation and their reference significance to the executive compensation system of China's financial state-owned enterprises, the fourth part analyzes the special problems and solutions to the executive compensation of listed financial state-owned enterprises in China. The fifth part puts forward constructive suggestions on the legal regulation of executive compensation of listed state-owned enterprises in China. The first part, review and summary. The formulation of executive compensation for listed financial state-owned enterprises in China has the characteristics of mandatory and gradual changes. At present, the executive compensation of listed financial state-owned enterprises is still unreasonable, which can not be linked to performance and can not be determined by itself. The hidden welfare of state-owned enterprises is serious and so on, and the mechanism of the above problems lies in the "empty position" of the investors, the expansion of the executive power and the dual status of the "political and commercial" status of the senior executives of the state-owned enterprises. The second part, analysis and comparison. The executive compensation system of listed state-owned enterprises in China can be divided into pre-arranged and ex post-relief measures. In the aspect of advance arrangement, this paper combs the formulation of executive compensation of listed financial state-owned enterprises in China from the aspects of main body of formulation, basis of formulation and disclosure of information. This paper mainly introduces the shareholder derivative litigation and the liability of securities defect disclosure. At the same time, the article also tries to compare the executive compensation arrangement between listed financial state-owned enterprises and non-listed financial state-owned enterprises in the aspects of investor representatives, "zero yuan salary issues" and the basis of salary formulation. The third part, learn from and learn. This paper introduces the executive compensation system in Anglo-American law, and holds that listed financial enterprises in China should learn from the design of long-term equity incentive system in the West, and strengthen the disclosure of information and procedures. The fourth part, thinking and decryption. The article aims at "executive power", "on the job consumption and option exercise", "balancing the political and economic status of senior executives", From the perspective of "brain drain in the reform of public utilities", this paper comprehensively explains the localization of senior executives of listed financial state-owned enterprises and puts forward their own opinions. The fifth part, prospect and suggestion. The author thinks that there is still a lot of room to perfect the legal regulation of executive compensation system of listed financial state-owned enterprises in China. Chinese legislators should comprehensively restructure the legal system of executive compensation in China's listed financial and state-owned enterprises from the perspectives of compensation committees, investor representatives' review, information disclosure, shareholder derivative litigation, and the system of unreasonable executive compensation recovery. Finally, it tries to establish a reasonable executive compensation system of listed financial state-owned enterprises in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D922.291.91

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 楊揚(yáng);;國(guó)企高管薪酬透視[J];人民論壇;2007年11期

2 李建偉;;高管薪酬規(guī)范與法律的有限干預(yù)[J];政法論壇;2008年03期

3 王佐發(fā);;高管薪酬制度的反思與重構(gòu)[J];法學(xué)論壇;2009年02期

4 陳英鳳;;且說(shuō)規(guī)范金融國(guó)企高管薪酬[J];四川統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線;2009年05期

5 魏文彪;;限制高管薪酬的契機(jī)[J];浙江人大;2009年Z1期

6 王建昆;;“暗中盜竊”的高管薪酬[J];南風(fēng)窗;2009年18期

7 趙立新;;金融危機(jī)與企業(yè)高管薪酬制度[J];中國(guó)浦東干部學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2009年04期

8 姜愛(ài)林;;轉(zhuǎn)型期國(guó)有企業(yè)高管薪酬管理若干問(wèn)題初探[J];當(dāng)代社科視野;2009年12期

9 唐棠;;國(guó)企高管薪酬制度的公司治理分析[J];法制與社會(huì);2010年32期

10 鄧微;;國(guó)有控股上市公司高管薪酬決定機(jī)制存在的問(wèn)題及對(duì)策初探[J];法制與社會(huì);2011年17期

相關(guān)會(huì)議論文 前10條

1 謝佼遂;;盈余管理與高管薪酬的關(guān)系:文獻(xiàn)回顧及未來(lái)研究趨勢(shì)[A];經(jīng)濟(jì)生活——2012商會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)研討會(huì)論文集（下）[C];2012年

2 井潤(rùn)田;;行業(yè)層面的管理決斷權(quán)度量及其對(duì)高管薪酬的影響[A];系統(tǒng)工程與和諧管理——第十屆全國(guó)青年系統(tǒng)科學(xué)與管理科學(xué)學(xué)術(shù)會(huì)議論文集[C];2009年

3 趙純祥;;國(guó)企高管薪酬管制的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析[A];中國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)高等工科院校分會(huì)2010年學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集[C];2010年

4 李艷輝;陳震;;市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程與高管薪酬——業(yè)績(jī)敏感性[A];中國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)財(cái)務(wù)成本分會(huì)2011年年會(huì)暨第二十四次理論研討會(huì)論文集[C];2011年

5 王清剛;胡亞君;;管理層權(quán)力與異常高管薪酬行為研究[A];中國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)2011學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集[C];2011年

6 羅宏;張瑋倩;;媒體報(bào)道對(duì)高管薪酬的管制作用研究[A];中國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)2011學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集[C];2011年

7 孫俊奇;貴永m(xù)，

本文編號(hào)：1819028