本文選題：控制股東　切入點(diǎn)：公司機(jī)會　出處：《上海師范大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：在經(jīng)濟(jì)高度市場化的信息時代,機(jī)會即財(cái)富。公司機(jī)會是公司開展經(jīng)營活動的重要資源,對公司的發(fā)展起關(guān)鍵作用。如果公司機(jī)會被篡奪,將大大損害公司利益,破壞市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定發(fā)展。目前,學(xué)界對公司機(jī)會規(guī)則的研究多以董事、高管為對象,而忽視機(jī)會篡奪的另一主體控制股東。實(shí)際上,控制股東作為公司的實(shí)際擁有者和控制者,通過自己強(qiáng)大的表決權(quán)和控制力掌控公司重大決策,影響公司未來發(fā)展,如果其肆意妄為,篡奪屬于公司的商業(yè)機(jī)會,便會成為公司治理的癥結(jié),嚴(yán)重?fù)p害公司及其他股東利益�，F(xiàn)實(shí)中,控制股東極有可能對公司機(jī)會予以篡奪,且其篡奪手段多樣、方式隱秘,具有特殊性,亟需法律加以規(guī)制。然而,我國現(xiàn)行法律法規(guī)對控制股東篡奪公司機(jī)會的規(guī)定處于空白狀態(tài),致使公司機(jī)會保護(hù)規(guī)則存在疏漏,也無法對控制股東篡奪公司機(jī)會的行為進(jìn)行規(guī)制,這不僅不利于公司及其他股東合法利益的保護(hù),也不利于市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定健康發(fā)展,因此,將控制股東納入篡奪公司機(jī)會主體范圍可謂意義重大、刻不容緩。本文以控制股東為研究對象,運(yùn)用比較研究、實(shí)證研究等方法,重點(diǎn)論證為什么要對控制股東篡奪公司機(jī)會的行為進(jìn)行規(guī)制和怎樣進(jìn)行規(guī)制的相關(guān)問題。首先,闡述相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)。通過分析,得出現(xiàn)有的公司機(jī)會規(guī)制理論并不完全適合控制股東這一主體。針對控制股東,提出:禁止其篡奪公司機(jī)會的理論基礎(chǔ)為誠實(shí)信用原則,并從控制股東篡奪公司機(jī)會違背公平、違背正義和破壞經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序的角度進(jìn)行分析。其次,探討公司機(jī)會認(rèn)定的相關(guān)問題。提出堅(jiān)持寬嚴(yán)適度、統(tǒng)一前提標(biāo)準(zhǔn)下具體問題具體分析的思路及統(tǒng)一前提標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和具體個性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)相結(jié)合的方法,在認(rèn)定時將自然人控制股東和法人控制股東加以區(qū)分。再次,分析合理利用公司機(jī)會的正當(dāng)情形,提出了應(yīng)將正當(dāng)利用情形法典化,同時允許公司根據(jù)時代變化通過公司章程約定或者協(xié)商的方式自行規(guī)定的思路。最后,思考機(jī)會被篡奪后的救濟(jì),提出了以保護(hù)公司利益為主、維護(hù)股東利益為輔;以對股東直接規(guī)制為主、間接規(guī)制為輔的救濟(jì)思路。明晰了歸入權(quán)當(dāng)先、損害賠償權(quán)為補(bǔ)充的救濟(jì)方式,完善了歸入權(quán)的具體程序,明晰了舉證責(zé)任;區(qū)分了直接篡奪和間接篡奪等具體救濟(jì)措施。本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于將控制股東作為篡奪機(jī)會主體進(jìn)行專題探討,以誠實(shí)信用原則的公平、公正、秩序三個要素來分析為什么要對控制股東加以規(guī)制;并將篡奪行為類型化,結(jié)合控股股東篡奪機(jī)會的特殊性提出認(rèn)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的新思路;同時結(jié)合我國現(xiàn)實(shí)中的新情況明晰公司機(jī)會理論的例外情形,最后,在救濟(jì)時,區(qū)分直接篡奪和間接篡奪,為救濟(jì)措施的構(gòu)建提供新的思考。通過寫作,筆者期待能突破公司機(jī)會研究難點(diǎn),更好地保護(hù)公司及其他股東的利益,最終達(dá)到優(yōu)化公司治理、促進(jìn)市場經(jīng)濟(jì)健康發(fā)展的目的。
[Abstract]:In the information age of highly market-oriented economy, opportunity is wealth. Corporate opportunity is an important resource for a company to carry out business activities and plays a key role in the development of the company. If the opportunity is usurped, it will greatly harm the interests of the company. To destroy the stable development of market economy. At present, the academic research on the rules of corporate opportunity mostly focuses on directors and executives, while neglecting another main controlling shareholder who is usurped by opportunity. In fact, As the actual owner and controller of the company, the controlling shareholders control the major decisions of the company through their own powerful voting power and control, and affect the future development of the company. If they act wantonly and usurp the business opportunities belonging to the company, It will become the crux of corporate governance, seriously damage the interests of the company and other shareholders. In reality, controlling shareholders are very likely to usurp the opportunity of the company, and their usurpation means are various, the ways of usurpation are secret, and they have particularity. However, the regulation of controlling shareholders usurping the opportunity of the company is in a blank state, which leads to the omission of the rules of corporate opportunity protection. Nor can we regulate the usurpation of corporate opportunities by controlling shareholders, which is not conducive to the protection of the legitimate interests of the company and other shareholders, nor to the stable and healthy development of the market economy. It is of great significance to bring controlling shareholders into the scope of usurping the subject of corporate opportunity. This paper takes controlling shareholders as the research object, using comparative research, empirical research and other methods. Focus on why to regulate the usurpation of corporate opportunities by controlling shareholders and how to regulate the relevant issues. First, explain the relevant theoretical basis. It is concluded that the existing theory of corporate opportunity regulation is not completely suitable for the controlling shareholder. In view of the controlling shareholder, the theoretical basis of prohibiting the usurpation of corporate opportunity is the principle of good faith, and the usurpation of corporate opportunity from the controlling shareholder violates the fairness. From the perspective of violating justice and disrupting economic order, this paper analyzes. Secondly, it discusses the relevant issues of the company's opportunity recognition. It proposes to adhere to leniency, strictness and moderation. The idea of concrete analysis under the unified premise standard and the method of combining the unified premise standard with the specific personality standard distinguish the natural person controlling shareholder from the legal person controlling shareholder. This paper analyzes the proper situation of making use of the company's opportunity reasonably, and puts forward the idea that the proper utilization situation should be codified, while allowing the company to regulate itself according to the changes of the times by the way of agreement or negotiation of the company's articles of association. Finally, Considering the relief after the usurpation of the opportunity, this paper puts forward the relief thought of protecting the interests of the company and safeguarding the interests of the shareholders, and taking the direct regulation of the shareholders as the main, and the indirect regulation as the supplementary. The right to compensation for damages is a supplementary relief method, improves the specific procedure of subsuming right, and clarifies the burden of proof; This paper distinguishes between direct usurpation and indirect usurpation and other specific relief measures. The innovation of this paper lies in the discussion of controlling shareholders as the subject of usurpation, so that the principle of good faith is fair and just. Order three elements to analyze why to regulate the controlling shareholders, and to type usurpation behavior, combined with the particularity of the usurpation opportunities of controlling shareholders to put forward a new way to identify the criteria; At the same time, combined with the new situation in our country, the exception of corporate opportunity theory is clarified. Finally, in the process of relief, we distinguish between direct usurpation and indirect usurpation, so as to provide new thinking for the construction of relief measures. The author expects to break through the difficulties in the research of company opportunities, better protect the interests of the company and other shareholders, and finally achieve the goal of optimizing corporate governance and promoting the healthy development of the market economy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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