本文選題：地方政府 + 債券發(fā)行　； 參考：《北京外國語大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國目前處于存量債務(wù)和新增債務(wù)并行且需要進(jìn)行交接的特定歷史階段。國務(wù)院和財(cái)政部在認(rèn)識(shí)到目前地方政府債務(wù)困局后,系統(tǒng)性、有針對性地構(gòu)建起我國當(dāng)前"開前門、堵后門、修圍墻"的地方政府債務(wù)處置機(jī)制。"開前門"是指允許地方政府在國務(wù)院確定的限額內(nèi)發(fā)行債券,但有發(fā)債權(quán)的地方政府僅限于省級,且發(fā)行量由國務(wù)院決定。"堵后門"是指剝離地方政府融資平臺(tái)公司的融資職能。"修圍墻"是指針對現(xiàn)有的政府融資方式進(jìn)行完善,鼓勵(lì)通過PPP模式將社會(huì)資本引入公共部門。地方政府存量債務(wù)中通過銀行貸款舉借的部分,通過3年左右窗口期,由省級財(cái)政部門在限額內(nèi)安排發(fā)行地方債券進(jìn)行置換。對于地方政府債務(wù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)處置,也提出了應(yīng)急預(yù)案和地方政府財(cái)政重整計(jì)劃,對當(dāng)前尚未發(fā)生但將來發(fā)生可能行極大的債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)化解提出了紓困方案。我國地方政府債券發(fā)行起步比較晚,制度細(xì)節(jié)也仍待完善。因此需要借鑒國外的制度設(shè)計(jì)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn),為我國地方政府債券發(fā)行制度的發(fā)展提供參考。日本與我國同為單一制國家,在中央與地方政府事權(quán)劃分和財(cái)政責(zé)任承擔(dān)上,可以為我國央地事權(quán)、財(cái)權(quán)改革提供一定借鑒。北海道夕張市的財(cái)政困局產(chǎn)生原因和財(cái)政重整處置也值得我們參考。美國的財(cái)政聯(lián)邦制度決定了其政府間的財(cái)政事權(quán)劃分和財(cái)政責(zé)任承擔(dān)都相對獨(dú)立,美國繁榮、高度發(fā)達(dá)的金融市場使其地方政府債券呈現(xiàn)出鮮明的市場化特點(diǎn)。由于政治體制和立法精神的差異,美國的聯(lián)邦財(cái)政制度不符合我國國情,但其高度市場化的政府債券發(fā)行制度和政府財(cái)政信息披露制度對我國建立和完善政府債券市場仍有借鑒意義。印度儲(chǔ)備銀行的獨(dú)立性比較低,在政府債務(wù)融資事務(wù)中參與度很高,雖然印度地方政府債券的發(fā)行歷史很長,但是定價(jià)機(jī)制和信用評級制度始終很難建立。我國的地方政府債券發(fā)行剛剛起步,參考印度央行做法,對我國央行在地方政府債券發(fā)行中扮演的角色有一定啟示。通過對日本、美國和印度地方政府債券發(fā)行制度的比較研究,目前我國地方政府債務(wù)管理制度的主要缺陷有以下幾點(diǎn):一是地方政府發(fā)債權(quán)限與支出責(zé)任分配不合理;二是地方債市場化定價(jià)失靈,具體表現(xiàn)為債券發(fā)行量受上級政府控制、債券發(fā)行方與承銷商關(guān)聯(lián)交易和地方債券信用無差別評級;三是窗口期債務(wù)置換操作模式有損央行獨(dú)立性。這三點(diǎn)缺陷之間是有邏輯聯(lián)系的,也有共同的法律制度基礎(chǔ)原因:財(cái)政責(zé)任劃分不清。其中,既有中央政府與地方政府之間的財(cái)政責(zé)任,又有省級政府對其下級政府的財(cái)政責(zé)任,還有貨幣當(dāng)局央行對地方政府的財(cái)政責(zé)任問題。適當(dāng)對引發(fā)債務(wù)危機(jī)的原因進(jìn)行區(qū)分或許更有利于劃定央地財(cái)政責(zé)任的邊界,如財(cái)政治理引發(fā)的債務(wù)危機(jī)和債券違約引發(fā)的債務(wù)危機(jī)。對于前者,中央政府無需承擔(dān)責(zé)任,但如果是經(jīng)過中央政府審批的債券發(fā)行,中央政府應(yīng)當(dāng)承擔(dān)審批失誤造成的后果,但又不是地方政府債務(wù)危機(jī)的全部后果。如果能夠做到權(quán)責(zé)分離,中央政府無需全權(quán)財(cái)政兜底。在厘清事權(quán)財(cái)權(quán)的前提下,還應(yīng)實(shí)施配套改革,構(gòu)建地方政府債券信用評級制度,發(fā)揮市場的約束作用,增強(qiáng)地方政府預(yù)算監(jiān)督管理。
[Abstract]:The specific historical stage of China is currently in the stock of debt and new debt and the need for parallel handover. The State Council and the Ministry of Finance in recognition of the current local government debt predicament, systematic, targeted to build China's current open the front door, blocking the back door, repair the fence "of the local government debt disposal mechanism." the front door is to allow local governments to issue bonds within the limits set by the State Council, but have the right to issuing bonds of local government is limited to the provincial level, and the issue is decided by the State Council. "Blocking the back door" refers to the release of local government financing platform companies financing functions. "Repair the fence" refers to government financing to improve the existing that will encourage social capital into the public sector through the PPP model. Through bank loans raised by some local government debt stock, through 3 years of the window period, by the provincial finance department in limits arrangements issued Party bond replacement. For risk management of local government debt, also put forward the emergency plan and local government fiscal restructuring plan, the future has not yet occurred but the bail-out may resolve for huge debt risk. Local government bonds issued in our country started relatively late, yet the details of the system is also perfect. Therefore it is necessary to learn from abroad the system design and experience, provide a reference for the development of our country's local government bonds issuing system. Japan and China as a unitary state, the central and local government fiscal responsibility and division of powers, for our country the central powers, provides some reference for financial reform. A city in Hokkaido the financial predicament the causes and disposal of financial restructuring is also worthy of our reference. The United States federal fiscal system determines its fiscal responsibility and financial responsibilities are relatively The United States Independence, prosperity, highly developed financial markets so that the local government bond market showed distinctive characteristics. Due to differences in the political system and the spirit of the legislation, the federal financial system does not meet the conditions of our country, but its highly market-oriented government bond issuance system and government financial information disclosure system of our country and establish the perfection of the government bond market is still of great significance. The independence of the Reserve Bank of India is relatively low, the government debt financing transaction in a high degree of participation, although the India local government bond issuance has a very long history, but the pricing mechanism and credit rating system is still difficult to establish in China. The local government bond issuance has just started, reference India's central bank, has implications for China's central bank plays in the local government bond issuance in the role. In Japan, the United States and India local government bond issuance system ratio. More research, the main defects of our local government debt management system has the following several points: one is the local government authority to issue bonds and expenditure responsibility allocation is unreasonable; the two is the failure of the local debt market pricing, the specific performance of the amount of bonds issued by the superior government control, bond issuers and underwriters and local bond credit transactions no difference in rating; three is the window period of debt replacement operation mode loss of central bank independence. There is a logical connection between the three point defects, also have a common law system is the fundamental reason: the division of fiscal responsibility is not clear. Among them, both between the central government and local government fiscal responsibility, and the provincial government the lower levels of government fiscal responsibility, the central bank and monetary authorities to fiscal responsibility of the local government. Due to the causes of the debt crisis of the distinction may be more conducive to delimit central fiscal responsibility boundary Circles, such as financial management caused by the debt crisis and debt default triggered debt crisis. For the former, the central government should bear the responsibility, but if it is approved by the central government bond issue, the central government approval shall bear the consequences of mistakes, but not all the consequences of local government debt crisis. If you can do separate responsibilities the central government, without full financial fallback. In clarifying the powers of, should also be supporting the implementation of the reform, the construction of local government bond credit rating system, play the role of constraints of the market, strengthen the supervision and management of the local government budget.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京外國語大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D922.2

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