“動(dòng)物權(quán)利”之理論述評(píng)
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-02-03 13:44
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 動(dòng)物權(quán)利 人類中心主義 非人類中心主義 出處:《南京師范大學(xué)》2008年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】: 人和動(dòng)物的關(guān)系是一個(gè)古老的話題,歷史上許多理論家都對(duì)此進(jìn)行過(guò)論述。盡管論證的角度不同,人們卻得出一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的結(jié)論:與人類相比,動(dòng)物是低等生物,人類對(duì)動(dòng)物不負(fù)有直接的道德義務(wù)。自近現(xiàn)代始,邊沁、辛格等思想家才開(kāi)始從功利主義的角度主張人類對(duì)動(dòng)物的直接義務(wù),但是動(dòng)物與人類的道德地位依然是不平等的。然而,勃興于20世紀(jì)中后期的動(dòng)物權(quán)利理論以一種顛覆性的姿態(tài)出現(xiàn),主張動(dòng)物擁有與人類平等的道德權(quán)利。 實(shí)際上,動(dòng)物權(quán)利理論是在試圖塑造一種非人類中心主義的倫理理念。這是一種近年來(lái)興起的關(guān)于人與動(dòng)物以及人與自然關(guān)系的新型倫理理念。非人類中心主義認(rèn)為,現(xiàn)代社會(huì)人類對(duì)自然的過(guò)度掠奪以及對(duì)動(dòng)物的過(guò)度利用,都來(lái)源于傳統(tǒng)的人類中心主義(人類自認(rèn)為是自然的主人,是唯一具有天賦價(jià)值的道德主體)。若想解決這些問(wèn)題,必須要將人類道德主體的身份拓展至動(dòng)物、植物、一切有生命的物種,甚至是一切無(wú)生命的自然物。動(dòng)物權(quán)利理論用這樣一種方式打開(kāi)了一個(gè)看待人與動(dòng)物乃至人與自然關(guān)系的全新視界。這個(gè)全新的視界為我們反觀人類中心主義自身,反思人類的地位,警醒人類的狹隘與自私打開(kāi)了一扇窗。 然而,環(huán)境倫理學(xué)所涉層面主要為道德,并不能根據(jù)環(huán)境倫理中關(guān)于動(dòng)物權(quán)利主體的主張,就認(rèn)同在法律中確定動(dòng)物的法律主體地位。更為重要的是,動(dòng)物不具備自我主體意志,更不具備社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治交往活動(dòng)這一權(quán)利現(xiàn)象發(fā)生的本體。盡管人也是一種動(dòng)物,但其具備了意志性和社會(huì)性,因而理所應(yīng)當(dāng)?shù)爻蔀榱藱?quán)利的主體。 另外,無(wú)論是主張動(dòng)物權(quán)利,還是擯棄動(dòng)物權(quán)利,其共同的目的都是為了保護(hù)動(dòng)物,進(jìn)而維護(hù)人類的根本利益。對(duì)動(dòng)物的保護(hù)表達(dá)了人類公共道德的精神訴求,也反映了人與自然和諧共存的客觀需要。
[Abstract]:The relationship between human beings and animals is an ancient topic, which has been discussed by many theorists in history. Although the argument is from different angles, people have come to a unified conclusion: compared with human beings, animals are inferior creatures. Human beings have no direct moral obligation to animals. Since modern times, Bentham, Singh and other thinkers began to advocate the direct obligations of human beings to animals from the perspective of utilitarianism. But the moral status of animals and human beings is still not equal. However, the theory of animal rights, which flourished in the middle and late period of 20th century, appeared in a subversive manner, claiming that animals have equal moral rights with human beings. Actually... The theory of animal rights is trying to shape an ethical concept of non-anthropocentrism, which is a new ethical concept about the relationship between human beings and animals and between man and nature. The over-plundering of nature and the over-utilization of animals in modern society all come from the traditional anthropocentrism (man thinks himself to be the owner of nature). It is the only moral subject with natural value. To solve these problems, it is necessary to expand the identity of human moral subject to animals, plants, all living species. Even all inanimate natural things. The theory of animal rights opens up a new vision of the relationship between man and animals and even between man and nature in such a way. This new horizon provides us with a new view of anthropocentrism. Body. Reflecting on the status of human beings, warning of human narrowness and selfishness opened a window. However, the aspect of environmental ethics is mainly moral, which can not identify the legal subject status of animals in the law according to the claim of animal rights subject in environmental ethics. More importantly, it is more important to determine the legal subject status of animals in the law. Animals do not have the will of their own subject, not to mention the existence of the right phenomenon of social, economic and political intercourse. Although man is also an animal, it has the will and sociality. So it became the subject of right. In addition, the common purpose of animal rights is to protect animals, whether they advocate animal rights or reject animal rights. The protection of animals not only expresses the spiritual appeal of human public morality, but also reflects the objective need of harmonious coexistence between man and nature.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:南京師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2008
【分類號(hào)】:D922.6
【引證文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條
1 李少英;論動(dòng)物權(quán)利及其實(shí)現(xiàn)[D];山東大學(xué);2011年
2 孔曙光;“動(dòng)物權(quán)利論”批判[D];中國(guó)海洋大學(xué);2012年
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