本文選題：不完全合同　切入點(diǎn)：剩余控制權(quán)　出處：《法學(xué)》2017年04期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：科斯認(rèn)為企業(yè)存在的原因是市場交易成本不為零,企業(yè)的合同紐帶說認(rèn)為企業(yè)內(nèi)部其實(shí)是各種合同的集束和紐帶。不完全合同理論進(jìn)一步認(rèn)為,因?yàn)槿说挠邢蘩硇院托畔⒉粚ΨQ等因素,市場交易的合同和企業(yè)內(nèi)部的合同集束都是不完備的,在初始合同基礎(chǔ)上的事后重新談判不可避免。在不完全合同的理論視角下,公司法(公司治理規(guī)則)有積極的功能,表現(xiàn)在就初始合同中沒有約定的內(nèi)容,公司治理規(guī)則應(yīng)富有效率地加以空白填補(bǔ)。不完全合同理論視角下的公司治理規(guī)則的基本框架包括:第一,通過事前的企業(yè)剩余控制權(quán)的分配,正確地激勵所有者和管理層,激勵他們對企業(yè)做出有價(jià)值的投資,防止尋求事后談判籌碼和權(quán)力的行為;第二,依據(jù)公司法提供一套企業(yè)所有者之間的集體決策機(jī)制、管理層之間的集體決策機(jī)制以及企業(yè)所有者與管理層之間的事后談判溝通機(jī)制,使得事后談判的成本最小化;第三,借助公司法中的強(qiáng)制規(guī)則和默認(rèn)規(guī)則,以不同的方式填補(bǔ)合同的不完全。
[Abstract]:Coase believes that the reason for the existence of enterprises is that the market transaction costs are not zero, and the firm's contract ties theory holds that the internal enterprises are actually the clusters and bonds of various contracts. Because of human's limited rationality and information asymmetry, the contract of market transaction and the contract cluster inside the enterprise are not complete, so it is inevitable to renegotiate on the basis of the initial contract. The company law (the rules of corporate governance) has a positive function, which is manifested in the content not stipulated in the initial contract, The basic framework of corporate governance rules from the perspective of incomplete contract theory includes: first, through the prior allocation of residual control right of the enterprise, the owner and management should be encouraged correctly. To encourage them to make valuable investments in the enterprise and to prevent the search for bargaining chips and powers after the event; second, to provide a collective decision-making mechanism among business owners under the Company Law. The collective decision-making mechanism between management and the communication mechanism of after-negotiation between owner and management minimize the cost of post-negotiation. Thirdly, with the help of mandatory rules and default rules in company law, Fill the incomplete contract in different ways.
【作者單位】： 清華大學(xué)法學(xué)院;
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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